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Preface
Firms and the state depend on each other in manifold ways. The corporate sector is an
important contributor to economic growth and development. Societies benefit from techno-
logical progress and innovations rooted in entrepreneurial activity. Revenue from corporate
income taxation is an important source of government funding in most countries around
the world. Tax revenue is needed to finance health care systems, to provide education and
to undertake investments in the public infrastructure, from which in turn firms benefit.
Furthermore, firms rely on the legal institutions that the state provides. Stable business
growth would not be possible without reliable property rights and sound laws that protect
business interests. Corruption as well as underdeveloped financial systems have been shown
to significantly hamper firm growth. Moreover, firms count on the state to intervene and
level the playing field in the case of imperfect competition and market failures.
Yet, the differing objective functions of profit-maximizing firms and welfare-maximizing
governments tend to cause strains in the relationship. According to PwC’s 21st Annual
Global CEO Survey, top executives see over-regulation as the top threat to business growth.
Also the threat of an increasing tax burden is among the 10 most frequent answers (PwC,
2018). This explains, why firms put considerable effort into avoiding taxes via complex cor-
porate structures. They put large amounts of resources into identifying and exploiting legal
loopholes and mismatches in corporate tax systems across countries. Recent research from
the Tax Justice Network suggests that global annual tax losses from legal tax avoidance
and illegal tax evasion add up to 500 billion US dollars (Tax Justice Network, 2017). States
react to this by coordinated initiatives at the international level, such as the OECD’s plan
to tackle base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2013).
Understanding the complex interplay between firms and the state lies at the core of
this thesis. The main focus is on the empirical analysis of the development of rates and
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revenues from corporate taxation over the last decades. In addition, this thesis shows that
regulatory interventions can impact firms, even if they are not directed at the corporate
sector. Results from the four papers comprising this thesis point out that policies should be
designed carefully in order to avoid distortions that might impair the benefits of a thriving
corporate sector. In the following, a brief overview on the content of the four chapters of
this thesis will be given.
Chapter 1 presents joint work with Clemens Fuest and Felix Hugger and explains the
composition of corporate tax revenues. A simple framework is introduced that splits changes
in corporate tax revenue into changes in statutory tax rates, firm profits and changes in
the definition of the tax base. The analysis is based on a large firm-level panel dataset
covering data from 33 OECD countries over the period 1995 to 2016. We show that while
the weighted measure of statutory corporate income tax rates fell by 16.5 percentage points
over the period covered, total corporate tax revenue across all countries changed by just
0.07 percent. We find that the phenomenon of stable revenues despite falling tax rates can
be explained in the following way: 36 per cent of the increase in the tax base is due to
higher net financial income of firms, depreciation has declined by 37 per cent and 27 per
cent is due to higher EBITDA. We find substantial heterogeneity in the developments when
looking at individual countries.
Chapter 2 studies the non-linear relationship between statutory corporate tax rates
and tax revenues. This paper, which is joint work with Clemens Fuest and Felix Hugger,
uses country and firm-level data for up to 190 countries and covers the period 1965 to 2018.
We find evidence for a robust Laffer curve type relationship between rates and revenues
from corporate taxation. The revenue-maximizing tax rate is at 32.1 percent and therefore
higher than statutory corporate income tax rates in most countries today. There is evi-
dence for substantial heterogeneity across countries with low-income countries showing a
significantly lower revenue-maximizing tax rate than high-income countries. Results from
the macro data set are complemented by a firm-level analysis of corporate tax payments.
The Laffer curve for corporate taxation is confirmed with the micro dataset, also when
controlling for the key determinants of the tax base within the corporate sector that have
been discussed in Chapter one of this thesis.
Chapter 3 explores firm-level determinants of effective tax rates and analyzes trends
in the dispersion of effective corporate income tax rates across firms and over time, with a
xix
special focus on digital firms. The analysis is based on a large firm-level data set, which
covers consolidated financial statement data for over 100,000 firms from 138 countries. Re-
sults from pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions show that larger and more profitable
firms face higher effective tax rates. The relation between the effective tax rate and R&D
intensity, the debt ratio and cash holdings is found to be negative. The positive effect of
firm size on the effective tax rate is even larger for digital firms, while there is no difference
with regard to the influence of R&D intensity, the debt ratio and cash holdings. Contrary
to non-digital firms, a higher share of intangible assets in total fixed assets is connected to
a lower effective tax rate for digital firms. Both digital and non-digital groups show a wide
dispersion of effective tax rates between the 10th and 90th percentile that stays rather con-
stant over time, reflecting that firms are highly heterogeneous in tax relevant characteristics.
Chapter 4 shows that regulatory changes, even if not explicitly directed at firms, can
have a measurable impact on the corporate sector. This chapter is based on joint work with
Christa Hainz and studies the effects of the removal of a longstanding government guarantee
for public banks in Germany. As the policy change only affected public banks, we employ
a difference-in-differences analysis in order to identify effects on firms being customers of
public banks as opposed to firms being solely affiliated with non-public banks. The paper
uses survey data for the period 1998 to 2007 obtained from the ifo Investment Survey as
well as balance-sheet information from BvD Amadeus. Our results show that public bank
firms perceived a deterioration in their financing situation following the removal of the
public guarantee in 2005. We do not find evidence for effects in terms of total investment
and employment at the firm level.
The Appendices to the respective papers can be found at the end of each chapter. A
consolidated bibliography is presented at the end of this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Explaining corporate tax revenues
1.1 Introduction
Corporate income taxation continues to be an important source of revenue for governments.
Data from the OECD shows, that corporate income tax (CIT) revenues contributed be-
tween 4.4 percent (Slovenia) and 21 percent (Chile) to total tax revenue in OECD countries
in the year 2015 (OECD, 2017).1 Looking at trends over time, corporate tax revenues are
surprisingly stable despite pronounced cuts in statutory tax rates over the last decades.
These developments of CIT rates and revenues may seem contradictory at first glance.
Why have CIT revenues not declined given the pronounced decrease in statutory corporate
income tax rates?
Several factors may have contributed to the observed stability of corporate tax revenues:
firstly, many recent corporate tax reforms were characterized by a combination of rate cuts
and base-broadening measures. Tax-cut cum base-broadening measures gained popularity
for a number of reasons: broadening the tax base may decrease distortions caused by the
corporate income tax and may result in better compliance due to reduced incentives for
tax avoidance and evasion. Furthermore, if base broadening reduces the complexity of the
tax system, administration and enforcement costs fall (OECD, 2010a). Secondly, the share
This chapter is joint work with Clemens Fuest and Felix Hugger.
1In the OECD, the average share of corporate taxes in total tax revenue was 8.13 percent in 1995
and 8.86 percent in 2015. Numbers are obtained from the OECD Revenue Statistics, available at https:
//stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV (last access August 16, 2018)
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of income declared as corporate income increased in many countries over the last decades.
The share of the corporate sector in total value added increased from 60.4 percent in 1995
to 65.7 percent in 2005. One factor explaining the growing corporate sector share is the
changing industry composition within countries in the OECD. Sectors where incorporated
firms dominate have grown faster than other sectors. Thirdly, there is an increase in corpo-
rate profitability. This is illustrated by Figure 1.1, which shows that the share of corporate
profits before taxes in value added of incorporated firms has increased significantly, from
14 per cent in 1995 to 22 per cent in 2016.2
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the factors that have led to the growth of
the corporate tax base, which has prevented corporate tax revenues from falling despite
declining tax rates. Our analysis is based on a comprehensive firm-level dataset cover-
ing 33 OECD countries over the period 1995 to 2016. Using firm level data allows us to
disentangle the role of different components of corporate profits, in particular the role of
depreciation, interest costs and financial income of firms, and changes in profitability driven
by the development of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Our
key findings are as follows: 37 percent of the increase in the tax base is caused by lower
depreciation, 27 percent is due to higher profitability, and 36 percent of the increase is
due to higher net financial income of firms. Within financial income, interest expenditure
has declined substantially. At the same time, however, financial income has declined, too,
reducing the net effect to just over one third of the change in profits. It is important to
note that these results are derived from an unbalanced panel. Although the tax revenue
generated by the unbalanced panel is close to aggregate tax revenue, we find substantial
heterogeneity in the developments when looking at individual countries.
2Note that this is the change in profitability for an unbalanced sample of firms, as will be explained in
greater detail below. The growing share of profits in value added is also documented in other studies (e.g.
Piotrowska and Vanborren, 2008).
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Figure 1.1: CIT rates and revenue from the corporate sector
In the literature, various papers analyze the development of corporate tax revenues and
the relationship between corporate tax rates and bases. Clausing (2007) looks at variation
of CIT revenues among OECD countries over the period 1979 to 2002 and focuses on the
size and profitability of the corporate sector. She finds that the tax-to-GDP ratio is larger
for countries with more profitable firms and larger corporate sectors measured as the sec-
tor’s share in total GDP. Here, the positive effect of the corporate profit rate is stronger
than the effect of the rising corporate sector share. Sœrensen (2006) looks at the develop-
ment of corporate income tax revenues in OECD countries over the period 1982 to 2004
and analyzes the relative influence of increasing incorporation, shifting between personal
and corporate income, and base broadening. In line with de Mooij and Nicodeme (2007),
he concludes that stable revenues are largely driven by increasing incorporation and income
shifting. Piotrowska and Vanborren (2008) focus on the European Union and find corporate
tax revenues to be stable at around 3% of GDP on average over the period 1995 to 2004.
However, they also find heterogeneity across countries with some countries experiencing
decreases in CIT revenue while finding rising revenues for the majority of countries. They
see the effect of incorporation to be more pronounced than changes in tax burdens and
profitability. There are several papers that try to shed light on developments with regard
to CIT base definitions. Blouin et al. (2014) focus on caps in interest deductibility. They
compile a detailed dataset on characteristics of thin capitalization regimes and compare
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those for 54 countries over the years 1982 to 2004. They find the number of countries with
a thin capitalization regime to be increasing over time. In 2004, 50 percent of the coun-
tries in their sample have an explicit set of thin capitalization rules. Kawano and Slemrod
(2016) construct a dataset covering a wide range of aspects of tax base definitions such as
R&D tax credits, loss carry-forward/carry-back rules, controlled foreign company (CFC)
legislation, and depreciation allowances. They cover OECD countries between 1980 and
2004 and find that the majority of tax reforms combined changes in statutory rates with
changes in the definition of the tax base. They find heterogeneity in the direction of the
base change: decreases in the CIT rate were combined with base broadening measures in
37 percent of the cases and with base narrowing measures in 26 percent of the cases. While
the papers presented differ in the time period and regions analyzed, they all build their
analysis on aggregate data at the country level. There is a small number of papers using
sectoral or firm level data to investigate revenue trends. Devereux et al. (2004) analyze the
development of corporate tax revenue on the UK and emphasize the role of financial sector
profits. Auerbach (2008) focuses on the US and argues that the increase in the average
CIT rates observed in the early 2000s is largely due to loss offset limitations. In a recent
contribution, Nicodeme et al. (2018) use sector level data from the EU for the period 1995
to 2015, and find that the stability of CIT revenues is due to base broadening measures.
Our paper presents an alternative approach by providing an analysis based on micro data
obtained from the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Orbis database. Using firm-level balance-sheet
data allows for a more thorough analysis of the components of the tax base. Besides dis-
entangling influencing factors of tax payments at the firm level, we quantify their relative
importance in explaining stable revenues at the aggregate level. However, there are some
drawbacks to our approach. Some factors which may drive corporate tax revenues cannot
be observed. One example is corporate sector size, as we are bound to observe changes only
within the corporate sector. In addition, some countries have very limited data coverage in
BvD Orbis, which confines the representativeness of our data. We will address these data
concerns in more detail in the discussion section.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the conceptual
framework of our analysis. Section 1.3 describes the data set, while Section 1.4 presents
the results. We first look at developments across all countries in our sample and then pay
attention to country heterogeneity by looking at selected countries individually. Section
1.5 puts our obtained results into perspective and discusses further relevant factors that
explain developments with regard to CIT revenues. Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Conceptual framework
In the literature on the relationship between tax rates and revenues, the standard approach
(introduced by Sœrensen (2006)) decomposes changes in CIT revenues relative to GDP
(R/GDP ) into changes in the size or structure of the business sector (B/GDP and C/B)
and changes with regard to the effective tax burden of the corporate sector (R/C):
R
GDP
=
R
C
· C
B
· B
GDP
(1.1)
with R being corporate tax revenue, C representing total corporate income, and B total
business income.3
Our conceptual framework, in contrast, may be regared as a "bottom-up approach": we
use firm-level data, which we aggregate by year over all countries and firms in our sample.
This allows us to disentangle the different components of the corporate income tax base
and to quantify their respective contributions to aggregate CIT revenue.
With regard to CIT revenues, we differentiate between hypothetical tax revenue (Hyp.
Revenue) and actual tax revenue (TAXA). Information on actual tax payments is directly
obtained from financial statements of firms.4 Aggregate actual tax revenue in year t is equal
to the sum of individual tax payments (TAXA) over all firms in the dataset. Hypothetical
tax revenue at the firm level is equal to the statutory tax rate of the country the firm is
located in multiplied with the tax base. The tax base of a firm is equal to its pre-tax income
PLBT . With τ indicating the statutory tax rate, aggregate hypothetical tax revenue in
year t is then equal to:
∑
j,i
Hyp.Revenuej,i,t =
∑
j,i
(τj,i,t · PLBTj,i,t) (1.2)
Equation 1.2 indicates that aggregate hypothetical revenue in year t is equal to the sum
of revenues over all firms j and countries i. This paper focuses on changes in the composi-
tion of the tax base. Using financial statement data, the tax base can be decomposed into
3Soerensen refers to B as "total profit earned in the economy as a whole" (Sœrensen, 2006, p.8). B
therefore also includes profits that are not accrued to the corporate sector.
4Variables that are directly observed in the data are labeled with capital letters, such as TAXA, PLBT ,
etc. Other variables such as Hyp. Revenue are computed.
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three parts: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA),
financial profit/loss (FIPL) and financial depreciation (DEPR). Making use of this de-
composition, we can rewrite equation 1.2 in the following way:
∑
j,i
Hyp.Revenuej,i,t =
∑
j,i
[τj,i,t · (EBITDAj,i,t + FIPLj,i,t −DEPRj,i,t)] (1.3)
EBITDA indicates how much profit the firm generates with its present assets and
ordinary business activities. This measure allows for a comparison of profitability across
firms despite any differences in their leverage, location, or collection of assets, as it does
not take into account interest payments, taxation, and depreciation. FIPL is the financial
net result, defined as the difference between financial revenue and financial expenses. It
includes interest payments of firms as part of financial expenses. In some specifications,
we will split FIPL into interest payments (INTE) and the rest of the financial net result
(Other_FIPL) in order to analyze developments with regard to interest payments of firms.
Other_FIPL can be interpreted as the net financial result excluding interest payments.
DEPR represents depreciation and amortization. Financial depreciation stated in financial
statements is likely to differ from depreciation rules applied for tax purposes. Therefore,
we do not claim that observed developments reflect changes in tax depreciation rules in the
context of base-broadening reforms.5
The analysis in most parts of the paper is based on data from an unbalanced sample of
firms. This sample of firms changes over time in terms of the total number of observations
available as well as in terms of industry, size, and country composition. To account for
these issues, we present results obtained from the analysis of the unbalanced sample as
shares in added value. We chose added value for two main reasons: Firstly, it is widely
available across firms. Secondly, aggregate value added is a close proxy for GDP as Figure
A1 in the Appendix shows and therefore offers an intuitive interpretation of the results.
The statutory CIT rates used are computed as a added-value weighted mean to reflect that
larger firms contribute a larger share of tax revenue.6. Overall, computed hypothetical
5A detailed summary of variable definitions is contained in Table A1 in the Appendix.
6To be more specific, we compute the weighted CIT rate for year t in the following way:
[∑
j,i
τj,i,tV Aj,i,t∑
j,i
V Aj,i,t
]
with V A indicating value added of firm j in country i.
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tax revenue and actual tax revenue obtained from our data (TAXA) are very similar in
magnitude and show the same trend over time.
To deal with potential concerns regarding the unbalancedness of our panel, we also
report results for a shorter, balanced panel of firms for the years 2004 to 2016. For the
balanced panel, we report the developments of tax base components and revenues as shares
in added value as well as in absolute terms. However, the balanced panel is not without
imperfections as well. For example, it does not reflect structural changes in the firm and
industry composition that might be relevant for the development of revenues.
The stability of corporate tax revenues despite pronounced cuts in statutory CIT rates
can only be explained with an compensating increase in the tax base. Making use of the
presented decomposition of tax base components at the firm level, we expect to see the
following developments in our sample over time:
1. Due to a different treatment of depreciation for accounting and tax purposes, declining
depreciation allowances as a part of base-broadening reforms will not be reflected in
our data. Therefore, we expect DEPR to stay rather stable over time. A slight
negative trend might be visible due to weak downward trends in investment in physical
assets in many advanced economies.7
2. Interest rates significantly declined in all OECD countries over the past 10 years. This
will affect reported financial income of firms (FIPL). However, the sign of the effect
remains unclear and depends on the leverage structure of firms. Declining interest
rates lead to lower interest expenses but also to reduced financial income. Moreover,
companies may have changed their financing structure. If companies are net debtors
on average, one would expect FIPL to fall over time.
3. We expect to see a positive trend in EBITDA at the aggregate level as previous
research suggests a rise in the profitability of firms in OECD countries (OECD, 2006).
1.3 Data
The firm-level data used in the analysis is obtained from BvD Orbis. The data covers
the period 1995 to 2016 and contains balance-sheet information on firms from 33 OECD
7See for example Crass, Licht and Peters (2014), who provide evidence for German firms by finding an
increasing focus on investments in intangible assets.
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countries. We complement our firm-level data with relevant macro data for the countries in
our sample. Deflators for the analysis of absolute values in our balanced panels are taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Information on the de-
velopment of gross value added, GDP, and the size of the corporate sector comes from the
OECD Annual National Account Statistics. Data on statutory tax rates is obtained from
several issues of KPMG’s Corporate Tax Surveys and EY’s Annual Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guides. All CIT rates are the top statutory rates taking into account all levels of
government.8 Details on data sources and definitions are provided in the Appendix. Table
A2 in the Appendix summarizes the steps to the final samples. After dropping data from
consolidated group-level accounts and excluding implausible values and outliers, our final
sample includes 12,100,556 observations from 2,608,778 firms.9 This gives an average of 4.6
observations per firm.
In our analysis using the unbalanced full panel, we express all relevant variables as
shares in value added. Value added at the firm level reflects the value of goods or services
produced after accounting for intermediate inputs. At the aggregate macro level, gross
value added serves as a basis for computing the gross domestic product by adding the pub-
lic sector share (taxes minus subsidies). Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that the ratio of
gross value added to GDP is constant over time at around 0.9.
Since the number of firms being included in the BvD Orbis database strongly increases
over the years, we also construct a balanced panel data set to account for potential biases
stemming from a changing composition of firms in the data over time. The balanced panel
also allows for an analysis of absolute values of revenues, taxation, and firm profits after ac-
counting for inflation. Our balanced sample covers 13 years from 2004 to 2016 and includes
67,241 firms from 19 countries. Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix give an overview on the
number of firms and observations by country in the respective samples. As a robustness
check, we construct a dataset with imputed values. Here, we also include firms for which
there is a one-year reporting gap in the covered period from 2004 to 2016. This imputed
panel contains observations from 108,631 firms.
8CIT rates of a country with different regional or local taxes reflect averages. Deductibilities of regional
or local taxes from federal taxes are taken into account.
9To be more specific, we excluded the observations in the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of
our key variables.
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An important question for our analysis is how well the companies in our sample cover
the economy as a whole. Table 1.1 shows the coverage of the unbalanced sample in terms
of added value. Coverage varies considerably between countries. For the full sample pe-
riod, the sample used covers more than a third of added value in Spain (37.89 percent),
Italy (34.68 percent), and the Czech Republic (33.72 percent), but less than one percent of
added value for Turkey (0.22), Ireland (0.39), Greece (0.52), and the United States (0.97).
Since coverage of US firms is low, Table 1.1 reports values with and without the US share.
The average coverage of all countries without the US is 23.1 percent of total added value
between 1995 and 2016. In general, coverage increases strongly over time, from about 6
percent of added value for the period 1995 to 1999 to 26.8 percent (2005-2010) and 36.1
percent for the years between 2010 and 2016. If the added value of the US and the US firms
in the sample is taken into account, the coverage is 13.4 percent of added value on average.
To put this into perspective, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) provide an in-depth analysis on
how well Orbis covers gross output of the corporate sector in individual countries. In line
with the numbers presented in Table 1.1, they also find significant heterogeneity in coverage
across countries and improvements in coverage over time.10
Table 1.1: Coverage in terms of total added value
Period Coverage (without US) Coverage (including US)
1995 – 1999 6.01 4.97
2000 – 2004 10.97 5.82
2005 – 2009 26.83 15.51
2010 – 2016 36.08 20.51
1995 – 2016 23.10 13.36
Notes: Coverage in terms of added value (in percent) for the unbalanced panel, calculated as sum of
added value in the sample divided by the sum of added value of all countries in the dataset in a given year.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics on our main variables. Section A of Table 1.2
10The numbers obtained by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) regarding data coverage are higher than what
we report. This is likely due to three facts: firstly, we exclude a significant number of firms from our
sample, due to implausible values in some variables. Secondly Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) look at coverage
in terms of gross output (turnover) instead of added value. Thirdly, they only include European countries,
which are covered relatively well. Our reported average coverage would increase if we did not include any
non-European OECD countries in the sample.
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reports summary statistics in terms of absolute values at the firm-level. The average firm
in our sample has slightly over 60 employees and total assets in the range of about 16
million Euros. The mean value of FIPL is negative, which means that on average, firms’
financial expenses are larger than their financial revenues. INTE reflects interest expenses,
which are part of the firms’ financial expenses. With Other_FIPL being computed from
FIPL = Other_FIPL − INTE, it reflects the net financial result of firms aside from
interest payments. It is positive but smaller in magnitude than INTE, such that we get
the negative net result indicated by FIPL. DEPR is positively defined and shows a mean
value of 460,000 Euros. EBITDA of our mean firm is slightly above 1.2 million Euros.
Taking into account the median values indicated in the table, we see that the sample com-
prises many very small firms. However, by weighing all relevant variables in terms of added
value at the firm level, it is accounted for that these firms do not significantly contribute to
overall tax revenue. Our full sample also contains loss-making firms and firms with nega-
tive tax payments in order to provide a full picture on the distribution of profits within the
corporate sector. In Section 4.3 we will also report results for a sample that excludes firms
with negative profits and show that results are not distorted by including them in our main
specification. TAXA reflects tax payments of the firm as indicated in the financial state-
ments of the firm. We are aware that book-tax differences exist and therefore information
from accounting data presents an imperfect measure of actual tax payments.11 Also our
measure of the tax base, PLBT has flaws in this regard. As previously indicated, DEPR
just captures financial depreciation that follows different rules than depreciation schemes
allowed for tax purposes. While financial statements are compiled following international
financial reporting standards (IFRS) or generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
actual tax payments are determined by the respective national tax laws. However, cor-
porate tax return data is confidential and thus not available for analysis. Given that we
are mainly interested in depicting developments over time at the aggregate level, we are
confident that our data picks up a significant share of relevant trends.
11Graham et al. (2012) as well as Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide excellent overviews on the
accounting literature on book-tax differences. They stress that taxation indicated in financial statements
does not reflect temporary differences, such as accelerated depreciation schemes that would reduce current
tax expenses but increase deferred tax expenses by the same amount and therefore provides an imperfect
proxy for actual tax payments.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on balance-sheet variables
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Obs.
A: absolute values (firm-level)
TOAS 15,936.12 617,571.30 1,611.00 0.72 659,000,000 9,738,931
EMPL 62.27 1,273.00 10 0 1,014,335 9,433,812
AV 3,555.35 134,349.93 438.02 1.36 365,000,000 12,100,556
PLBT 725.11 23,020.78 42.00 -3,414,998.30 14,215,468.25 12,100,556
EBITDA 1,266.95 36,103.92 96.63 -1,384,824.00 17,688,823.00 12,100,556
FIPL -80.84 6,847.84 -5.00 -5,072,000.00 3,960,655.25 12,100,556
INTE 229.76 13,921.18 9.27 -74,855.00 32,768,944.00 12,100,556
Other_FIPL 148.92 12,970.45 0.76 -2,789,905.50 32,768,694.00 12,100,556
DEPR 460.95 13,703.02 26.00 0.00 9,002,999.92 12,100,556
TAXA 201.32 6,612.54 10.31 -495,366.82 3,080,000.00 12,100,556
B: Shares in added value (yearly aggregates)
TOAS 3.80 0.66 4.15 2.45 4.47 9,738,931
PLBT 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.24 12,100,556
EBITDA 0.36 0.01 0.36 0.29 0.37 12,100,556
FIPL -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 12,100,556
INTE 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.11 12,100,556
Other_FIPL 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 12,100,556
DEPR 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.16 12,100,556
TAXA 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.07 12,100,556
Notes: Part A presents summary statistics for the unbalanced panel at the firm level. EMPL indicates
the number of employees in a firm (in persons), all other values in the upper part of the table (A) are in
thousand Euros. Variables in the lower part (B) are aggregate shares in added value. In Part B,
aggregation was done over all firms in a given year.
12 1. EXPLAINING CORPORATE TAX REVENUES
Figure 1.2: Components of the corporate tax base
Notes: Values are computed using the unbalanced sample and represent shares in added value.
Figure 1.3: FIPL: Net financial result of firms
Notes: Values are computed using the unbalanced sample and represent shares in added value
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Part B of Table 1.2 shows the main variables as shares of value added. They are com-
puted by summing the respective variable over all firms in a year and dividing it by the
total sum of added value in that year. The mean value for PLBT of 0.21 is explained by
the sum of EBITDA (0.36) and FIPL (-0.02), minus the value of DEPR, which is 0.13.
Figure 1.2 shows a graphical representation of the components of pre-tax profits (PLBT )
between 1995 and 2016. The solid line represents PLBT as a share of added value. The
dashed lines show the developments in EBITDA, DEPR, and FIPL. Figure 1.3 disentan-
gles the financial result of firms (FIPL) further into interest expenses and the net financial
result without interest paid. We can see a negative trend in interest payments. This is
likely due to two reasons: firstly, many countries included caps on interest deductibility as
part of base broadening reforms as previous research showed (see for example Blouin et al.,
2014), which might make debt financing less attractive. Falling interest payments could
therefore reflect changes in the financing structure of firms. Figure A8 in the Appendix
shows the development of the share of long-term debt in total assets. We see a positive
trend that is interrupted by the financial crisis in 2008. After 2012, the positive trend picks
up again. Therefore, less debt financing is unlikely to drive the observed negative trend
in interest payments. Secondly, especially in the time after 2008, there was a pronounced
negative trend in interest rates in most OECD countries. We expect the low interest rate
environment to be the main driver of the observed negative trend.
Figure 1.2 also shows the development of depreciation over time. We see a decline in
depreciation for the first 10 years of our sampling period, which is consistent with previous
findings in the literature (see for example Devereux et al., 2002). Since 2006, the share of
depreciation in added value has been rather stable at around 0.13 percent of value added.
EBITDA, in contrast, shows a strongly positive trend over the period from 2001 to 2007.
It declined during the crisis years 2008 to 2010 from 0.38 to around 0.34 percent of value
added. Between 2011 and 2015, EBITDA remained rather stable and seems to have picked
up its positive trend in the last year of our sample period. Regarding the financial results of
firms, INTE and the rest of the financial net result add up to a value converging towards
zero with a value of around 0.01 percent of value added in 2016.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Full sample
Figure 1.4 shows percentage point changes in CIT rates, tax revenue, and our measure
of the tax base, PLBT , across all countries in our sample. We split the sample into 4
sub-periods, 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2005, 2005 to 2010, and 2010 to 2016, to better cap-
ture the heterogeneity in developments within the different periods. Table 1.4 shows the
corresponding numbers and adds developments of the components of the tax base. The
CITrate column in Table 1.4 decomposes the percentage point change of 16.46 in Figure
1.4 into changes in the respective sub-periods. While CIT rates decreased throughout all
sub-periods, the overall decline in CIT rates mainly stems from the earlier years in our
sample. In the years 2010 to 2016 the decrease in statutory rates was less pronounced, with
a value of 2.35 percentage points. Revenues from corporate taxation increased in the first
half of the sample period by a total of 1.74 percentage points in added value, but declined
by 1.46 percentage points between 2005 and 2010. This decline was due to a combination
of lower rates and a smaller tax base due to the financial crisis. In all other periods, the tax
base measure PLBT increased and thus offset or even overcompensated the effects of the
declining tax rates. The strongest increase of the share of PLBT in added value occurred
between 2000 and 2005 (6.1 percentage points). Between 2010 and 2016 revenues remained
more or less constant (– 0.20 percentage points).
The development of the tax base can be investigated in more detail. To recall, PLBT
can be decomposed in the following way: PLBT = EBITDA + FIPL − DEPR. The
strong increase in PLBT in the first ten years of the sample (1995 to 2000 and 2000 to
2005) is driven mainly by a rising share of financial profits in added value (+ 3.7 percent-
age points in total between 1995 and 2005) and decreased depreciation (– 3.4 percentage
points). EBITDA only increased by 1.8 percentage points in added value between 1995
and 2005. Looking at INTE reveals that the positive financial result of firms during that
time seems to been driven by a pronounced decline in interest expenses. The contraction of
the tax base after 2005 was primarily due to a decline in EBITDA of 2.6 percentage points.
In addition, weaker financial results compensated for lower deprecation. The increase in net
financial income of firms over the full sample period by 3.1 percentage points was mainly
due to the falling interest expenses (minus 5.6 percentage points of value added). For the
entire period of 1995 to 2016 our key results regarding the factors driving the develop-
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ment of the corporate tax base are as follows: Aggregate firm pre-tax profits, our measure
of the tax base, increased by 8.6 percentage points. This led to a marginal increase in
corporate tax revenue of 0.07 percentage points in added value across all countries. 36
percent of this increase in the tax base can be attributed to higher net financial income
of firms, depreciation has declined by 37 percent, and 27 percent is due to higher EBITDA.
Table 1.3: Changes in tax revenues (in percent)
Period CIT rate PLBT Hyp. Rev. Act. Rev.
1995 – 2000 – 9.7 + 19.7 + 8.1 + 10.4
2000 – 2005 – 12.8 + 37.9 + 20.3 + 21.5
2005 – 2010 – 14.7 – 11.5 – 24.5 – 21.4
2010 – 2016 – 8.2 + 11.8 + 2.7 – 3.8
Full period – 38.3 + 63.4 + 0.8 + 1.3
Notes: All values are computed using the unbalanced panel and present changes in percent.
Table 1.3 summarizes changes in the mean statutory CITrate and PLBT in percent.
It furthermore includes two columns, which show the hypothetical revenue (Hyp.Rev.) and
a measure of actual tax revenue (TAXA).12 Hypothetical revenues are computed by mul-
tiplying our tax base measure PLBT with an added value weighted mean of statutory tax
rates. Differences between actual and hypothetical revenues occur due to the fact that our
statutory CIT variable does not perfectly capture the applicable CIT rate for a firm due to
local or regional differences in taxation within a country and the aforementioned book-tax
differences regarding the tax base. According to Table 1.3, the percentage change in hypo-
thetical revenue of 0.8 percent is explained by the rate change of – 38.3 percent and the base
change of + 63.4 percent (0.8 = (−38.3%+63.4%+ ((−38.3%) ∗ 63.4%))). The actual rev-
enue change of + 1.3 percent is close to the development expected based on this calculation.
12Actual revenue (TAXA) is the sum of taxation as stated in financial statements of firms and obtained
from BvD Orbis. As previously discussed, we are aware of book-tax differences and that taxation figures
from financial statements provide an imperfect proxy of actual tax payments.
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Figure 1.4: Trends in CIT rates, the corporate tax base and tax revenue
Notes: The values indicate changes in percentage points in our weighted measure of statutory CIT rates
(CIT), actual tax revenues (TAXA) and the corporate tax base (PLBT).
Table 1.4: Percentage point changes across all countries
Period CIT TAXA PLBT EBITDA DEPR FIPL INTE
1995 – 2000 – 4.17 + 0.53 + 2.7 – 0.8 – 1.8 + 1.7 – 1.7
2000 – 2005 – 4.95 + 1.21 + 6.1 + 2.6 – 1.6 + 2.0 – 2.8
2005 – 2010 – 4.98 – 1.46 – 2.6 - 2.6 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.2
2010 – 2016 – 2.35 – 0.20 + 2.3 + 3.1 + 0.9 + 0.1 – 0.9
Full period – 16.46 + 0.07 + 8.6 + 2.3 – 3.2 + 3.1 – 5.6
Notes: The values in this table represent changes in percentage points and are computed using the
unbalanced panel. Numbers in this table correspond to the graphical representation in Figure 1.4.
∆PLBT = ∆EBITDA+ ∆FIPL− ∆DEPR. Corresponding changes in percent can be found in the
Appendix in Table A7.
In sum, the expectations, formulated in Section 1.2, were partially confirmed. (1) De-
preciation declined over the full sample period and in three out of the for sub-period. This
is consistent with most reforms being of the tax cut cum base broadening type, which often
includes the introduction of more restrictive depreciation schemes. (2) The variable for
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financial profit/loss by firms, FIPL, is increasing in most periods. This is mainly due to
decreasing interest expenses. Since its values are negative, this is congruent with FIPL
converging towards zero. (3) EBITDA increased for the full sample period, indicating
increasing corporate profitability, but this results only holds for two of the sub-periods.
1.4.2 Heterogeneity across countries
We look at the development of the components of PLBT for six countries in our sample
in more detail: Germany, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, and Sweden. We chose those
six countries due to their good firm coverage in Orbis 13 and because they offer variation
in their CIT rate due to tax reforms over our period of interest. Looking at individual
countries allows for a more thorough analysis of conducted tax reforms and their impact
on tax revenues. Table 1.5 shows developments within the countries for the period 1995
to 2016 based on the unbalanced panel. Part A of the table explains the changes in tax
revenues in percentage changes, while part B of Table 1.5 summarizes the developments of
tax base components in percentage points.
Table 1.5 indicates substantial heterogeneity in the developments across the six coun-
tries. While tax revenue was rather stable in the United Kingdom over the 22-year period, it
increased in Germany, France, and Spain, but decreased in Italy and Sweden. All countries
cut their statutory CIT rates between 1995 and 2016, but the cut was most pronounced
in Germany (49.63 percent or 29.28 percentage points) and Italy (40.98 percent or 21.80
percentage points). At the same time, the tax base as a share of added value grew in five
out of the six countries, the only exception being Sweden. In France and Germany, the
share of the tax base in added value more than doubled (+ 172.62 percent and + 120.46
percent respectively). In sum, the changes in CIT rates and the tax base explain the de-
velopment of revenues relatively well for Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. Revenues in
France grew less than one would expect based on CIT rate and tax base changes; in Spain
revenues increased, even though one would expect more or less table revenues.
The development of the tax base in added value is decomposed in part B of table 1.5.
As discussed in the previous section, the tax base measure (PLBT ) can be decomposed into
13The unbalanced sample covers on average 28.5 percent of added value between 1995 and 2016 for these
six countries.
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three components: EBITDA, financial profits (FIPL), and depreciation (DEPR). While
the tax base rose in five countries, the driving forces behind this development varied. In
Germany, the UK, and France, the tax base increased by around 10 percentage points in
added value. While in Germany and the UK, this was due to rising EBITDA and a simul-
taneous decline in depreciation, the development in France was mainly driven by increasing
financial profits.14 Spain showed a development similar to France, but at slightly lower
levels, resulting in an expansion of the tax base by 6.61 percentage points.
Table 1.5: Explaining changes in revenues and the tax base
A: Explaining changes in tax revenues (percentage changes of ratios)
Country CIT rate PLBT Hyp. Revenue Act. Revenue
Germany – 49.63 + 120.46 + 11.05 + 13.89
Italy – 40.98 + 11.18 – 34.38 – 21.62
France – 9.17 + 172.62 + 147.63 + 16.14
Spain – 28.57 + 39.12 – 0.63 + 25.83
Sweden – 21.43 – 40.23 – 53.04 – 67.93
UK – 39.39 + 64.63 – 0.23 + 0.73
B: Explaining changes in the tax base (percentage point changes of ratios)
EBITDA FIPL DEPR PLBT
Germany + 7.33 – 0.34 – 3.52 + 10.52
Italy – 13.70 + 5.14 – 10.56 + 2.00
France + 0.55 + 7.55 – 2.67 + 10.77
Spain + 0.07 + 6.92 + 0.38 + 6.61
Sweden – 24.95 + 6.45 – 5.08 – 13.41
UK + 11.73 0.06 + 2.62 + 9.18
Notes: All values are computed using the unbalanced panel. While part A reports changes in percent,
part B reports changes in in percentage points.
In Italy and Sweden the share of EBITDA in added value declined between 1995 and
2016 (– 13.70 and – 24.95 percentage points, respectively). The rising financial profits and
especially lower depreciation compensated this development in Italy, resulting in a slight
14The increase in financial profits in France was again due to a sharp decline in interest payments of –
16.62 percentage points in added value. In the UK, interest payments only declined by 4.29 percentage
points; in Germany, they even rose by 0.28 percentage points in the same period.
1.4 Results 19
expansion of the tax base (+ 2 percentage points). In Sweden, financial profits and depre-
ciation also offset some of the effects of declining EBITDA, but overall the tax base still
shrunk by 13.41 percentage points.
Looking at individual countries, allows to investigate the effects of specific tax reforms.
Germany introduced several major changes in its CIT system between 1995 and 2016 and
is therefore a good case to be discussed in more detail. Between 1999 and 2001, CIT rates
were reduced from over 50 percent to 38.4 percent (consisting of a CIT rate of 25 percent, a
trade tax of 19.5 percent and the solidarity surcharge of 5.5 percent). Next to the change in
the statutory tax rate, the reform introduced further amendments to the tax system such
as a uniform taxation for accumulated earnings and dividends. In 2002, the full imputation
system was replaced by a half-income system (Schneider, 2000). In 2008, the CIT rate
was lowered again, from 38.4 percent to slightly below 30 percent. Again, the reform was
accompanied by some base-broadening measures such as an interest stripping rule and the
introduction of a withholding tax on capital income like interest and dividends (Stimmel-
mayr, 2015).
These tax reforms are visible in the top left part of Figure 1.5.15 At the same time,
revenues remained very stable at around 5 percent of added value. Two temporary slips
in 2001 to 3.3 percent and 2009 to 4.3 percent can be attributed to economic crises and a
corresponding decline in the tax base. Figure 1.5 also shows the development of the com-
ponents of the tax base (top right), financial profits (bottom left), and the development of
hypothetical revenue (bottom right). Table 1.6 summarizes these developments in 5-year
intervals.
15The corresponding Figures for Italy, France, Span, Sweden, and the UK are shown in the Appendix.
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Table 1.6: Development over time in Germany
Period CIT rate TAXA PLBT EBITDA FIPL DEPR
1995 – 2016 – 29.3 + 0.6 + 10.5 + 7.3 – 0.3 – 3.5
(– 49.6 %) (+ 13.9 % ) (+ 120.5 %)
1995 – 2000 – 7.4 – 0.6 + 4.5 + 2.1 + 0.4 – 1.9
(– 12.5 %) (– 13.3 % ) (+ 51.0 %)
2000 – 2005 – 13.3 + 1.2 + 1.9 + 1.1 – 1.6 – 2.4
(– 25.8 %) (+ 29.6 % ) (+ 14.5 %)
2005 – 2010 – 8.9 – 0.2 + 3.0 + 3.6 – 0.2 + 0.5
(– 23.2 %) (– 3.3 % ) (+ 19.9 %)
2010 – 2016 + 0.3 + 0.2 + 1.2 + 0.5 + 1.0 + 0.3
(+ 1.1 %) (+ 4.8 % ) (+ 6.4 %)
Notes: Values are percentage point changes computed using the unbalanced panel from 1995 to 2016.
Values in parentheses show corresponding changes in percent.
Figure 1.5: Germany
All values are computed using the unbalanced panel. Values are aggregated at the country level and
expressed as shares in aggregate added value, except for the CIT rate.
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1.4.3 Balanced sample
We construct a balanced panel to investigate to what extent our results are driven by a
changing firm composition in our sample over time. Due to the limited number of obser-
vations in the early years of the sample, we use a shorter period for the balanced sample
(2004 to 2016). Figure 1.6 shows the development of the components of the tax base mea-
sure PLBT over time. For this sample, we see a slight decline in EBITDA and overall
stability of PLBT . Regarding DEPR and FIPL, we see similar developments as for the
unbalanced sample, with FIPL converging towards zero and DEPR declining.
Table A6 in the Appendix compares the ratio levels of our main variables between the
unbalanced panel and the balanced panel. When comparing results from the unbalanced
and balanced panel, it has to be kept in mind that the country composition of both samples
is different. Still, all variables show similar magnitudes in terms of their means. Table 1.7
points out that given our weighted measure of statutory CIT rate changes, the decrease in
CIT rates was more pronounced in the unbalanced panel (7.3 percentage points) than in
the balanced sample (5.6 percentage points).
One advantage of the balanced panel is that it allows to express changes in CIT rev-
enues and the tax base components in absolute terms. The changes in absolute terms are
summarized in Table 1.8.16 The sum of pre-tax profits (PLBT ) in 2004 in the balanced
sample was 63.2 billion Euros. Over the sample period, revenues increased by 15.3 billion
Euros to 78.6 billion Euros in 2016. Table 1.8 also shows the development of total added
value (AV ) to make the developments in absolute terms comparable with those obtained
from expressing variables as shares in added value. While PLBT has been increasing over
the period 2004 to 2016, it increased less than AV , which explains the lack of a positive
trend in PLBT as a share in AV in Table 1.7. Tax revenues proxied by TAXA decreased
by 1.3 billion Euros in total. Therefore, the growth of the tax base did not fully compensate
the negative effect of cuts in statutory CIT rates for the countries in the balanced sample.
16Summary statistics on absolute values in the balanced panel are reported in the Appendix (see Table
A5).
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Figure 1.6: Components of the corporate tax base
All values are computed using the balanced panel. Values are aggregated at the country level and
expressed as shares in aggregate added value.
Table 1.7: Comparison of percentage point changes in the unbalanced and balanced panel
Period CIT TAXA PLBT EBITDA DEPR FIPL INTE
A: Balanced panel
2004 – 2008 –2.9 – 0.4 + 0.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 0.0 + 0.9
2008 – 2012 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 2.2 0.0 + 0.7 – 1.6
2012 – 2016 – 1.7 – 0.4 + 1.0 + 0.4 – 0.2 + 0.5 – 0.9
2004 – 2016 – 5.6 – 1.9 0.0 – 2.9 – 1.6 + 1.2 – 1.7
B: Unbalanced panel
2004 – 2008 – 3.6 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 0.4 + 2.0
2008 – 2012 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 + 0.9 + 0.1 – 0.2 – 1.7
2012 – 2016 – 2.6 – 0.5 + 1.7 + 0.6 – 0.5 + 0.6 – 1.5
2004 – 2016 – 7.3 – 1.4 + 1.1 + 0.6 – 0.5 0.0 – 1.3
Notes: The values in this table represent changes in percentage points. Part A reports percentage point
changes from the balanced panel, part B reports results on the unbalanced panel in the same time periods
for comparison.
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Table 1.8: Absolute changes in tax revenues and tax base components
Period AV TAXA PLBT EBITDA DEPR FIPL INTE
2004 – 2008 + 29.8 + 1.0 + 8.1 + 7.5 – 0.9 – 0.4 + 3.9
2008 – 2012 + 12.9 – 2.6 – 1.6 – 2.0 + 1.6 + 2.1 – 4.6
2012 – 2016 + 24.3 + 0.3 + 8.8 + 9.6 + 2.2 + 1.4 – 2.4
2004 – 2016 + 67.0 – 1.3 + 15.3 + 15.1 + 2.9 + 3.1 – 3.1
Notes: The values in this table have been computed using the balanced panel and reflect absolute
changes within the periods in billion Euros. GDP deflators have been used to account for inflation.
1.4.4 Excluding loss-making firms
For our sample of non loss-making firms, we exclude all firms that report negative pre-
tax profits in one of the years between 1995 and 2016. This leaves us with 6,483,408
observations. Figure 1.7 shows the development of the components of the corporate tax
base for this sample. Congruent to our prior results, we see a positive trend in EBITDA,
a decline in DEPR, and FIPL converging towards zero. As for the unbalanced sample
including loss-making firms, Table 1.9 shows that tax revenues (TAXA) are rather stable
over the full period for this sample as well, with a slight decline of – 0.4 percentage points.
Again, this development was mainly driven by a strong growth of the tax base during the
first 10 years of the sample period.
Table 1.9: Percentage point changes excluding loss-making firms
Period CIT TAXA PLBT EBITDA DEPR FIPL INTE
1995 – 2000 + 0.7 + 0.5 + 4.4 + 1.5 – 2.3 + 0.5 + 0.8
2000 – 2005 + 1.4 + 1.2 + 6.4 + 1.8 – 2.3 + 2.3 – 2.9
2005 – 2010 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.1 + 0.3 + 0.6 – 0.8 + 0.1
2010 – 2016 – 1.4 – 0.2 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 0.9 + 0.1 – 1.3
Full period – 16.8 – 0.4 + 7.8 + 0.85 – 4.9 + 2.0 – 3.3
Notes: The values in this table represent changes in percentage points and are computed using the
unbalanced panel excluding loss-making firms.
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Figure 1.7: Components of the corporate tax base (sample without loss-making firms)
1.5 Discussion of results and further relevant factors
As discussed, the increase in the tax base over the last two decades compensated for the
decline in CIT rates. In sum, the changes in CIT rates and the tax base approximately
offset each other over the period from 1995 to 2016, resulting in stable revenues. In Section
4, we focused on the contribution of firm profits, financial results, and developments in
depreciation to explain changes in the corporate tax base. However, there are additional
developments that could add to explaining stable revenues and that should be addressed.
So far, we only discussed the development of corporate profitability, but not how it
came about. One factor to consider here is the development of the share of profitable
firms. As shown, excluding loss-making firms from the analysis does not fundamentally
impact results. Still, an increase in the share of profitable firms may have contributed to
the increase in corporate profitability. For the sample period of 1995 to 2016, the share of
profitable firms in our dataset increases by about 10 percentage points from 76 percent to
86 percent. Therefore, the increasing profitability is only not driven by a small number of
firms that were able to raise their profit substantially, but by a broader trend benefiting a
large share of the sample.
A second factor contributing to rising profitability could be different sectoral growth rates.
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For the sample used in this paper, there is some indication that more profitable industries
grew at faster rates than less profitable sectors, adding to the positive trend of mean prof-
itability in our sample. To further investigate this channel, a more representative sample
of firms across countries and industries would be needed.
Additionally, it would be beneficial to track developments with regard to market concentra-
tion and the profitability distribution of firms. Larger firms in the sample tend to be more
profitable than small or medium sized companies. Increasing firm concentration would
therefore also increase average profitability. Unfortunately, our sample does not allow for
an accurate estimation of the development of firm concentration.
Besides increasing profitability, a rise in the corporate share in GDP could have con-
tributed an expansion of the tax base. Such an development would not be captured by our
data, as we only cover the corporate sector. Yet, it is plausible to assume that the part of
GDP generated by the corporate sector increases over time. One reason could be income
shifting from the personal income tax base to the corporate tax base, as CIT rates are
lower than top personal tax rates in many countries. It has been shown in the literature
that such income shifting does occur. Clausing (2007), for example, shows in her analysis
that an increasing share of income is labeled as corporate income. Data from the OECD
Annual National Accounts Statistics gives some initial evidence in this regard and is shown
in Figure A7 in the Appendix. Figure A7 shows the sector shares in gross value added as
an average across countries. While the household sector’s share declined from around 25
percent in 1995 to slightly above 20 percent in gross value added in 2016, the corporate
sector’s share increased from 60 percent to roughly 65 percent. This is likely to also reflect
an increasing capital share of GDP as compared to the labor share.
Lastly, our results should be interpreted with some caution. First of all, the firms in our
datasets are unlikely to be perfectly representative. This applies to both the unbalanced
and the balanced samples. As previously discussed, book-tax differences result in the fact
that the information retrieved from accounting data can only serve as imperfect proxies for
actual developments with regard to tax payments and the tax base. Hanlon and Shevlin
(2005) even find evidence, that the gap of financial accounting income and taxable income is
widening over time. However, this diverging trend is not shown for most countries included
in our sample. Moreover, our data does cover a significant part of total economic activity,
and the development of tax revenue in our data is very similar to the developments found
in the literature based on aggregated tax revenue measures. This suggests that the findings
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described above at least partially explain the developments underlying the expansion of the
tax base.
1.6 Conclusion
Competitive pressures caused many governments to decrease statutory CIT rates. Nev-
ertheless, CIT revenues to remained a stable source of revenue in most countries. For a
firm-level dataset from 33 OECD countries, we show that while the weighted measure of
statutory CIT rates fell by 16.5 percentage points over the period from 1995 to 2016, total
corporate tax revenue across all countries changed by just 0.07 percent. This was due to a
substantial expansion of the tax base.
Our decomposition of the corporate tax base into developments of firm profits from ordi-
nary business activities, financial profits and losses, and depreciation show that all three
factors contributed to the observed stability of tax revenues: 36 percent of the increase in
the tax base is due to higher net financial income of firms, depreciation has declined by 37
percent, and 27 percent of the expansion of the tax base is due to higher EBITDA.
Looking at six individual countries, we find substantial heterogeneity in developments, with
revenues increasing in three countries, decreasing in two countries and remaining stable in
one country. While we are aware of some shortcomings to the data (especially regard-
ing the representativeness of firms in the dataset and book-tax differences), we are still
confident that the decomposition of the tax base at the firm level offers new insights com-
pared to previous studies based on aggregate data. This contribution therefore adds to the
understanding of observed developments and trends in corporate tax revenues.
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1.A Data sources
CIT rates. Top statutory corporate income tax rates (sum of taxes of all levels of gov-
ernment on January 1 of the respective year, in percent). These rates were taken from
several issues of KPMG’s Corporate Tax Surveys (1998 to 2006), KPMG’s Corporate and
Indirect Tax Surveys (2007 to 2014) and KPMG’s Corporate tax rates table (2015-2018),
complemented with data from EY’s Annual Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides (2004 to
2017), data from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and Devereux (2007).
Corporate share. Corporate sector share in value in percent of total value added. https:
//stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE13 (last access August 16, 2018).
Deflators. GDP deflators from the World Development Indicators Database, World-
bank, available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS.AD?view=
chart (last access August 16, 2018).
Share of corporate tax in total tax revenue OECD Revenue Statistics Database, OECD,
available at https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV# (last access Au-
gust 16, 2018).
Micro data. Bureau van Dijk, Orbis Database. For a description of variables see Table
A1.
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1.B Additional tables
Table A1: Description and computation of variables in Orbis
Variable name Description Computation
AV Added value TAXA + PL + STAF +
DEPR + INTE
DEPR Depreciation: total amount of depreciation and
amortization of the assets
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes: net profit from
operating activities (equal to OPPL)
PLBT - FIPL
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and ar-
mortization: operating results and depreciation
EBIT + DEPR
EMPL Total number of employees included in the com-
pany’s payroll
INTE Interest paid: total amount of interest charges paid
FIPL Financial profit/loss: net result from financial ac-
tivities of the company, defined as financial revenue
minus financial expenses
FIRE - FIEX
TAXA Taxation: all taxes related to the accounting period
(paid, accrued or deferred)
OPPL Total operating revenues minus all operating ex-
penses
EBIT
PL Profit/loss for the period: net income of the year PLAT + EXTR
PLAT Profit/loss after taxation PLBT - TAXA
PLBT Profit/loss before taxation: sum of operating profit
and financial profit
EBIT + FIPL
TURN Turnover: net sales
FIRE Financial revenues (from long-term and short-term
financial assets, securities revaluation, received in-
terests, sales of securities and shares, change of state
of reserves and accounting adjustments in financial
area etc.)
FIEX Financial expenses (interest paid, write-offs in finan-
cial assets etc.)
STAF Cost of employees: sum of all employee costs of the
company, including pension costs
FIAS Fixed Assets: Total amount of non current assets
after depreciation
IFAS + TFAS + OFAS
TOAS Total Assets: sum of fixed assets and current assets FIAS + CUAS
Source: Orbis User Guide (2011), pp.420-508
30 1. APPENDIX
Table A2: Steps to the final samples
Step Firms Observations
Starting sample 2,813,844 13,907,376
Dropping consolidated accounts, implausi-
ble values and outliers
- 205,066 - 1,806,820
Unbalanced Panel 2,608,778 12,100,556
Keep years 2004 to 2016 - 107,875 - 763,501
Drop firms with missing data for at least
two years in a row
- 2,392,272 - 9,924,852
Balanced Panel with imputed values) 108,631 1,412,203
Drop firms with missing data - 41,390 - 538,070
Balanced Panel (no imputation) 67,241 874,133
Notes: In the balanced sample with imputed values, imputations were made for firms with one-year
reporting gaps within the period 2004 to 2016.
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Table A3: Number of firms and observations by country in the unbalanced panel
Country Firms Observations Obs. in %
Austria 8,041 39,560 0.33
Australia 2,774 8,493 0.07
Belgium 20,997 117,777 0.97
Canada 448 1,060 0.01
Chile 57 141 0.00
Czech Republic 59,386 264,156 2.18
Denmark 46,341 92,956 0.77
Finland 57,472 243,888 2.02
France 412,812 2,279,937 18.84
Germany 97,197 422,847 3.49
Greece 35 105 0.00
Hungary 16,443 68,772 0.57
Iceland 18 39 0.00
Ireland 4,095 14,543 0.12
Israel 54 148 0.00
Italy 590,281 3,005,661 24.84
Japan 140,042 476,400 3.94
Republic of Korea 153,787 592,625 4.90
Luxembourg 2,198 8,442 0.07
Latvia 266 1,008 0.01
Netherlands 955 3,596 0.03
Norway 90,389 432,078 3.57
New Zealand 612 1,969 0.02
Poland 41,940 180,383 1.49
Portugal 182,469 704,869 5.83
Slovak Republic 45,350 171,355 1.42
Slovenia 24,125 80,274 0.66
Spain 467,849 2,174,122 17.97
Sweden 77,394 426,539 3.52
Switzerland 380 2,704 0.02
Turkey 38 139 0.00
United Kingdom 63,972 282,209 2.33
United States 561 1,761 0.01
Total 2,608,778 12,100,556 100
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Table A4: Number of firms and observations by country in the balanced panel
No imputations With imputations
Country Firms Obs. in % Firms Obs. in %
Austria 13 169 0.02 65 845 0.06
Belgium 1,298 16,874 1.93 1,812 23,556 1.67
Czech Republic 993 12,909 1.48 1,557 20,241 1.43
Denmark 1 13 0.00 1 13 0.00
Finland 748 9,724 1.11 1,256 16,328 1.16
France 13,417 174,421 19.95 21,309 277,017 19.62
Germany 515 6,695 0.77 825 10,725 0.76
Hungary 201 2,613 0.30 423 5,499 0.39
Ireland 0 0 1 13 0.00
Italy 26,406 343,278 39.27 42,895 557,635 39.49
Republic of Korea 1,452 18,876 2.16 2,859 37,167 2.63
Norway 3,430 44,590 5.10 5,094 66,222 4.69
Poland 615 7,995 0.91 920 11,960 0.85
Portugal 906 11,778 1.35 2,858 37,154 2.63
Slovak Republic 652 8,476 0.97 1,006 13,078 0.93
Slovenia 256 3,328 0.38 420 5,460 0.39
Spain 12,346 160,498 18.36 19,162 249,106 17.6
Sweden 2,653 34,489 3.95 4,037 52,481 3.72
Switzerland 34 442 0.05 46 598 0.04
United Kingdom 1,305 16,965 1.94 2,085 27,105 1.92
Total 67,241 874,133 100 108,631 1,412,203 100
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Table A5: Summary Statistics on balance-sheet variables (balanced panel)
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Obs.
A: absolute values (firm-level)
TOAS 0.30 5.19 0.05 -431.05 1257.33 874,133
EMPL 79.96 861.84 22.00 0.00 195952.00 698,425
AV 4553.96 46982.33 1077.39 4.40 8413770.65 874,133
PLBT 1057.26 17715.09 146.00 -459849.00 4243408.78 874,133
EBITDA 1611.09 25003.56 281.95 -249002.66 5914145.29 874,133
FIPL -39.70 2577.34 -14.27 -375092.13 516358.22 874,133
INTE 156.73 2305.42 23.00 -31495.00 492683.05 874,133
DEPR 514.00 7982.62 76.76 0.00 2276240.36 874,133
TAXA 303.09 5191.41 48.23 -431045.00 1257334.09 874,133
B: Shares in added value (yearly aggregates)
TOAS 3.20 0.13 3.19 3.02 3.41 874,133
PLBT 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.22 0.26 874,133
EBITDA 0.36 0.01 0.35 0.34 0.37 874,133
FIPL -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 874,133
INTE 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 874,133
DEPR 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.13 874,133
TAXA 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 874,133
Notes: EMPL indicates the number of employees in a firm (in persons), all other values in the upper
part of the table (A) are in Mio. Euros. Variables in the lower part (B) are shares aggregate shares in
added value. Aggregation was done over all firms in a given year.
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Table A6: Comparison of summary statistics in ratio levels in the unbalanced and balanced
panel
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Obs.
A: Unbalanced panel
TOAS 3.59 0.74 3.93 2.45 4.47 12,100,556
PLBT 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.24 12,100,556
EBITDA 0.36 0.01 0.36 0.29 0.37 12,100,556
FIPL -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 12,100,556
INTE 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.11 12,100,556
DEPR 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.16 12,100,556
TAXA 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.07 12,100,556
B: Balanced panel
TOAS 3.20 0.13 3.19 3.02 3.41 874,133
PLBT 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.22 0.26 874,133
EBITDA 0.36 0.01 0.35 0.34 0.37 874,133
FIPL -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 874,133
INTE 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 874,133
DEPR 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.13 874,133
TAXA 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 874,133
Notes: All variables are aggregate shares in added value. Aggregation was done over all firms in a given
year.
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Table A7: Percentage changes for the full sample
Period CIT PLBT EBITDA FIPL INTE DEPR TAXA
1995 – 2016 – 38.35 + 63.44 + 6.54 – 62.3 – 53.33 – 19.69 + 1.34
1995 – 2000 – 9.73 + 19.69 – 2.26 – 32.79 – 16.39 – 11.12 + 10.36
2000 – 2005 – 12.79 + 37.95 + 7.59 – 58.39 – 32.14 – 11.12 + 21.51
2005 – 2010 – 14.74 – 6.56 – 7.09 + 45.30 – 2.62 – 5.21 - 21.44
2010 – 2016 – 8.16 – 1.03 + 9.04 – 7.23 – 15.52 + 7.25 - 3.80
Notes: The values in this table represent changes in percent over time (growth rates) for the unbalanced
sample. To give an example, the value for CIT in the row representing the full sample period 1995 – 2016
is computed in the following way: ∆CIT = (CIT2016−CIT1995)
CIT1995
.
Table A8: Changes in percentage points for selected countries
Country CIT PLBT EBITDA FIPL INTE DEPR TAXA
Germany – 8.570 + 0.037 + 0.014 + 0.003 – 0.002 - 0.020 - 0.004
Italy – 5.850 + 0.024 – 0.027 + 0.018 – 0.019 – 0.032 - 0.028
France – 1.030 – 0.017 – 0.033 + 0.006 – 0.012 – 0.009 – 0.017
Spain – 10.000 – 0.050 – 0.112 + 0.028 – 0.025 – 0.035 – 0.034
Sweden – 6.000 + 0.033 – 0.011 + 0.032 – 0.025 – 0.012 – 0.009
United Kingdom – 10.000 + 0.026 + 0.039 – 0.004 – 0.007 + 0.008 – 0.014
Notes: All values are computed using the balanced panel.
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1.C Additional figures
Figure A1: Average ratio of gross value added to GDP across countries
Figure A2: Italy
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Figure A3: France
Figure A4: Sweden
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Figure A5: Spain
Figure A6: Great Britain
1.C Additional figures 39
Figure A7: Average sector shares across countries
Sector shares computed by expressing a sector’s gross value added as share of total gross value added for
each country and computing a yearly average across all countries. Source: OECD Annual National
Accounts Statistics
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Figure A8: The development of debt in added value
The figure depicts the development of mean long-term debt in added value for the unbalanced sample of
firms.
Chapter 2
Do corporate tax cuts pay for
themselves? Evidence on the Laffer
curve in corporate taxation
"It is a paradoxical truth that tax rates are
too high and tax revenues are too low and
the soundest way to raise the revenues in
the long run is to cut the rates now."1
2.1 Introduction
In the recent past, many countries have introduced reforms to their corporate income tax
systems. In most cases, reforms entailed pronounced cuts in the top statutory tax rates. A
prominent example is the United States, which introduced a comprehensive corporate tax
reform in 2017. The "Tax Cuts and Jobs Act" entailed a major cut of the statutory CIT rate
from 35 percent to 15 percent. During the negotiations on the plan, the potential revenue
This chapter is joint work with Clemens Fuest and Felix Hugger. We would like to thank participants
at the Annual Conference of the International Institute for Public Finance (IIPF) in Tokyo, Japan, for
valuable comments and suggestions.
1This quote is commonly attributed to John F. Kennedy.
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consequences of the reform were a central point of conflict. Supporters of the plan such as
Steven Mnuchin claimed that "the tax plan will pay for itself with economic growth" 2 as
the United States will become a more attractive location for business. Critics of the plan
strongly opposed that view and argued that cutting the rate from 35 percent to 15 percent
will result in a drop in revenues and a sharp increase in the government deficit. Given
that many countries already face a tense situation with regard to their public budgets,
understanding and anticipating revenue consequences from changes in statutory corporate
income tax rates is of vital importance. This paper sets out to assess the relationship
between corporate income tax rates and corporate tax revenue empirically, using a large
macro- and firm-level dataset covering 190 countries and including observations from over
50 years for the period 1965 to 2018.
The negative trend in statutory corporate income tax rates set in during the 1980s
as shown by Devereux (2007). At the same time, revenues from corporate taxation as a
share of GDP seem to have remained rather stable. This hints at a non-linear relationship
between CIT rates and revenues. A first informal approach to characterize this non-linear
relationship was made by Arthur Laffer. In 1974, Laffer sketched the idea of a hump-shaped
relationship between tax rates and revenues on his napkin during an informal White House
dinner. Since then, many economists seized and formalized the concept: Among the first
was Fullerton (1982), who develops a general equilibrium model to simulate the effects
of tax rate changes on revenues.3 With regard to more recent contributions, Gruber and
Rauh (2007) estimate the impact of CIT rates on corporate taxable income using Com-
pustat data for firms in the United States. They apply the approach of Gruber and Saez
(2002) and find an elasticity of the corporate tax base with respect to the corporate income
tax rate of - 0.2. Clausing (2007) focuses on estimating revenue-maximizing CIT rates
for her sample of OECD countries covering the period 1979 to 2002. She finds a robust
hump-shaped relationship between tax rates and revenues, with a revenue maximizing tax
rate of around 33 percent. Brill and Hassett (2007) also find empirical evidence of such a
relationship. They add to Clausing’s (2007) contribution on revenue maximizing CIT rates
by analyzing the development of the revenue maximizing rate in the OECD over time. For
2Quote by Steven Mnuchin, former Treasury secretary in "Arthur Laffer’s Theory on Tax Cuts Comes
to Life Once More", New York Times, April 25, 2017.
3In this brief overview on the related literature, we will focus on empirical contributions with regard to
corporate income taxation. Saez et al. (2012) offer an excellent and more detailed review of the income
taxation literature.
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the period of 1980 to 2005, Brill and Hassett find it to decline from about 34 percent to
around 26 percent. Devereux (2007) offers an analysis over a longer period of time as he
looks at data for OECD countries for the years 1965 to 2004. He only finds weak evidence
for a statistically significant relationship between tax rates and revenues. However, he
concludes, that while there does not seem to be a robust relationship between rates and
revenues across the OECD, a hump-shaped relationship might still hold within countries.
Lastly, there are two very recent contributions on the topic. Dahlby and Ferede (2018)
estimate corporate tax base elasticities using Canadian province-level data. They find four
Canadian provinces to be on the negatively sloped side of the Laffer curve. In addition,
Dahlby and Ferede compare the economic costs associated with raising tax revenue via
corporate income taxation, personal income taxation and sales taxation. They find these
costs to be highest for corporate income taxation as the tax base reacts more elastically
to rate changes than the personal income tax base or sales tax base. Taken together, the
authors conclude that substantial welfare gains could be achieved by substituting tax rev-
enue from corporate taxation with revenue from other sources. Steinmueller et al. (2018)
investigate Laffer curve type relationships based on forward-looking measures of average
and marginal tax rates computed from firm-level data. By incorporating firm-level data in
the analysis on the Laffer curve relationship between tax rates and revenues, their analysis
is most closely connected to our approach. Using firm-level data allows them to consider
the financial structure and asset composition in the computations of marginal tax rates.
Regarding developments of the tax base, they find that around half of the countries in their
sample decreased depreciation allowances in the period 2004 to 2016. From falling marginal
and average effective tax rates, they conclude that cuts in the statutory rates were more
pronounced than the base broadening measures, on average. In terms of their analysis of a
Laffer curve relationship, they find a robust inverse U-shaped relationship with maximizing
statutory tax rates of 31 percent, 27 percent for effective average tax rates and 17 percent
for effective marginal tax rates.
Our paper adds to the literature by expanding the analysis to a wider context. Our
panel data set covers 190 countries over a long period of time of up to 53 years. The large
dataset allows for comparisons of developments between country groups. We furthermore
investigate whether the relationship between CIT rates and revenues observed at the aggre-
gate level is compatible with the relationship between rates and tax payments at the firm
level by constructing a large firm-level data based on balance-sheet information from the
Bureau van Dijk Orbis database. Firm-level data allows us to control for the influence of
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changes in corporate profitability on aggregate tax revenue. Our key results are as follows:
First, results from pooled OLS estimations show a strong relationship between corporate
tax rates and revenues. This relationship is hump-shaped and robust to the inclusion of
time fixed effects, country fixed effects and various control variables. On average, we find a
revenue maximizing rate of around 31 percent, which is in line with previous findings in the
literature (e.g. Clausing, 2007). We find significant heterogeneity across country groups
with varying revenue maximizing tax rates when differentiating results for high income,
middle income and lower income countries. While the revenue maximizing rate is lowest
for countries with low GDP per-capita, their statutory rates are the highest on average.
We find that except for the lower income group, countries are on the positively sloped
side of the Laffer curve, on average. Relating to the quote of Steve Mnuchin on whether
corporate tax rate cuts are likely to pay for themselves, tax cuts in high income countries
such as the United States should therefore not be expected to pay for themselves. Looking
at development of the revenue-maximizing rate in the OECD over time, we find that this
rate decreased until the mid 2000s and remained rather stable since then at around 30
percent. Revenue maximizing rates obtained from the analysis of the firm-level data are of
very similar magnitude and confirm the existence of a Laffer curve in corporate taxation.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows: in Section 2.2 we discuss the data and
relevant descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 explains the empirical approach. In Section 2.4
we discuss our results from both, the macro and micro dataset, while Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and descriptives
To comprehensively analyze the relationship between statutory CIT rates and revenues, we
use both macro and micro data. Our macro dataset includes country-level data for up to
190 countries for the period 1965 to 2018 and includes data from various sources, such as
the OECD, the Worldbank as well as tax information from PwC and KPMG. Micro data
comes from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Orbis database and covers 33 countries over the
period 1990 to 2016. A detailed description of data sources is provided in the Appendix
2.A. First, an overview on the macro data will be provided. This will be followed by a
description of the firm-level data used in this paper.
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2.2.1 Macro data
Data on statutory tax rates is available for all years in the dataset. While information on
CIT rates for all 54 years is only available for a sample of 20 OECD countries, coverage
increases over time and reaches 190 countries in some years. In total, the dataset contains
information on the CIT rates of 3,852 country-year observations, covering all geographic
regions and income groups. From 2004 to 2018, the sample contains more than 97 percent
of world GDP and over 93 percent of the world’s population in each year. The two main
data sources for statutory CIT rates are the Corporate Tax Surveys by KPMG and EY’s
Annual Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides. This data is complemented by information from
the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and Devereux (2007). All tax rates
used are the sum of top statutory CIT rates on all levels of government.4
Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate trend in statutory CIT rates across all countries in our
sample. As briefly discussed in the introduction, statutory CIT rates have fallen substan-
tially over the last three decades. Over the early and mid 1980s, CIT rates in our sample
averaged at around 44 percent, before a rapid decline set in. Between 1986 and 2003, the
average CIT rate fell by 17.1 percentage points (from 44.2 to 27.1 percent). Subsequently,
rates still declined, but at a slower pace reaching a mean of 23.8 percent in 2010. Since
then, until 2018, the average CIT rate remained rather stable at around 23 percent.
We differentiate three groups of countries based on their income level.5 Figure 2.2 shows
the development of average CIT rates for three income groups over the period 1993 to 2018.
4In case of different regional or local taxes within countries, averages are used. We are aware of the
fact that country differences in tax base definitions and differences in tax enforcement are other relevant
explanatory factors for revenue developments that are not captured by statutory CIT rates. Still, statutory
tax rates are a key component of CIT schedules and play an important role in attracting investment,
especially since most countries rely on flat-tax rate regimes. In addition, some control variables included in
the regression should capture at least part of the effects of differences in tax base definitions and enforcement.
5A static definition of country groups is used. The grouping is based on the World Bank’s income
group classification of 2016. "Middle income" refers to the World Bank’s Upper middle income countries;
Lower middle and Low income countries are combined into one group ("Lower income"). Table B2 in the
Appendix provides a list of all countries in the three groups.
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Figure 2.1: CIT rates and revenues
In all groups, CIT rates have fallen substantially. High income countries started at the
lowest level in 1993 (37.7 percent on average) and showed an almost linear decline until
2010 when rates reached 22.8 percent on average. Between 2010 and 2017, the average CIT
rate in high income countries was more or less stable and fluctuated around 22 percent,
before dropping to 20.6 percent in 2018. With 40.6 percent, middle income countries had
slightly higher CIT rates on average at the beginning of the sample period. However, this
average quickly converged to the levels of high income countries and showed a similar trend
between 1996 and 2016. From 2016 to 2018, middle income countries on average raised their
CIT rates by one percentage point to 22.8 percent.Countries with lower income started out
with the highest CIT rates on average in 1993 (43.4 percent), but cut these rates to levels
below the two other groups by 1997 (32.1 percent). Since then, CIT rates in lower income
countries declined slower than in the other two groups and reached a mean of 25.9 percent
in 2018. Since the developments described may be influenced by changing coverage of the
sample, Table B1 in the Appendix shows the development of CIT rates for the three in-
come groups between 2004 and 2018 for a balanced sample of 147 countries. The trends
apparent for the balanced sample match those described for the unbalanced panel over the
corresponding period.
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Figure 2.2: The development of statutory CIT rates by income group
Table 2.1 gives some indication about the dispersion of statutory CIT rates. The CIT
rates of the countries in our sample range between 0 percent and 65 percent. The mean
value over all countries and years is at 28.78 percent. The standard deviation of CIT rates
is highest for the group of high income countries and lowest for the group of lower income
countries.
Furthermore, Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on CIT revenues. Revenue data
originates from three sources: The OECD’s Revenue Statistics, the IMF’s World Revenue
Longitudinal Dataset, and the Government Revenue Dataset compiled by the International
Centre for Tax and Development. The information from these sources is combined with
OECD data being preferred when available. Overall, the combined dataset contains in-
formation on CIT revenues from up to 166 countries and a total of 4,628 country-year
observations. Revenue data on 22 OECD countries is available for the 52 year period from
1965 to 2016. As for CIT rates, coverage increases over time. From 1990 to 2016, the
dataset contains revenue data of 138 countries on average. In contrast to the observed neg-
ative trend in CIT rates, the share of revenues from corporate taxation in GDP remained
relatively stable between 1965 and 2016. Between 1965 and the late 1990s, CIT revenues
fluctuated between 2 and 2.5 percent of GDP. From 2000 to 2008, the share increased to
3.8 percent. Over the financial crisis, CIT revenues dropped to about 3 percent of GDP in
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2010 and remained at this level until 2016.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics on the macro data set
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Obs. Coverage (Years)
Full sample
CIT revenue 2.80 2.79 2.19 0.00 35.65 4,628 1965 – 2016
Statutory CIT rate 28.78 11.98 30.00 0.00 65.00 3,852 1965 – 2018
PIT minus CIT 3.97 14.32 1.10 -55.00 55.00 3,319 1981 – 2018
Govt. expenditure 16.28 7.58 15.44 0.00 135.78 7,398 1965 – 2017
Educ. expenditure 4.17 3.01 3.75 0.25 83.97 9,150 1970 – 2016
Resource rents 6.81 10.94 1.95 0.00 89.60 8,097 1970 – 2016
ln(population) 14.80 2.44 15.27 8.48 21.05 11,322 1965 – 2017
ln(GDPPC) 8.28 1.53 8.19 4.75 11.88 8,407 1965 – 2017
GDP growth 3.84 6.64 3.83 -64.05 149.97 8,602 1965 – 2017
Trade share 80.29 54.26 70.23 0.02 860.80 7,948 1965 – 2017
NPV of depr. 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.32 1,567 2004 – 2016
Corporate share 63.66 7.86 64.55 37.83 80.94 671 1990 – 2017
High income countries
CIT revenue 3.00 2.92 2.41 0.00 35.65 1,947 1965 – 2016
Statutory CIT rate 31.04 13.36 32.00 0.00 65.00 2,087 1965 – 2018
Middle income countries
CIT revenue 3.28 3.29 2.45 0.00 31.70 1,119 1965 – 2016
Statutory CIT rate 25.51 9.61 25.00 0.00 54.00 816 1981 – 2018
Lower income countries
CIT revenue 2.22 2.00 1.72 0.00 24.84 1,551 1980 – 2016
Statutory CIT rate 27.65 7.83 30.00 0.00 52.50 901 1983 – 2018
The development of CIT revenues in GDP between 1990 and 2016 is shown separately
for the three country groups in Figure 2.3. The development for high and middle income
countries was relatively similar. In both groups, revenues from corporate taxation where
at around 2.5 to 3 percent between 1990 and 1999. From 2000 to 2008, the shares rose to
about 4.5 percent on average in both groups. Afterwards, revenues declined and reached
3.3 and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2010 for high and middle income countries respectively.
While revenues in middle income countries remained at a similar level until 2016, the av-
erage in high income countries declined further to 2.8 percent in 2016. CIT revenues in
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics on key variables in the micro data set
Mean Std. Dev. Median Observations Year availability
Taxation 257.40 7,289.28 18.00 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
EBITDA 1,448.80 39,119.72 124.53 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
Depreciation 484.11 14,464.33 28.89 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
Interest payments 236.04 15,007.53 10.59 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
Other fin. profits 157.51 14,121.11 1.00 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
Added value 3,786.89 78,255.30 485.19 9,878,715 1990 – 2016
Note: This table presents sample means, standard deviations, and median values for the key variables
from the micro data-set. The last column indicates for which years a variable is available.
countries with lower income developed differently. In this group of countries, revenues were
at around 2 percent of GDP throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. From 2003 onwards,
revenues started to increase and reached 3 percent of GDP in 2013 and 3.5 percent in 2016.
As shown in Figure B2 in the Appendix, this last development is not confirmed when in-
vestigating a balanced sample. In the balanced sample, lower income countries were not
able to increase its revenues any further after 2008. According to this sample, a gap of
about 0.6 percentage points persists between the share of CIT revenues in GDP of richer
and poorer countries.
50 2. DO CORPORATE TAX CUTS PAY FOR THEMSELVES?
Figure 2.3: The development of corporate tax revenues by income group
The control variables included in Table 2.1 give some indication about the levels and
dispersion of country size, public sector size, economic activity and development levels of
the countries in our sample. Half of the ten control variables are available for more than 50
years from 1965 to 2017 (Government expenditure as a share of GDP, ln of population, ln of
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and trade share in GDP). Two more (education expenditure
as a share of GNI and resource rents as a share of GDP) are available from 1970 to 2016.
The difference between PIT and CIT rates is available from 1981 onwards. The net present
value of depreciation allowances is available for on average 121 countries over 13 years (2004
to 2016). Data on the share of the corporate share in total added value is available from
1990 to 2017, but only for a smaller sample of up to 32 countries. A detailed overview on
variable definitions and sources is provided in the Appendix.
Table 2.1 shows, that across the countries in our sample the difference between PIT and
CIT rates (computed as PIT rate minus CIT rate) is found to be positive, on average. PIT
rates tend to be higher than CIT rates. The mean and the median value, however, are quite
small. This might reflect that governments are aware of profit shifting activities between
the two tax bases and try to limit those by setting similar rates, on average.
On average, the governments of countries in our sample spend 16.28 percent of GDP, with
4.17 percent being spent for education purposes. Education expenditure shows a great
variation with a range from 0.25 to 83.97 percent of gross national income (GNI). Given
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that our sample covers 190 countries at different development levels, there is also a large
dispersion with regard to GDP per capita and GDP growth. On average, the growth rate
of the countries in our sample is 3.84 percent.
Almost all countries in our sample are active in international trade. The median value of
the trade share is 70.23 percent. The share of resource rents in GDP, however, is relatively
low across countries, as the median value of 1.95 percent of GDP indicates. Nevertheless,
there is substantial variation across the countries in our sample with the maximum value
being 89.6 percent.
The corporate share for the 32 countries we have data for varies between roughly 38 and
81 percent. For most countries, however, the corporate sector is significantly larger than
the private and public sector, as the relatively high median and mean values of roughly 64
percent indicate.
To capture differences and changes in the tax base across countries and over time, we add
the net present value of depreciation allowances (NPV of depr.) for industrial buildings in
some specifications. The depreciation of industrial buildings is roughly comparable across
countries, in contrast to the depreciation of many other investments. Devereux’s et al.
(2002) approach allows to compare incentive effects of different tax depreciation rules.6
2.2.2 Firm-level data
Firm-level data is obtained from the BvD Orbis database, which offers comprehensive
balance-sheet information for a large set of countries. Expanding our analysis to micro
data allows to control more thoroughly for developments within the corporate sector, such
as positive trends in firm profitability. Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the micro
variables used. All variables reported are measured in thousand Euros. In total, the firm-
level dataset contains a total of almost 10 million firm-year observations from 33 countries
over the years 1990 to 2016.7
To proxy CIT revenues on the micro level, we compute the share of tax payments in
value added. The dataset only contains firms with positive tax payments, as negative taxes
often reflect subsidies that are unrelated to CIT rates, but are based on other institutional
arrangements of the respective countries or may even be determined on a case by case basis.
6We follow the approach of Devereux et al. (2002) and Devereux et al. (2011) in the calculation of the
net present value of allowances per unit of investment.
7A detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix 2.A. Table B1 reports the coverage of
the firm-level data by country.
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The mean value for tax payments of the firms in our micro data set is 257.400 Euro. The tax
base for the average firm is 886,160 Euros and can be proxied as the mean value of EBITDA
(1,448,000 Euro) minus depreciation (484,111 Euro) and interest payments (236,040 Euro)
plus other financial profits (157,510 Euro). This equals a mean effective tax rate of 29
percent, which is very close to our mean value with regard to the statutory CIT rate of 28.8
percent (see Table 2.1). To examine whether the micro data reasonably matches the macro
data in terms of CIT revenues, Figure 2.4 plots the development of CIT revenues in GDP
from the macro data and taxed paid in added value from the micro data over the period from
2000 to 2016 for a balanced sample of 18 countries.8 For completeness, the average CIT
rate for the corresponding sample is plotted as well. While the level of the two measures is
different, the development over time is almost parallel. Both measures are relatively stable
over time, with a small peak in 2007 at 3.9 percent (macro data) and 5.9 percent (micro
data). At the same time, the average CIT rate for this sample fell from 33.2 to 24.8 percent.
Figure 2.4: CIT revenues: Comparison of macro and micro data
Note: This figure is based on data for a balanced sample of 18 countries.
8Figure B4 in Appendix shows the same development for the full sample of 33 countries starting in 1992.
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2.3 Empirical approach
The data described in the preceding section is used in various ways to examine the relation-
ship of corporate tax rates and revenues. We start out by analyzing CIT rates and revenues
using a pooled OLS regression model for the macro data. Our baseline specification is of
the following form:
CITrevenuei,t = α+ β1 CITratei,t + β2 CITrate_squaredi,t + γ Xit + ψt + εit (2.1)
with CITrevenue being the share of revenue from corporate taxation in GDP. i in-
dicates the observational unit in our panel, which is country for the macro data set, and
t indicates the time unit, which is year, as our dataset contains annual observations. As
we suspect a non-linear relationship between CIT rates and revenues, we include both, the
absolute level of the CIT rate (CIT ) and its square (CIT_squared). Year fixed-effects (ψ)
are included to account for influences over time that affect all countries in the same way.
ε is the residual in the estimations. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at
the country level to take into account potential within-cluster correlation and heterogeneity.
X is a vector of control variables, that varies depending on the specification. As previ-
ously discussed, the controls at the country level include the difference between PIT and
CIT rates (PITminusCIT ), government expenditure (Govt.exp.), education expenditure
(Educ.exp.), the share of resource rents in GDP (Resourcerents), the ln of population
(ln(population)), the ln of GDP per capita (ln(GDPPC)), GDPgrowth, and the trade
share in GDP (Tradeshare). We add the difference between PIT and CIT rates as pre-
vious research has shown (see for example Mintz 1995, Fuest and Weichenrieder 2002,
Slemrod 2004) that corporate taxation serves as a backstop to personal taxation. We in-
clude population size as a proxy for the size of the market of the countries in our sample. In
the competition for mobile companies, larger countries may be able to exploit some market
power due to bigger domestic markets and capital stocks. For example, Bucovetsky (1991)
claims that in equilibrium, larger states are able to set higher CIT rates as the elasticity
of the tax base with respect to the CIT rate is lower than in smaller states. We consider
government expenditure as it provides a more accurate picture of revenue needs than just
controlling for population size. Education expenditure is added as following Mintz (1995),
public investment in education may be linked to higher CIT rates. At the same time,
a better educated workforce could increase profits and/or the efficiency of tax collection
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and thereby the share of CIT revenues in GDP. The considerations regarding GDP per
capita are the following: tax authorities in less developed countries often face administra-
tive difficulties when it comes to the collection of taxes. On the other hand, according to
Abramovsky et al. (2014), corporate taxes are easier to administer than other tax types,
especially if most revenue is raised from a small number of large taxpayers. As a result,
poor countries may depend stronger on the revenue generated from corporate taxation
than developed countries. We also collected information on the trade share as openness
may lead to competition between governments for internationally mobile capital, result-
ing in a negative influence of internationalization on CIT rates and revenues (Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986) On the other hand, governments may expand the welfare state to insure
citizens against higher economic risks resulting from globalization and thus increase cor-
porate taxation. In addition, an increase in firm mobility may raise corporate profits and
thereby increase the tax base, leading to higher CIT revenues (Garrett and Mitchell 2001).
Resource rents might be relevant for our estimation as profits in this sector are likely to
react more inelastically to taxation compared to other, more mobile sectors (Slemrod 2004).
The relationship between statutory rates and CIT revenues is first analyzed for the
full sample. In a second step, the sample is split the three income groups to investigate
heterogeneity in the relationship between rates and revenues across high, middle and lower
income countries.
The results obtained with the macro data set are then replicated and expanded using the
firm-level dataset for OECD countries covering the period 1990 to 2016. For the firm level
estimations, the observational unit of our panel i is the firm. We continue to use annual
observations so the time unit of the panel remains unchanged. For the micro analysis, we
expand our set of included control variables X with relevant balance-sheet items. Firstly,
we add earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), which
reflects profitability of firms before considering the financial structure and asset composition
of the firm. It is therefore a measure of overall corporate profitability. From EBITDA, the
tax base of a firm can be proxied by adjusting for the capital and financial structure
in the following way: Tax Base = EBITDA − depreciation − interest payments +
other fin. profits
Using micro data, we estimate equation 2.1 in a modified form: our dependent variable
for tax revenue is computed as the sum of corporate tax payments in a given year as a
share of added value. As before, country-level variables are included to control for observ-
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able macro effects. Next to including time fixed effects, we also include industry fixed effects
to account for unobserved industry characteristics. The set of control variables is expanded
with our balance-sheet variables, which capture changes in the firm-level composition of
the tax base. All firm-level variables are included as shares in added value. Controlling for
changes in the tax base composition allows to give some indicatory inference on whether
observed tax base changes are due to changes in corporate profitability or changed depre-
ciation patterns. This provides a major advantage as compared to approaches only based
on aggregate data.
In Section 2.4.3, we include further control variables in our pooled OLS specifications.
Furthermore, we employ a fixed effects panel estimation on our macro dataset to rule out
that our presented results are biased by unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across
countries.9 Estimations (1) to (3) of Table 2.10 summarize the results.
2.4 Results
This chapter reports the results of the baseline regressions. All specification presented in
this Section are pooled OLS regressions. Results based on country-level data are presented
in Section 2.4.1; Section 2.4.2 reports the results from the firm-level estimations. Robust-
ness checks are described in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 The relationship between CIT rates and revenues
Table 2.3 shows the results of the baseline pooled OLS regressions. The dependent vari-
able in all estimations of Table 2.3 is the share of CIT revenues in GDP at the country
level. The statutory CIT rate and its square are the explanatory variables of main interest.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all estimations of Table 3. In column
(1), the coefficients of both the statutory rate and its square are highly significant and
indicate an inversely U-shaped relationship between CIT rates and revenues. According
9Regarding our micro sample, the trade-off on whether to use a fixed-effects estimator versus the pooled-
OLS specification is the loss of variance in fixed effects modeling versus relaxing the assumption of no
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Our micro dataset is strongly unbalanced. Many companies are
only covered for an individual year or a very short period of time. We therefore only apply pooled OLS
estimations.
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to this estimation, tax revenues are maximized at a rate of 32.1 percent. This result is
visualized by Figure 2.5, which shows the predicted CIT revenues in GDP at different tax
rates. The vertical line marks the mean CIT rate in the sample used in the corresponding
regression at 31.2 percent, which is close to the revenue maximizing rate. The predicted
revenue resulting from the revenue maximizing rate is 3.3 percent of GDP, while the actual
mean revenue is 3.0 percent of GDP.
Estimation (2) and all subsequent estimations include year fixed-effects. Accounting
for such time-effects that influence all countries equally does not change the coefficients
substantially. Estimation (3) includes the net present value of depreciation allowances for
industrial buildings to control for changes in the tax base definition. Since the variable is
only available for the years 2004 to 2016, the number of observations is about halved. The
coefficients for the tax rate and its square, however, are largely unchanged. The coeffi-
cient of the tax base measure itself is negative, but not statistically significant. To control
for potential tax competition effects, estimation (4) includes the unweighted average CIT
rate of all other countries. This average is not weighted by GDP, as the shifting of paper
profits is not necessarily tied to real economic activity in low tax countries. Since the in-
clusion of this variable lead to issues regarding multicollinearity, it is not included in any
other specifications.10 The coefficients of main interest remain largely unchanged with a
revenue maximizing rate of 32.7 percent. Finally, estimation (5) controls for a number of
country-specific characteristics, as discussed in Section 2.2. Of these additional controls,
the share of resource rents in GDP, GDP per capita, and the trade share in GDP all yield
significant positive coefficients. The coefficient of total government expenditure is positive
but insignificant, suggesting that CIT revenues are not central in the in the financing of
governments in most countries. The influence of the CIT rate on revenues is robust to the
inclusion of these additional controls.
As suggested by column (5) of Table 2.3, GDP per capita of countries does influence
their CIT revenues. To further investigate potential differences between countries of differ-
ent income, Table 2.4 reports estimation results for different income groups. Since data for
lower income countries is available only after 1993, only the years 1993 to 2016 are used in
all estimations of Table 2.4 to make results comparable. Estimation (1) contains the results
for the full sample. Columns (2) to (4) report the estimation results for high, middle, and
10The variance inflation factor (vif) for the average CIT rate of others in Estimation (4) is 4,328.06. As
a rule of thumb, vif values larger than 10 indicate problems regarding multicollinearity.
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Table 2.3: Pooled OLS regressions (Full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue
CITrate 0.161∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0317) (0.117) (0.0331) (0.0469)
CITrate_sq -0.00251∗∗∗ -0.00218∗∗∗ -0.00425∗∗ -0.00276∗∗∗ -0.00273∗∗∗
(0.000488) (0.000488) (0.00202) (0.000666) (0.000899)
NPV depr -5.375
(6.913)
avCITrate_others -1.176
(0.770)
PIT minus CIT -0.00870
(0.0147)
Govt exp 0.0152
(0.0276)
Educ exp -0.0772
(0.0970)
Resource rents 0.101∗∗
(0.0423)
ln(population) -0.0460
(0.128)
ln(GDPPC) 0.468∗∗∗
(0.150)
GDP growth 0.0628
(0.0448)
Trade share 0.00733∗∗
(0.00284)
constant 0.714∗ -0.764 -0.283 46.20 -4.950∗∗
(0.367) (0.607) (1.144) (30.81) (2.046)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,636 2,636 1,142 2,636 2,172
R2 0.034 0.075 0.040 0.078 0.255
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
lower income countries, respectively. All estimations contain year fixed-effects. The overall
pattern is similar for all groups. For middle income countries, the CIT rate coefficients are
not statistically significant on their own. However, the coefficients are jointly significant
at the 10 percent level. The relationship between CIT rates and revenues is particularly
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Figure 2.5: The Laffer curve in corporate taxation
strong for high income countries (Estimation (2)). GDP per capita has a positive influ-
ence on CIT revenues also within groups for high and lower income countries. The effect
of resource rents in the full sample seems to be primarily driven by middle income countries.
Table 2.6 summarizes the the revenue maximizing rates for the full sample and by in-
come group. The revenue maximizing rate across all countries is 31.3 percent. For high
income countries, the revenue maximizing rate is at 34.8 percent. Lower income countries
exhibit the lowest revenue maximizing rate (24.2 percent). This seems reasonable, as lower
income countries often have lower administrative capacity facilitating tax evasion. A more
elastic tax base with respect to tax rates reduces the revenue maximizing rate. The actual
mean tax rate of high income countries over the sample period (1993-2016) was 31.0 per-
cent, while low income countries had an average tax rate of 27.7 percent. According to the
results of Table 2.4, high income countries should therefore be able to increase their CIT
revenues by increasing their CIT rates. In contrast, low income countries should lower their
CIT rates to raise more revenue from corporate taxation. Due to the low significance of
the coefficients for middle income countries, the results for this group of countries should
be treated with caution and are not further discussed.
The dataset used for the above analysis covers more than two decades. Over such long
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Table 2.4: Pooled OLS regressions (By income group)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample High income Middle income Lower income
CITrate 0.250∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.119 0.165∗∗
(0.0654) (0.0954) (0.0755) (0.0689)
CITrate_sq -0.00400∗∗∗ -0.00512∗∗ -0.00141 -0.00341∗∗
(0.00135) (0.00192) (0.00165) (0.00128)
PIT minus CIT -0.0149 -0.00272 -0.0367 0.0208
(0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0272) (0.0160)
Govt. exp. 0.0198 -0.0606 0.105∗ 0.0274
(0.0277) (0.0493) (0.0549) (0.0170)
Educ. exp. -0.0859 -0.207 -0.187 0.236∗∗
(0.0991) (0.184) (0.166) (0.0942)
Resource rents 0.101∗∗ 0.0881 0.201∗∗∗ 0.00707
(0.0414) (0.0682) (0.0407) (0.0167)
ln(population) -0.0601 -0.500∗∗ 0.225 0.530∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.233) (0.164) (0.131)
ln(GDPPC) 0.490∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗ 0.196 0.875∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.390) (0.481) (0.235)
GDP growth 0.0574 0.0198 0.0262 0.0224
(0.0482) (0.107) (0.0351) (0.0184)
Trade share 0.00691∗∗ 0.000162 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0142∗
(0.00290) (0.00341) (0.00771) (0.00801)
constant -5.312∗∗ -2.650 -9.653∗ -15.07∗∗∗
(2.237) (3.770) (4.828) (2.990)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,878 986 450 442
R2 0.264 0.300 0.722 0.469
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
period of time, the position of the Laffer curve might shift. Brill and Hassett (2007) find
evidence for such a shift between the late 1980s to 2005. They claim that the revenue
maximizing rate declined from 34 to 26 percent for an unbalanced sample of 20 OECD
countries. A change in the revenue maximizing over time rate could rationalize the rate
cuts seen in many countries. Table 2.7 reports the development of the revenue maximizing
rate for 3-year intervals between 1995 and 2015 for a balanced sample of 33 OECD coun-
tries. According to these estimations, the revenue maximizing rate is rather stable over time
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at around 30 percent. In the period from 2001 to 2003, the revenue maximizing rate was at
30.7 percent. It declined slightly to 29.6 percent for the periods 2004 to 2006 and 2007 to
2009, before rebounding to just above 30 percent (30.5 in 2010-2012 and 30.4 in 2013-2015).
The actual mean tax rate for this group of countries, in contrast, steadily declined from
30.8 percent between 2001 and 2003 to 24.9 percent (2013-15). The difference between the
revenue maximizing rate and the actual rate rose accordingly from +0.1 percentage points
(2001-2003) to 5.5 percentage points in the last sample. The gradual move away from the
revenue maximizing rate could therefore have contributed to the decline in revenues since
2007.
2.4.2 Results from estimations using micro data
The country-level estimations presented show highly significant and robust results for the
relationship between CIT rates and revenues. This section now presents estimation results
based on firm-level data, which allow for a more thorough control of tax base effects. The
micro dataset covers the period from 1990 to 2016 and contains almost 10 million firm-year
observations from 33 OECD countries. There are two main questions: First, can the pat-
terns detected in the macro (country-level) data also be found in the micro data? Second,
is the relationship robust to the inclusion of firm-level controls of the tax base? The de-
pendent variable in the regression with micro data is the share of (positive) tax payments
in value added. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All estimations reported
contain year and industry fixed-effects.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 2.5. Estimation (1) contains the set of
country-level controls that was also used in the macro regressions of the previous section.
Since the micro sample predominantly contains firms from high-income countries, the nu-
merical results should be compared to those from Column (2) of Table 2.4. The coefficients
for the CIT rate and its square resulting from the firm-level estimation are similar to those
of the corresponding country-level estimation for high-income countries. The resulting rev-
enue maximizing rate is only marginally higher than in the regression with macro data (35.3
percent compared to 34.8 percent). Thus, the firm-level data is largely able to reproduce
the results from the macro estimations.
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Table 2.5: Pooled OLS regressions (Firm-level data)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax in AV Tax in AV Tax in AV Tax in AV
CITrate 0.372∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.00466) (0.00324) (0.00275) (0.00328)
CITrate_sq -0.00527∗∗∗ -0.00638∗∗∗ -0.00446∗∗∗ -0.00253∗∗∗
(0.0000723) (0.0000563) (0.0000482) (0.0000525)
PIT minus CIT -0.0659∗∗∗ -0.0484∗∗∗
(0.000511) (0.000331)
Govt. exp. -0.191∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.00141)
Educ. exp. 0.0351∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.00751) (0.00505)
Resource rents -0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗
(0.00305) (0.00188)
ln(population) -0.485∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗
(0.00728) (0.00462)
ln(GDPPC) 0.584∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0128)
GDP growth -0.260∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00136)
Trade share -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0150∗∗∗
(0.000221) (0.000139)
EBITDA in AV 0.137∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.000149) (0.000178) (0.000177)
DEPR in AV -0.129∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.000286) (0.000286)
INTE in AV -0.127∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.000366) (0.000357)
oFIN in AV 0.111∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.000379) (0.000378)
constant 5.656∗∗∗ -13.48∗∗∗ -10.29∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.124) (0.104) (0.158)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9,878,690 9,878,696 9,878,696 9,878,690
R2 0.054 0.368 0.463 0.486
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Revenue-maximizing CIT rates
All countries High income Middle income Lower income
CITrate 0.250 0.356 0.119 0.165
CITrate_sq -0.004 -0.00512 -0.00141 -0.00341
max. rate 31.25 34.76 42.19 24.19
actual mean rate 28.78 31.04 25.51 27.65
∆rate – 2.47 – 3.72 – 16.68 + 3.46
Notes: Revenue maximizing rates are computed as − β1
2β2
with β1 being the coefficient on the tax rate
and β2 the coefficient on the tax rate squared.
Table 2.7: The development of the revenue-maximizing rate in OECD countries
2001 – 2003 2004 – 2006 2007 – 2009 2010 – 2012 2013 – 2015
CITrate 0.2751 0.3166 0.3150 0.3869 0.3203
CITrate_sq -0.0045 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0064 -0.0053
max. rate 30.7 29.6 29.6 30.5 30.4
actual mean rate 30.8 28.4 26.2 25.3 24.9
∆rate + 0.1 – 1.2 – 3.4 – 5.2 – 5.5
Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS regressions of CIT revenues on the CIT rate and its square for a
balanced sample of 33 OECD countries for 3-year time periods. Revenue maximizing rates are computed
as − β1
2β2
with β1 being the coefficient on the tax rate and β2 the coefficient on the tax rate squared.
Estimation (2) now contains the share of EBITDA in added value to control for the
influence of firm profitability on CIT revenues. The corresponding coefficient is statistically
significant and has a positive sign. Not surprisingly, higher profitability is related to higher
tax payments. In estimation (3), three additional control variables are introduced: the
shares of depreciation, interest payments, and other financial profits in added value. The
coefficients of depreciation and interest payments are both negative, as both are deductible
from taxable profits to some degree in all countries. The coefficient of other financial profits
is positive, as they increase to a company’s taxable profit. In sum, EBITDA, depreciation,
interest and other financial profits represent an approximation of the tax base (as a share
of added value). The inclusion of the additional firm-level controls leads to some changes
in size of the coefficients of the CIT rate and its square. Yet, the inversely u-shaped rela-
tionship between rates and revenues remains robust.
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Estimation (4) of Table 2.5 contains the firm-level controls as well as the country-level
controls. This reduces the resulting coefficients for the CIT rate and its square, but again
without changing the fundamental relationship between rates and revenues. The coeffi-
cients of the micro control variables also change only very little as compared to estimation
(3). In sum, the micro regressions confirm the existence of a Laffer curve for corporate
taxation. This relationship between CIT rates and revenues is also robust to the inclusion
of controls for the tax base.
2.4.3 Robustness and discussion
In the following, robustness of the obtained results will be discussed. First, we check
whether our specification using the squared term of the CIT rate is correct by testing for
the the significance of higher order polynomials. Second, we rerun our main specifications
using additional control variables, such as the share of the corporate sector as changes
in the distribution of economic activity between the public and private sector are likely
lead to changes in the share of CIT revenues in GDP. Third, we estimate the relationship
between CIT rates and revenues using a more restrictive fixed effects model. Overall, all
robustness tests confirm our obtained results. Lastly, we discuss potentially remaining
concerns regarding our data.
Alternative specifications
When adding higher order polynomials of the CIT rate to the basic model, they are not
statistically significant. Table 2.8 shows the results of a more formal evaluation of alterna-
tive specifications up to the degree of four using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). For both measures, the quadratic function yields
the lowest values indicating the preferred model. Steinmueller et al. (2018) find similar
results.
Controlling for the size of the corporate sector at the macro level
Figure B3 in the Appendix shows how the corporate share in GDP has developed between
1995 and 2016 for a balanced sample of 24 (mostly OECD) countries. In 1990. the cor-
porate share in GDP was at 60.6 percent. Over the 21-year period it increased in 3 waves
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Table 2.8: Test of alternative specifications
Polynomial AIC BIC
2 11741.1 11758.5
3 11742.3 11765.6
4 11743.3 11772.4
and stood at 64.8 percent in 2016. After the dot-com crash in the early 2000s and in the
aftermath of the the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the corporate share declined for some
time, but recovered quickly. In sum, the corporate share in GDP does not seem to be stable
over time, creating a source of potential bias.
A set of estimations shown in Table 2.9 assesses the robustness of the previous results
when controlling for the corporate share in the different countries. All estimations of Table
2.9 are based on macro data. Estimations (1) to (3) show the baseline results for the set
of 32 countries for which the corporate share variable is available. Estimations (4) to (6)
include the corresponding control variable. Adding this additional control only leads to
minor changes in the coefficients for the CIT rate and its square. On average over the
three different specifications, the revenue maximizing rate is 1.6 percentage points higher,
when controlling for the share of the corporate sector in added value. The coefficient of
the additional control is positive, but only statistically significant in estimations (4) and
(5). As expected, a larger corporate share in the economy leads to higher revenues from
corporate taxation.
Fixed-effects regressions
To make full use of the panel structure of the macro dataset, the main specifications are
rerun using a fixed effects panel estimation.11 Estimations (1) to (3) of Table 2.10 summa-
rize the results.
While the coefficients in specifications (1) to (3) are substantially smaller in size than
those in the pooled OLS estimations, their signs do not change. The inverse u-shaped rela-
11Panel estimations for the micro sample are not sensible due to the strongly unbalanced structure of the
micro dataset. Many companies are only covered for an individual year or a short period of time.
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tionship between CIT rates and revenues remains robust. According to Estimation (1), the
revenue maximizing rate is 31.6 percent, which is close to the result from the corresponding
pooled OLS estimation of 32.1 percent (see estimation (1) of Table 2.3). The coefficients for
the CIT rate and its square are jointly significant at the 10-percent level. When year fixed-
effects are included, the corresponding coefficients are jointly significant at the 5-percent
level (estimation (2)). Estimation (3) reports the results with additional controls. In this
specification, the CIT rate and its square are both significant at the 5-percent level.
Results from both the country-level estimations are therefore robust to the use of fixed-
effects panel estimations.
2.4.4 Discussion of endogeneity and data concerns
Overall, this paper argues that the relationship between CIT rates and revenues is in-
versely U-shaped. While the exact location of the revenue maximizing rate differs between
countries, the fundamental relationship seems to be robust. The estimations reported use a
variety of controls to rule out potential omitted variable bias. The results from country- and
firm-level estimations are also largely consistent. Moreover, we do not think that reverse
causality is a central concern for our analysis. First, tax rates are in most cases determined
before the revenues of a given year have materialized. Even in well governed countries, it
usually takes some time until tax incomes can be precisely determined. Therefore, tax rates
can - at best - be determined at the basis of last year’s revenues. Second, the insignificant
or in some specifications even negative coefficient of total government expenditure suggests
that CIT revenues do not play a key role in the financing of governments in most countries.
This may be interpreted as an argument against reverse causality, as rates are probably not
set as a reaction to a certain level of revenue if the generation of revenue is not the primary
reason for corporate taxation.
Nevertheless, there remain some weaknesses in our data. With regard to the macro
data and given that we cover a long period of time (1965 to 2018), it is plausible that the
computation and definition of some variables is not perfectly comparable across countries
or changed over time. With regard to the micro data, information on taxation and pre-tax
profits obtained from balance-sheets does not provide a fully accurate picture of actual
tax payments. While balance-sheet items are reported following international financial
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Table 2.9: Pooled-OLS regression: controlling for the relative size of the corporate sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue
CITrate 0.181∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.0830) (0.0862) (0.0608) (0.0774) (0.0793) (0.0613)
CITrate_sq -0.00279∗∗ -0.00261∗ -0.00264∗∗∗ -0.00281∗∗ -0.00264∗∗ -0.00263∗∗∗
(0.00127) (0.00131) (0.000902) (0.00117) (0.00124) (0.000917)
PIT minus CIT -0.00510 -0.00569
(0.0112) (0.0116)
Govt. exp. 0.00496 0.00797
(0.0413) (0.0409)
Educ. exp. -0.0998 -0.118
(0.128) (0.138)
Resource rents 0.325∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.0999) (0.101)
ln(population) -0.251∗ -0.257∗
(0.127) (0.132)
ln(GDPPC) 0.569∗∗ 0.550∗∗
(0.240) (0.241)
GDP growth 0.0461∗ 0.0428
(0.0272) (0.0273)
Trade share 0.00452∗ 0.00416
(0.00240) (0.00278)
Corp. share 0.0701∗∗ 0.0686∗∗ 0.00634
(0.0302) (0.03029) (0.0163)
constant 0.275 -0.322 -4.283 -4.642∗ -5.145∗∗ -4.321
(1.171) (1.200) (3.981) (2.661) (2.502) (3.972)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 649 649 648 649 649 648
R2 0.038 0.085 0.600 0.159 0.201 0.600
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errrors are clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
reporting standards (IFRS) or generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), actual
tax payments are computed following the tax legislation of individual countries. Several
contributions in the accounting literature take up on the question on how well actual tax
payments are reflected by accounting data. Graham et al. (2012) give a comprehensive
overview on research on book-tax differences and conclude that the predictive power of
taxation information obtained from firms’ financial statements for actual tax payments of
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Table 2.10: Fixed-effects panel estimations
(1) (2) (3)
CIT revenue CIT revenue CIT revenue
CITrate 0.0596 0.0768∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0399) (0.0417)
CITrate_sq -0.000942∗ -0.000609 -0.00100∗∗
(0.000524) (0.000491) (0.000502)
PIT minus CIT 0.0163∗
(0.00862)
Govt. exp. 0.0291∗
(0.0165)
Educ. exp. 0.0153
(0.0772)
Resource rents 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0372)
ln(population) -0.869
(1.482)
ln(GDPPC) 1.595∗∗∗
(0.387)
GDP growth 0.0511∗∗
(0.0199)
Trade share -0.00289
(0.00356)
constant 2.145∗∗∗ 0.230 -1.495
(0.683) (0.943) (23.98)
Year FE No Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 2636 2636 2172
R2 0.009 0.134 0.256
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
firms is limited.12 Nevertheless, given the congruence of results obtained from macro data
and firm-level data, we are confident that at the aggregate level, balance-sheet data does
entail valuable information to depict trends in corporate tax burden and revenue develop-
ments.
12Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide another excellent overview on the accounting literature. In line
with Graham et al. (2012), they also stress that taxation indicated in financial statements does not reflect
temporary differences, such as accelerated depreciation schemes that would reduce current tax expenses
but increase deferred tax expenses by the same amount.
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Lastly, some caveats regarding the representativeness of the data have to be mentioned.
For this paper, data from a large number of sources was combined to generate a com-
prehensive dataset on corporate tax rates and revenues. For most indicators, the sample
represents every continent and main region in the world, all World Bank income groups,
and more than three quarters of world GDP. One potential problem, however, is its un-
balancedness due to changes in the composition of the sample. Such changes are almost
unavoidable in long panels because of the formation of new countries and the dissolution
of others. Important examples are the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. If
changes in the sample composition significantly influence the results, it is reported accord-
ingly. Another issue is the underrepresentation of developing countries for most indicators.
This is why trends are decomposed by income group so that developments for lower income
countries become visible and are not superimposed by trends of other income groups. Our
micro data is an unbalanced panel data set. The number of firms included in the Orbis
database rises over time, so the number of firms included is much higher for the last years
of the sample than prior years. We therefore compute revenues as shares of value added to
account for the increasing firm coverage over time. Yet, there might be relevant changes in
firm composition over time.
2.5 Conclusion
Tax revenues from corporate income taxation are an important source of revenue for gov-
ernments. While revenues have remained stable despite pronounced cuts in statutory CIT
rates over the last three decades, it is questionable whether the stability in CIT revenues
would hold for further CIT rate cuts. Our analysis, which is based on a large panel data
set covering up to 190 countries for up to 53 years, shows that most countries are on the
positively sloped side of the Laffer curve by now. For the full sample, we find a revenue
maximizing CIT rate of 31.25 percent. The actual mean rate across all countries and years
lies at 28.78 percent. This relatively low value is predominately driven by the CIT cuts
that occurred since the 1990s in many countries. Moreover, we analyze the development
of the revenue maximizing CIT rate for OECD countries over time. While it is likely to
have declined from the 1980s to early 2000s (see Brill and Hassett, 2007), we find it to
be rather stable since the mid 2000s at around 30 percent. These results are informative
to policy makers that consider further cuts in statutory CIT rates. Our results from the
micro analysis at the firm level complete the picture. Firstly, we find revenue maximizing
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rates of very similar magnitude than those obtained by the macro analysis, which confirms
that obtained results are robust. Secondly, we find positive trends with regard to firm prof-
itability and the relative size of the corporate sector over time. Next to largely unobserved
legal changes of tax base definitions, they are relevant explanatory factors in the observed
stability of CIT revenues. Thus, developments within the corporate sector are important
to consider.
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Appendix
figuresection tablesection
2.A Data sources
CIT revenues. Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP. These were taken from the
OECD’s Revenue Statistics database on July 16, 2018, complemented with data from the
IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data, published in August 2015 (http://data.imf.
org/?sk=77413F1D-1525-450A-A23A-47AEED40FE78) (last accessed on August 25, 2016)
and data from the International Centre for Tax and Development’s Government Revenue
Dataset, released in May, last accessed on September 5, 2016. (http://www.ictd.ac/
datasets/the-ictd-government-revenue-dataset#core-dataset).
CIT rates. Top statutory corporate income tax rates (sum of taxes of all levels of gov-
ernment on January 1 of the respective year, in percent). These rates were taken from
several issues of KPMG’s Corporate Tax Surveys (1998 to 2006), KPMG’s Corporate and
Indirect Tax Surveys (2007 to 2014) and KPMG’s Corporate tax rates table (2015-2018),
complemented with data from EY’s Annual Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides (2004 to
2017), data from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and Devereux (2007).
Income groups Income groups are defined according to the World Bank definition of July
2016 and taken from https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/
906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (last access 28/08/16). Since Argentina
was not classified in July 2016, the classification of 2015 is used.
NPV of depreciation allowances. Net present value of depreciation allowances for in-
dustrial buildings (in percent). We follow the approach of Devereux et al. (2002) and
Devereux et al. (2011) in the calculation of the net present value of allowances per unit of
investment. Capital allowances are differentiated in straight line and declining basis sys-
tems in the calculation. A real interest rate of 5 percent and an inflation rate of 2 percent
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is assumed. We refrain from potential interaction effects with personal taxes. Information
on depreciation allowances is taken from several issues EY’s Annual Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guides (2004 to 2017).
PIT minus CIT. Difference between the maximum statutory individual and corporate
tax rates (in percentage points). PIT rate are top statutory rates for personal income
taxation as applicable to the top bracket of the personal income tax schedule (in percent).
For the period from 1981 to 2005, tax rates were taken from Georgia State University’s
Andrew Young School World Tax Indicators (https://aysps.wufoo.com/forms/s7x0x5/)
on August 15, 2016. Tax rates for the years from 2006 to 2018 were taken from KPMG’s
Individual Income Tax Rates Tables and EY’s Worldwide Personal Tax Guides (2013/14 -
2016/17).
Government expenditure. General government final consumption expenditure in per-
cent of GDP. This includes all government current expenditure for purchases of goods and
services, including the compensation of employees, and most expenditure on national de-
fense and security. These were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators Database http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators on July 16, 2018.
Educaction expenditure. Operating expenditure on education in percent of GNI, in-
cluding wages and salaries, excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment.
These were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
on July 16, 2018.
Resource rents. Rents from resources (oil, gas, coal, minerals and forest) in percent of
GDP. These were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
on July 16, 2018.
ln(population). Natural logarithm of total number of country residents. These were
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators on July 16,
2018.
ln(GDPPC). Natural logarithm of GDP per-capita (in constant 2010 USD). These were
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators on July 16,
2018.
GDP growth. Annual growth rate of GDP (in percent). These were taken from the World
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Bank’s World Development Indicators Database http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators on July 16, 2018.
Trade share. Sum of exports and imports of goods and services in percent of GDP.
These were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
on July 16, 2018.
Corporate share. Corporate sector share in value in percent of total value added.
OECD National Accounts at a Glance Dataset, OECD National Accounts Statistics, https:
//doi.org/10.1787/data-00369-en on July 16, 2018.
Taxation (TAXA). All taxes related to the accounting period (paid, accrued or deferred).
Source: Bureau van Dijk, Orbis Database.
Added Value (AV). Sum of Taxes paid, Profit/Loss for period, Costs of employees, de-
preciation and interest paid. Source: Bureau van Dijk, Orbis Database.
EBITDA. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Source: Bureau
van Dijk, Orbis Database.
Depreciation (DEPR). Total amount of depreciation and amortization of the assets.
Source: Bureau van Dijk, Orbis Database.
Interest payments (INTE). Total amount of interest charges paid. Source: Bureau van
Dijk, Orbis Database.
Other fin. profits (oFIN). Net result from financial activities of the company, defined
as financial revenue minus financial expenses, excluding interest payments. Source: Bureau
van Dijk, Orbis Database.
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2.B Additional tables
Table B1: Number of firms and observations by country in the micro data set
Country Firms Observations
Austria 7,819 37,428
Australia 2,483 6,818
Belgium 19,148 96,248
Canada 361 850
Chile 53 121
Czech Republic 45,307 180,827
Denmark 38540 71,197
Finland 52,136 202,665
France 331,520 1,539,164
Germany 93,638 392,816
Greece 33 93
Hungary 15,258 64,114
Iceland 10 21
Ireland 3,847 12,542
Israel 49 111
Italy 554,352 2,733,302
Japan 132,668 440,101
Latvia 223 792
Luxembourg 2,079 7,677
Netherlands 868 3,004
New Zealand 568 1,679
Norway 72,958 304,833
Poland 38,592 161,839
Portugal 146,042 534,984
Republic of Korea 149,805 569,543
Slovak Republic 40,177 134,402
Slovenia 20,002 66,210
Spain 412,171 1,721,385
Sweden 72,687 358,722
Switzerland 333 2,166
Turkey 33 111
United Kingdom 58,996 231,568
United States 464 1,382
Total 2,313,220 9,878,715
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Table B2: List of countries by income group
High income countries
Andorra Czech Republic Republic of Korea San Marino
Antigua and Barbuda Denmark Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Argentina Estonia Latvia Seychelles
Aruba Faroe Islands Liechtenstein Singapore
Australia Finland Lithuania Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
Austria France Luxembourg Slovakia
Bahamas French Polynesia Macao SAR, China Slovenia
Bahrain Germany Malta Spain
Barbados Gibraltar Monaco St. Kitts and Nevis
Belgium Greece Nauru St. Martin (French part)
Bermuda Greenland Netherlands Sweden
British Virgin Islands Guam New Caledonia Switzerland
Brunei Darussalam Hong Kong SAR, China New Zealand Taiwan, China
Canada Hungary N. Mariana Islands Trinidad and Tobago
Cayman Islands Iceland Norway Turks and Caicos Islands
Channel Islands Ireland Oman United Arab Emirates
Chile Isle of Man Poland United Kingdom
Croatia Israel Portugal United States
CuraÃ§ao Italy Puerto Rico Uruguay
Cyprus Japan Qatar Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Middle income countries
Albania Cuba Kazakhstan Peru
Algeria Dominica Lebanon Romania
American Samoa Dominican Republic Libya Russian Federation
Angola Ecuador Macedonia, FYR Serbia
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Malaysia South Africa
Belarus Fiji Maldives St. Lucia
Belize Gabon Marshall Islands St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Mauritius Suriname
Botswana Grenada Mexico Thailand
Brazil Guyana Montenegro Turkey
Bulgaria Iran, Islamic Rep. Namibia Turkmenistan
China Iraq Palau Tuvalu
Colombia Jamaica Panama Venezuela
Costa Rica Jordan Paraguay
Lower income countries
Afghanistan Ethiopia Mauritania South Sudan
Armenia Gambia Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Ghana Moldova Sudan
Benin Guatemala Mongolia Swaziland
Bhutan Guinea Morocco Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Haiti Myanmar Tanzania
Burundi Honduras Nepal Timor-Leste
Cabo Verde India Nicaragua Togo
Cambodia Indonesia Niger Tonga
Cameroon Kenya Nigeria Tunisia
Central African Republic Kiribati Pakistan Uganda
Chad Korea, DPR Papua New Guinea Ukraine
Comoros Kosovo Philippines Uzbekistan
Congo, DR Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Vanuatu
Congo, Rep. Lao PDR Samoa Vietnam
CÃ´te d’Ivoire Lesotho SÃ£o TomÃ c© and Principe West Bank and Gaza
Djibouti Liberia Senegal Yemen, Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep. Madagascar Sierra Leone Zambia
El Salvador Malawi Somalia Zimbabwe
Eritrea Mali
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2.C Additional figures
Figure B1: The development of statutory CIT rates by income group
Note: This figure is based on data for a balanced sample of 147 countries.
Figure B2: The development of CIT revenues by income group
Note: This figure is based on data for a balanced sample of 102 countries.
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Figure B3: The development of the corporate share in GDP (balanced sample)
Note: This figure is based on data for a balanced sample of 24 countries.
Figure B4: CIT revenues: Comparison of macro and micro data
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Figure B5: Aggregate value added (micro data) as a proxy for GDP
Chapter 3
Effective tax rates of multinational
firms: are digital firms any different?
"You must pay taxes. But there’s no law
that says you gotta leave a tip."1
3.1 Introduction
Discrepancies between statutory corporate income tax rates and effective tax payments of
firms, have caused an intense public debate on the "fairness" of corporate taxation. Es-
pecially large and highly successful multinational tech firms such as Alphabet, Amazon,
Apple or Facebook are in the center of attention. This has been fueled by a recent pro-
posal of the European Commission to adopt a special taxation regime targeted at "digital
companies". The Commission argues that under current international taxation rules, it
is especially the group of firms in the digital business sector, that does not pay its "fair
share of tax" (European Commission 2018). This argumentation has been shaped by two
developments: Firstly, the European Commission is concerned that although a majority of
costumers of digital firms is located in its member countries, the tax relevant location of
value creation is often stated to be in third countries. Secondly, investigations by the Euro-
pean Commission over the last years have detected some questionable tax practices among
its member states that involved digital firms. For example, in August 2016 the European
1This quote is taken from a Morgan Stanley Advertisement.
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Commission released the results of its investigations on tax rulings granted to Apple by
Ireland and found Apple’s effective tax rate on its European profits to be at 0.005 percent
in 2014 (European Commission, 2016). However, the analysis of a firm’s tax payments in
individual countries or geographical regions does not allow for any conclusions with regard
to a firm’s global tax burden.
So far, there is a lack of conclusive evidence on whether the effective tax rates of digital
firms on their global income are any different from those of other firms. This paper aims
to shed light on this question by analyzing the firm level determinants of effective tax rates
for a large sample of firms, containing both digital and non-digital firms. My panel data set
contains consolidated financial statement data and covers firms from 138 countries for the
period 1984 to 2013. This paper focuses on the analysis of consolidated financial statement
data, as I am interested in the tax burden firms face as economic entities, comprising all
facets of the corporate structure. Firstly, I explore firm level factors that determine corpo-
rate tax payments. I find that larger (in terms of total assets) and more profitable firms face
higher average effective tax rates. On the other hand, firms with higher R&D intensity, a
higher debt ratio and a higher share of cash holdings face lower average effective tax rates.
Secondly, I check for differences in determinants of effective tax rates between digital and
non-digital firms. I find that the positive effect of firm size on the effective tax rate is even
larger for digital firms. Contrary to non-digital firms, a higher share of intangible assets in
total fixed assets is connected to a lower effective tax rate for digital firms. There are no
differences with regard to the influence of R&D intensity, the debt ratio and cash holdings.
Thirdly, I look at trends in the dispersion of effective tax rates over time. Applying the
panel convergence and club clustering test by Philipps and Sul (2007, 2009) on the full
sample as well as for the sample of digital firms, I do not find any signs of convergence of
effective tax rates across firms over time. This reflects the fact that firms, and especially
the group of digital firms, are highly heterogeneous in tax relevant tax characteristics.
Previous results from the literature help to understand general developments in corpo-
rate taxation. Several studies have shown a negative global trend with regard to statutory
corporate income tax rates over the last decades. For example, Devereux (2007) shows that
statutory corporate income tax rates in OECD countries have been declining significantly
since the 1960s from an average of slightly above 40 percent to around 33 percent in 2004.
Cuts in statutory tax rates were often accompanied by tax base broadening measures in
order to moderate the negative effect on tax revenues. However, the base broadening mea-
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sures only partially counteracted the decline in statutory tax rates. Therefore, effective tax
rates, measured as the share of income taxes paid in pre-tax profits, show a negative trend
over time as well. Next to a fall in levels of statutory and effective tax rates, Slemrod (2004)
also finds evidence for a decline in the dispersion of statutory and effective tax rates across
countries over time. Regis et al. (2015) do not find evidence of an overall convergence
of statutory tax rates in European countries but identify four distinct convergence clubs.
With regard to effective tax rates, Spengel et al. (2016) finds large heterogeneity in the
mean effective average tax rates across European countries. Applying the methodology by
Devereux and Griffith (1999,2003), they find the mean average effective tax rate in 2016 to
vary between 9 percent (Bulgaria) to 38.4 percent (France).
The tax competition literature offers an approach to explain the observed negative trends in
statutory tax rates. Slemrod (2004) argues that the decline in statutory and effective rates
since the 1980s is mainly due to competitive pressures rather than changes in the domestic
determinants of corporate taxation. Devereux et al. (2002) look at effective tax rates on
marginal investment across the EU and G7 countries and find evidence for increased com-
petition for profitable projects, which is reflected in declining effective tax rates on those
investments.
In addition to contributions from the tax competition literature, insights from the profit-
shifting literature prove helpful in understanding falling trends in effective tax rates, espe-
cially in the case of multinational firms. Firms lower their effective tax burden by exploiting
differences, mismatches and loopholes in international tax law to optimally allocate capital
across countries. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Dischinger (2010), for example, show
that there is a negative relationship between the statutory corporate tax rate of a country
and the share of reported pre-tax profits in that country. Next to contributions quantifying
the extent of artificial profit-shifting and estimating the magnitude of tax revenue lost due
to (legal) tax avoidance, much effort has been put in disentangling the shifting channels.
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) find companies to preliminary rely on strategic transfer
pricing and licensing, rather than inter-company debt, to artificially shift profits across
countries. Besides Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), Dharmapala (2014) and Riedel (2018)
provide excellent and detailed overviews on the profit shifting literature. Next to profit
reallocations, strategic location decisions and tax haven activity of firms can help to lower
their tax burden as well. For example, Hines, Gumpert and Schnitzer (2016) investigate
investments in tax havens based on firm characteristics. They find that larger and more
productive manufacturing firms are more likely to own tax haven affiliates.
Most closely related to the research question of this paper, several studies focus on exploring
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firm level determinants of effective tax rates. Using consolidated financial accounts data,
Markle and Shackelford (2012, 2014) show that headquarter location matters. Analyzing
firms from 82 countries for the period 1988 to 2009, they find that Japanese and US based
multinationals face significantly higher effective tax rates on their worldwide income than
multinationals headquartered in tax havens. Nicodeme (2007b) examines the relationship
between firm size and tax payments and finds a robust negative correlation between the
total number of employees and the effective tax rates of companies in the European Union.
Fuest, Maffini and Riedel (2010) analyze country and firm level determinants of effective
tax rates in developing countries. They find that larger firms pay higher effective tax rates,
on average. A higher degree of corruption in the country is connected to lower tax pay-
ments of firms. Whether the firm belongs to a multinational group or not does not have
any influence on its effective tax rate. The latter result is confirmed by Markle and Shack-
elford (2012), who also do not find significant differences between the effective tax rates of
multinational and domestic firms. Markle and Shackelford (2014) furthermore show that
the type (financial conduit vs. operating subsidiaries) and location of newly obtained sub-
sidiaries matters for the effective tax rate at the consolidated level. Some papers go beyond
the analysis of financial statement information and stress the relevance of typically unob-
served factors such as management, corporate culture and compensation schemes. Dyreng
et al. (2010) find evidence for individual effects of top executives on effective tax rates.
Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Rego and Wilson (2012) as well as Armstrong et al. (2012)
show that incentive mechanisms in compensation schemes impact the effective tax rate of
firms.
Most of the mentioned papers use unconsolidated financial statement data and focus on the
analysis of tax payments within countries. With my focus on consolidated data, I add to
the literature by comprehensively analyzing determinants of effective tax rates of firms as
economic entities. Next to pooled OLS estimations, I use a fixed effects model to account
for the potential influence of unobserved firm characteristics such as management and com-
pensation scheme effects. By exploring differences in the determinants of effective tax rates
between digital and non-digital firms, this paper is furthermore informative to the current
debate on a fair taxation of firms in the digital business sector.
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the conceptual framework and
derives hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. Section 3.3 describes the data,
while section 3.4 introduces the empirical estimation strategy. Section 3.5 presents the
results and section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses
The focus of this paper lies on the analysis of effective tax rates (ETRs) of firms as economic
entities. Assets, liabilities, income and expenses of the parent company and its subsidiaries
are therefore considered as those of a single economic entity. The effective tax rate, which
a multinational firm i with j subsidiaries in c countries in year t faces, is equal to the ratio
of its worldwide reported tax payments to worldwide taxable income and can be expressed
in the following way:
Effective tax ratei,t =
∑
j,i,c
[τc,t · taxable incomej,i,c,t]∑
j,i,c
taxable incomej,i,c,t
(3.1)
Tax payments at the subsidiary level in a country are equal to taxable profit within that
country multiplied by the respective statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Worldwide
tax payments are then equal to the sum of all tax payments over all subsidiaries and coun-
tries the firm operates in. Information on taxable income in individual countries, however,
is not available as tax return data, which would contain this information, is confidential.
Using information from consolidated financial statements, however, the effective tax rate
(ETR) of firm i in year t can be approximated in the following way:
ETRi,t =
∑
j,i,c
[τc,t · taxable incomej,i,c,t]∑
j,i,c
taxable incomej,i,c,t
· (1− λc,t) ≈
TAXAi,t
PLBTi,t
(3.2)
The ETR is computed as the ratio of tax expenses (TAXA) to profit/loss before taxation
(PLBT ) as reported in financial statements. Using consolidated financial statement data,
this is equal to worldwide tax expenses to worldwide pre-tax profit of the firm. Reported
pre-tax accounting income is not equal to taxable income due to book-tax differences, which
is reflected by the term (1− λ). Book-tax differences arise, as firms report financial state-
ment information according to IFRS (or GAAP), while taxable income is determined in
accordance with the respective national tax laws (Drake et al., 2018). Book-tax differences
potentially vary across countries and over time, mainly due to changes in national tax laws.
The sign and magnitude of (1− λ) cannot be estimated. A second caveat, that should be
kept in mind, arises with regard to the taxation variable in financial statements. Income
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tax expenses as reported in financial statements contain both, current and deferred taxes.
Ideally, I would like to separately identify current taxes and deferred taxes as they reflect
timing differences arising from accounting principles. Despite these difficulties, using taxa-
tion information from financial statements holds the advantage, that it is widely available
and considerably well comparable across countries due to common accounting principles
such as IFRS. Moreover, Markle and Shackelford (2012) show, that total and current tax
expense are highly correlated. Therefore, my measure of ETR should be suitable to capture
trends in ETR within and across firms.
From equation 3.2, it is evident that the ETR is affected by the statutory tax rates and
the share of worldwide profit reported in the respective countries, in which the firm’s head-
quarter and its subsidiaries are located in. Using information from consolidated financial
statements doest not allow to attribute shares of reported profit to the different subsidiaries
of a firm or to analyze (re-)location decisions of firms. However, it allows for a comprehen-
sive ex-post analysis of the relationship between firm characteristics and the reported tax
burden of firms.
I expect the ETR to be influenced by a set of firm characteristics. In the following, I
will briefly discuss the hypotheses on the distinct firm characteristics, building on previous
findings from the literature. Given that digital firms file their financial statements accord-
ing to the same accounting rules as other firms, I do not expect to see distinctive trends
regarding every discussed factor. However, given the public scrutiny that digital firms face
on the one hand, and the special endeavors of many countries to attract them on the other
hand, I expect to see differing results for digital firms in some aspects.
The impact of firm size on the ETR has been discussed in the literature before. The sign
of the relationship, however, is found to be ambiguous. Some early studies (Rego, 2003;
Kraft, 2014) find a positive relation between firm size and ETR. They argue, that larger
firms have a greater public visibility and are therefore more in the focus of tax authorities
and the government, which might take action to redistribute wealth away from the firm.
On the other hand, other studies find a negative relationship (e.g. Richardson and Lanis,
2005) and argue that larger firms tend to have a larger set of possibilities to avoid taxes and
more resources to engage in tax planning. Siegfried (1972) introduces a political economy
argument by stating that larger firms are more likely to influence the political process in
their favor. Another class of studies (such as Liu and Cao, 2007) argues, that there is no
systematic relationship between firm size and ETR at all. Two measures are commonly
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used to capture the size of a firm: the total number of employees and total assets. In
terms of total assets, I expect to see a positive relationship between firm size and the ETR.
The recent endeavors by the European Commission, hint towards the public visibility ar-
gument. On the other hand, in terms of employees, I expect to see a negative effect due
to the political economy argument. Especially firms that employ a large number of people
are likely to receive a favorable treatment by politicians and local authorities. With regard
to digital firms, I expect the positive effect of firm size in terms of total assets to be more
pronounced, given the public attention on those firms.
Corporate tax systems in most countries tend to treat debt and equity financing dif-
ferently. While interest expenses are often tax-deductible, dividend payouts are usually
not. I therefore expect to see a negative relationship between the share of debt financing of
a firm and its ETR. I do not expect this effect to differ between digital and non-digital firms.
Previous studies have looked at the relationship between firm profitability and the ETR.
The sign of the effect is found to be ambiguous. Armstrong et al. (2012) find a positive
relationship between the return on assets (ROA) and the ETR. However, they also find
a negative relationship with regard to the standard deviation of ROA. The authors argue
that a greater variation in pre-tax profits results in lower ETRs to be paid. Mahenthiran
and Kasipillai (2011) find a negative relation and argue that more profitable firms engage
more in tax planning. While the sign of the effect could go into both directions, I do not
expect to see a difference in the effect between digital and non-digital firms.
Many countries offer special tax treatment to income from intellectual property, such
as patents. In Europe, eleven countries offer so-called Intellectual Property Box regimes.
(Evers et al., 2013) I therefore expect to see a negative relationship between R&D inten-
sity and the ETR. In a robustness check, a control variable for the level of government
support provided in the country the firm is headquartered in is added. I also check for
an influence of the share of intangible assets in total fixed assets. Depreciation rules that
apply to tangible assets can often not be applied to intangibles. Therefore, I expect to see
a positive relationship between the share of intangibles and the ETR. However, I expect
to see a differing trend for digital firms. Given that many countries try to attract highly
innovative digital firms, that are characterized by a high share of intangible assets, I expect
to see a negative relationship between the share of intangibles and the ETR for digital firms.
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Lastly, I analyze the relationship between the share of cash that a firm holds and its
ETR. I expect to see a negative relationship between the share of cash and the ETR since
holding a larger share of cash might indicate a higher propensity of the firm to flexibly re-
allocate profits across borders. There should not be any difference in the effect with regard
to digital firms.
Of course, anti-profit shifting regulations and improvements in tax enforcement at the
national and international level impact the influence of the previously discussed firm char-
acteristics on the average tax burden from corporate income taxation. For example, most
base-broadening reforms included some form of thin-capitalization regulations that led to
a decline in the advantage from debt financing. On the other hand, IP Boxes and R&D tax
credits represent relatively new instruments, which were introduced in numerous countries
to attract highly innovative firms. They widened opportunities for R&D intensive firms to
legally lower their tax burden.
Next to discussing the influence of firm characteristics on ETRs, I also look at trends in
the dispersion of ETRs over time. Given that the previously described firm characteristics
are likely to influence ETRs at the firm level, a convergence in ETRs across firms could be
expected if firms got more similar in relevant firm characteristics. Furthermore, convergence
trends could occur if the stated hypothesis in the literature (e.g. Slemrod, 2004) holds,
that statutory CIT rates converge across countries over time. I am especially interested if a
convergence pattern can be identified with regard to the group of firms that the European
Commission classifies as digital firms. Results on the convergence test will be presented in
Section 3.5.3, after presenting results for the influence of firm-level characteristics on ETRs
in Section 3.5.1.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data sources and the sample selection process
Financial statement data used in this paper stem from the BvD Orbis database. Orbis
collects balance sheet and profit and loss account data via country specific data providers.2
2By covering both listed and non-listed firms, Orbis offers a broader coverage than other available firm-
level databases, such as Compustat. A list of data providers by country is provided in the Appendix C3.
A more detailed report on filing requirements and coverage by country can be found in Kalemli-Ozcan et
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The dataset spans the period 1984 to 2013 3 and includes consolidated financial statements
from firms located in 138 countries worldwide. Orbis differentiates types of accounts based
on their consolidation level. For the purpose of this paper, a differentiation is made between
consolidated accounts (Orbis consolidation level C1 and C2) and unconsolidated accounts
(Orbis consolidation level U1 and U2). A consolidated statement is defined as "the state-
ment of a company integrating the statements of its subsidiaries" (Bureau van Dijk, 2011).
This paper will use data from consolidated accounts, as the focus of the analysis lies on
developments of tax burdens of large (multinational) companies as economic entities. Most
contributions in the literature use unconsolidated account information at the subsidiary
level, as this allows for within country analyses as well as to track profit shifting activities
among subsidiaries of the same firm. Given the extremely complex group structures of
large multinational companies, however, it is impossible to get a full picture of a firm’s
tax burden from unconsolidated account data. This paper aims at filling this gap in the
literature by relating firm characteristics to the reported tax burden at the consolidated
level. Information on statutory tax rates is collected from the annual tax reports of EY,
KPMG and complemented by data from Devereux (2007). Detailed information on the data
sources used to compile the statutory tax rates dataset can be found in the Appendix of
Chapter 2. Industry classifications are made corresponding to the Statistical Classification
of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) as well as the International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC).4 Firms are classified
according to their main business activity. For the purpose of this paper, 17 industry groups
are formed. Digital firms are identified at the NACE 4-digit level following the definition
of the European Commission (2018). It basically comprises firms whose main business seg-
ments rely on digital data, technologies or online platforms. Table C6 shows the industry
classifications and short descriptions of the respective groups.
Table C1 summarizes the steps to the final sample. The original dataset spans the period
1979 to 2014, with very few observations for the years 1979 to 1983 and 2014. Consequently,
those years were dropped. Furthermore, incomplete balance-sheet information with regard
to taxation and profit/loss before taxation was dropped as well as micro firms with total
assets of less than 2 million USD, as in many countries special CIT rates and tax incentives
al., 2015.
3The latest Orbis version used in this data set stems from 2015; Orbis has a reporting lag of about two
years on average, 2014 was excluded due to a low number of observations available.
4NACE Rev. 2 classifications used to define industry groups are equivalent to ISIC Rev.4 groups at the
two-digit level (United Nations, 2008).
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exist for very small firms. Moreover, I dropped observations from the agricultural sector,
the mining and quarrying sector, firms active in public administration, defense activities
or education, art and recreation. Firms, which are active in these areas, are likely to face
a special set of tax rules or to receive public support in forms of subsidies, for example.
Therefore, their ETR would be hard to compare with firms from the manufacturing or
services sector. I dropped observations with obvious accounting mistakes and implausible
values. To give one example, I checked whether indicated tax expense (TAXA) matches
with the reported difference between profit/loss before tax (PLBT ) and profit/loss after
tax (PLAT ). If reported TAXA deviates by more than 10 percent from (PLBT −PLAT ),
the observation is dropped. I also dropped observations from firms that report tax expenses
to be larger than their total assets in the same year as well as observations from firms re-
porting negative values for intangible assets or R&D expenses as it is unclear whether there
is some economic reasoning behind it or if it simply reflects accounting mistakes. For the
final sample, the debt ratio of firms is computed as the ratio of the sum of loans (LOAN)
and long term debt (LTBD) to total assets (TOAS). R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D
expenses (RD) to turnover (TURN), alternatively operating revenue (OPRE) is used in
the denominator. The cash ratio is the share of cash holdings of the firm (CASH) in total
assets. Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are the two measures that
are used to capture profitability of the firm. Return on equity is computed as the ratio of
profit/loss for the period (PL) to shareholder funds (SHFD) and return on assets relates
profit/loss for the period to total assets. Furthermore, the relevance of intangible assets
for the firm is captured by the share of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) in total fixed assets
(FIAS). Table C5 gives an overview on the definition and computation of the variables
used in the analysis.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The final unbalanced sample contains 539,628 observations from 112,143 firms covering 30
years from 1984 to 2013. Firms in the sample are headquartered in 138 countries. 86
percent of observations and firms in the sample stem from the 15 countries with most ob-
servations. These 15 countries include five European countries (Germany, France, Great
Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), the United States, Canada, China, India, four other
Asian countries (Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam) and interestingly two tax havens
(Singapore, Cayman Islands). Countries in the dataset are grouped into six geographical
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regions: Europe, South and Central America, North America, Asia, Oceania and Africa.
Table C2 in the Appendix indicates the number of observations and firms in the final sam-
ple as well as the length of the panel by country and region. Some specifications report
graphs and table for a balanced panel covering the years 2004 to 2013. It contains 62,070
observations from 6,207 firms. Summary statistics on the balanced panel are reported in
the Appendix in Table C15.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on the unbalanced panel, containing the key items
from financial statements of firms. In the upper part A of the table, summary statistics
are reported for the full sample. The lower part B of table 3.1 shows summary statistics
for the group of digital firms. The group of digital firms is defined following the definition
of Fuest et al. (2018), which builds on the definition of digital business activities of the
European Commission (2018). It contains 2,666 firms from 64 countries and includes major
firms such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Alibaba, Twitter and Yahoo.
Table 3.1 reports three distinct values with regard to effective tax rates. ETR is com-
puted including all firms in the sample, also those that report negative or zero tax payments.
ETR1 reports summary statistics on the group of firms that report either zero or positive
tax payments. ETR2 presents summary statistics for the group of firm that actually pays
taxes by excluding firms with zero or negative tax payments. In the full sample, firms pay
an ETR of 21 percent, on average. The reported ETR is slightly lower for digital firms
with an average ETR of 20 percent. The median firm in the full sample pays 24 percent in
corporate income taxes, for the median digital firm it is 21 percent. The share of intangible
assets in total fixed assets is 23 percent for the full sample, on average. The share of R&D
expenses in operating profit is 2 percent. These values are considerably higher fro the group
of digital firms with a ratio of intangibles to total fixed assets of 46 percent and an R&D
intensity of 5 percent. Comparing the summary statistics for the return on equity (ROE)
and the return on assets (ROA), it is evident that the business activities of digital firms
are more volatile. Loss_last_year is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
firm reported a negative value for PLBT in the previous year. On average, 14 percent of
digital firms report losses in the previous year while it is only 8 percent of firms across the
full sample.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics on financial statement data
mean sd p50 min max count
A: Full sample
ETR 0.21 0.16 0.24 -0.23 0.62 539,628
ETR1 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.62 493,737
ETR2 0.26 0.12 0.26 0.00 0.62 445,955
TAXA 16.73 217.34 0.28 -0.04 39,943.19 539,628
PLBT 58.85 740.49 1.30 -81,888.96 174,799.30 539,628.00
TOAS 1,281.36 20,719.01 27.74 2.00 2,907,129.25 535,600
Employees 3,983.54 22,740.75 393.00 0.00 2,200,000.00 231,629
Intangibles_ratio 0.23 0.28 0.09 0.00 2.12 227,648
Cash_ratio 0.14 0.18 0.08 -0.15 1.00 395,563
RD_intensity 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.15 25,5687
Debt_ratio 0.17 0.21 0.08 -0.45 1.00 460,900
ROE 0.11 0.59 0.11 -10.00 9.97 511,589
ROA 0.04 0.13 0.04 -1.00 1.00 530,391
Loss_last_year 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 539,628
Digital 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 539,628
B: Digital firms
ETR 0.20 0.18 0.21 -0.23 0.62 13,883
ETR1 0.23 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.62 12,060
ETR2 0.27 0.14 0.28 0.00 0.62 10,303
TAXA 16.38 146.38 0.67 0.00 5,541.00 13,883
PLBT 47.10 904.49 2.84 -81,888.96 22,540.00 13,883.00
TOAS 597.15 4,470.83 50.91 2.00 175,940.97 13,536
Employees 2,982.13 16,174.91 352.00 0.00 434,246.00 9,537
Intangibles_ratio 0.46 0.32 0.44 0.00 1.03 10,498
Cash_ratio 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.00 1.00 12,852
RD_intensity 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.15 9,875
Debt_ratio 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.00 1.00 12,621
ROE -0.02 0.87 0.10 -9.94 9.92 12,722
ROA 0.02 0.19 0.05 -1.00 0.99 13,139
Loss_last_year 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 13,883
Notes: Values for total assets (TOAS), taxation (TAXA) and profit/loss before taxation (PLBT) are in
Million USD. Employees indicates the total number of people working for a firm. ROE and ROA are
ratios of profit/loss for the period to total equity and total assets, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Growth rates of the key items from financial-statement data
mean sd p50 min max count
A: Full sample
growth_toas 0.14 0.30 0.08 -0.50 2.19 359,819
growth_ifas 0.48 2.64 -0.01 -1.00 37.72 158,038
growth_ebitda 0.13 0.91 0.08 -5.75 6.64 208,483
growth_plbt 0.18 1.39 0.06 -7.72 10.16 362,824
growth_roe -0.53 0.48 -0.61 -2.32 1.97 338,677
growth_roa 0.04 1.00 -0.05 -4.32 5.55 347,744
growth_taxa 0.56 2.12 0.07 -1.00 23.65 335,897
growth_cash 0.81 3.07 0.08 -0.97 38.07 268,183
growth_rd 0.18 0.71 0.08 -1.00 6.11 45,618
growth_debt 0.37 1.96 0.00 -1.00 27.17 206,962
B: Digital firms
growth_toas 0.17 0.37 0.09 -0.50 2.19 8,857
growth_ifas 0.69 3.06 0.02 -1.00 37.62 7,150
growth_ebitda 0.14 1.07 0.10 -5.75 6.55 8,570
growth_plbt 0.22 1.47 0.10 -7.72 10.04 9,384
growth_roe -0.47 0.49 -0.52 -2.32 1.96 8,228
growth_roa -0.01 1.00 -0.07 -4.24 5.49 8,577
growth_taxa 0.65 2.32 0.10 -1.00 23.47 8,284
growth_cash 0.70 2.81 0.08 -0.97 37.97 8,698
growth_rd 0.26 0.86 0.10 -1.00 6.03 3,113
growth_debt 0.53 2.55 -0.04 -1.00 27.08 6,158
Given the panel structure of the dataset, growth rates of the key variables can be calcu-
lated at the firm level. Part A of Table 3.2 reports growth rates for the full sample of firms,
part B of the table reports growth rates for the group of digital firms. Digital firms grow
faster with respect to total assets as well as absolute values of profit/loss before taxation
and earnings before interest, taxation and amortization (EBITDA). Digital firms also show
higher growth rates in terms of intangible assets and R&D expenses. While firms in the
full sample show, on average, a positive growth rate of 4 percent with respect to the return
on assets, digital firms show negative mean values for the growth rates of return on equity
and return on assets.
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Table 3.3 shows evidence for heterogeneity of firms across geographical regions by pre-
senting selected summary statistics by region. Firms located in Europe face the highest
ETR with a mean value of 22 percent. The mean ETR of firms located in South and Central
America is considerably lower with 15 percent, which reflects the fact that this geographical
region includes several tax havens such as Panama, the Cayman Islands and the British
Virgin Islands.5 R&D intensity is highest among firms located in North America with a
mean value of 12 percent. The other regions show significantly lower mean values between
0 and 2 percent. The top 15 companies in the dataset with respect to R&D intensity are all
from the North American region and include large biotech and pharmaceutical companies
such as Biotransplant Inc. and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals. North American firms also
show the largest mean in terms of employees, which is partly driven by Walmart with its
2.2 Million employees. Cash holdings as a share of total assets are highest among North
American and South and Central American firms. The debt ratio is highest for firms lo-
cated in Europe with a mean value of 23 percent and the median firm showing a debt ratio
of 19 percent. Asian firm show the lowest values in this regard with a mean debt ratio of
14 percent and a median value of 0 percent.
5A full list of countries included in the respective geographical regions is provided in the Appendix in
Table C4.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics by region
mean sd p50 min max count
Africa
ETR 0.19 0.14 0.21 -0.23 0.62 6,801
TOAS 483.84 7528.92 57.54 2.01 610935.75 6,793
Employees 5468.27 17353.92 1246.50 1.00 530200.00 1,560
Intangibles_ratio 0.21 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.99 3,114
Cash_ratio 0.13 0.16 0.08 -0.02 1.00 6,467
RD_intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.41 5,431
Debt_ratio 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.98 5,709
ROA 0.07 0.11 0.06 -0.99 0.91 6,773
Asia
ETR 0.21 0.15 0.24 -0.23 0.62 317,465
TOAS 377.58 3,725.84 12.90 2.00 402,892.31 316,084
Employees 3,296.72 13,412.05 650.00 0.00 366,937.00 73,191
Intangibles_ratio 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.00 2.12 96,056
Cash_ratio 0.13 0.16 0.08 -0.08 1.00 183,605
RD_intensity 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.15 171,432
Debt_ratio 0.14 0.20 0.00 -0.45 1.00 285,689
ROA 0.05 0.11 0.04 -1.00 1.00 315,065
Europe
ETR 0.22 0.16 0.25 -0.23 0.62 140,077
TOAS 2,897.33 38,564.74 54.02 2.00 290,7129.25 140,049
Employees 3,168.24 18,022.19 209.00 0.00 648,254.00 113,734
Intangibles_ratio 0.29 0.31 0.15 0.00 1.00 82,728
Cash_ratio 0.13 0.16 0.07 -0.15 1.00 136,619
RD_intensity 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.14 38,267
Debt_ratio 0.23 0.22 0.19 -0.05 1.00 101,514
ROA 0.04 0.13 0.04 -1.00 1.00 139,103
Oceania
ETR 0.19 0.16 0.25 -0.23 0.62 7,621
TOAS 961.92 4,460.95 98.97 2.00 100,863.66 7,618
Employees 2,348.53 10,299.10 345.50 1.00 200,000.00 2,164
Intangibles_ratio 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.00 1.00 4,968
Cash_ratio 0.14 0.19 0.06 -0.07 1.00 6,944
RD_intensity 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.14 4,544
Debt_ratio 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.00 1.00 6,535
ROA 0.01 0.19 0.05 -1.00 0.81 7,148
South Central America
ETR 0.15 0.15 0.15 -0.23 0.62 14,021
TOAS 1,301.63 18,889.31 183.15 2.00 1,160,328.88 14,017
Employees 4,091.58 13,344.47 1,057.00 1.00 460,000.00 8,593
Intangibles_ratio 0.20 0.26 0.08 0.00 1.00 8,448
Cash_ratio 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.00 1.00 13,981
RD_intensity 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.90 13,409
Debt_ratio 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.00 1.00 13,339
ROA 0.04 0.16 0.05 -1.00 1.00 13,849
North America
ETR 0.17 0.19 0.13 -0.23 0.62 53,643
TOAS 2,592.57 14,676.42 156.63 2.00 797,769.00 51,039
Employees 8,407.90 45,380.73 831.00 0.00 2,200,000.00 32,387
Intangibles_ratio 0.41 0.30 0.36 0.00 1.00 32,334
Cash_ratio 0.21 0.24 0.10 -0.02 1.00 47,947
RD_intensity 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.00 1.15 22,604
Debt_ratio 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 48,114
ROA -0.04 0.23 0.03 -1.00 1.00 48,453
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 give an indication on developments with regard to the dispersion
of ETRs of firms over time. Figure 3.1 shows the dispersion of ETRs over time, including
only observations from firms that report positive tax payments. Figures on the dispersion
of ETRs, which also include observations from firms reporting zero or negative tax pay-
ments can be found in the Appendix (see Figures C3 and C1). In Figure 3.1, the solid line
between the two dashed lines represents the median value of the ETR for each year from
1984 to 2013. The dashed line represents ETRs of firms at the 25th and 75th percentile
of the distribution, respectively. The shaded grey area comprises the ETRs of firms from
the 10th to the 90th percentile in each year. The dotted red line shows the mean ETR
of firms that report positive tax payments for each year, the green dotted line shows the
mean ETR among digital firms. With regard to digital firms, the mean was only calculated
for years, in which the group of digital firms consists of over 50 firms. From 1984 to the
late 1990s, the ETRs of firms at the indicated percentiles seem to have been rather stable.
From the late 1990s to 2013, the ETR of firms at the 90th percentile, the 75th percentile
and the 50th percentile declined steadily. While the median firm faced an ETR of about
32 percent in 1984, the median firm in 2013 faces an ETR of about 23 percent. ETRs in
the bottom half of the distribution did not experience a downward trend but continued
to be rather stable. Firms at the 10th percentile of the ETR distribution in 1984 paid
approximately 8 percent of corporate income taxes on their pre-tax profit. In 2013, firms
at the 10th percentile still pay a very similar ETR. This is also reflected in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the mean trend of ETR over time as well as different measures of
dispersion. Graph I in Figure 3.2 shows the negative trend in the mean ETR from the late
1990s onward. Graph II shows a decline in the standard deviation. However, looking at the
coefficient of variation in Graph III, which relates developments in the standard deviation
to the mean, an increasing trend is visible since the mid 1990s. Graph IV shows that the
range of ETRs between the 90th and 10th percentile declined over time. As previously
discussed, this is driven by the decreasing ETR of firms at the 90th percentile while the
ETR at the 10th percentile remained rather stable.
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Figure 3.1: The development of the distribution of ETR over time
Notes: ETR2 reports effective tax rates of firms that report tax expenses > 0. The shaded area
represents the dispersion within the 10th and 90th percentile, the solid line indicates the median ETR by
year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively. The red dotted line shows the
mean ETR for the full sample and the green dotted line shows the mean ETR for the group of digital
firms.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Firm-level characteristics of ETRs
In a first step, firm-level determinants of ETRs will be analyzed by estimating a pooled
OLS regression model:
ETRi,t = α+β1 toasi,t+β2 empli,t+β3 roei,t+β4 rdi,t+β5 ifasi,t+β6digitali+γXi,t+ηt+µc+εi,t
(3.3)
The dependent variable in the baseline specification is the ETR of firm i in year t,
which is equal to the ratio of taxation to pre-tax profits. It is regressed on a set of firm
characteristics introduced in the conceptual framework section as well as additional macro
controls X such as GDP, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and a measure for insti-
tutional quality (Freedom House Index).Year fixed effects (ηt) are included to capture the
influence of common trends over time. Additionally, fixed effects at the country level (µc)
are included to control for potential unobserved time-invariant country characteristics that
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Figure 3.2: Measures of Dispersion
Notes: Graph I shows the development of the mean ETR2 (only firms with tax expenses larger zero)
across the sample over time. The dashed line shows a 3-year average, computed at the firm level to
account for fluctuations during the business cycle and timing differences due to deferrals etc. Graph II
depicts the standard deviation of the ETR2 measure. Graph III shows the coefficient of variation. The
coefficient of variation is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation measure to the sample mean.
Graph IV represents the range, which is computed as the difference between the 90th and 10th percentile
of the ETR measure per year.
might be correlated with both the firm characteristics and the ETR. It is plausible, that the
level of taxation a firm faces influences its level of investments over time and therefore its
size (see for example Fernandez-Rodriguez and Martinez-Arias, 2014). In order to deal with
these reverse causality concern, the lagged level of the total assets variable is used in some
specifications. Results indicate whether the included firm-level characteristics are relevant
explanatory factors in the reported ETR of a firm. Observed correlations do not necessarily
imply causality between firm-level characteristics and the ETR. Potential channels of the
observed correlations between the firm’s ETR and its characteristics will be discussed in
Section 3.5.2.
A potential concern with the specification in Equation 3.3 is the potential existence of
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firm specific unobserved effects. If unobserved firm-level effects exist and they influence
both, the included explanatory variables and the ETR, the estimated coefficients will be
biased due to this omitted variables problem (Greene, 2017). One example would be the
quality of management within a firm. A good management is likely to have a positive
impact on the profitability and growth of a firm. At the same time, savvy managers might
be better at identifying and exploiting loopholes and mismatches in corporate tax systems,
which will result in a lower ETR of the firm. Research has shown (e.g. by Armstrong et
al., 2012) that unobserved firm-specific effects do play a role. The inclusion of firm fixed
effects controls for a potential bias arising from unobserved firm heterogeneity. In Section
3.5, results from both pooled OLS regressions and the fixed effects model are presented.
Furthermore, there might be a concern regarding the a dynamic nature of the panel.
Most corporate tax systems allow for temporary adjustments of taxation, for example via
tax deferrals. Therefore, it might be necessary to include a lagged level of the ETR as an
explanatory variable in the regression. In the literature, some contributions in the context
of effective tax rates have opted for the application of the Arellano-Bond estimator (see
for example Fernandez-Rodriguez and Martinez-Arias (2014) or Fuest, Maffini and Riedel,
2010). The Arellano-Bond estimator combines a first difference generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimation with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. The estimation
in first differences deals with time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across firms. The
IV strategy instruments potentially endogenous variables with lags of their levels. In the
literature, this estimation strategy is applied in panel regressions with a large number of
observations and few periods (large N, small T) as fixed-effects estimations are likely to
be biased in these settings due to the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). The Nickell bias occurs
due to a correlation of order (1/T ) between the explanatory variables and the error term.
However, given that the bias diminishes as T grows and that I am using a long panel with
up to 30 annual observations6, I expect the Nickel-bias to be negligible and the fixed effects
estimation to be suitable in the context of this paper. Results for the fixed effects model
including lagged levels of the dependent variable are reported in Section 3.5. Results of the
dynamic panel Arellano-Bond system GMM estimation approach are reported in Table C9
and discussed in Section 3.5.2.
6Judson and Owen (1999) recommend to use the fixed effects estimator for the unbalanced panel case
of T>20 instead of a dynamic panel estimation. For a balanced panel, they recommend the fixed effects
estimator even for the case of T ≤ 10. Also Kiviet (1995) stresses the relative efficiency of the fixed effects
estimator compared to GMM methods.
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3.4.2 Cluster analysis and panel convergence
Next to analyzing firm-level determinants of ETRs of firms, I am interested in investigating
trends with regard to convergence patterns of the ETRs. I apply the approach proposed by
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009), who introduce a nonlinear time varying factor model for the
analysis of transition and convergence trends in micro panel data. Regis et al. (2015) have
used the same methodology of cluster analysis and convergence testing to analyze trends in
statutory CIT rates in Europe. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one to
apply the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) methodology in the context of effective corporate
tax rates. Philipps and Suls’ model contains a simple panel regression based convergence
test, which I will apply to see if ETRs of firms at the consolidated level converge over time.
The advantage of the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) methodology is that it allows to look
at the evolution of the whole distribution rather than a measure of central tendency (Regis
et al. 2015). The methodology also allows to test for the existence of convergence clubs
without previously defining assumptions on the underlying characteristics of the clubs. It is
tested, whether idiosyncratic components within endogenised groupings of firms converge
to a common factor. Therefore, the Philipps and Sul approach allows to check for a distinct
trend of ETRs for the group of digital firms.
The Philipps and Sul (2007,2009) approach decomposes the panel data on ETRs as:
ETRi,t = γi,tνt (3.4)
This dynamic factor model is based on the assumption that the development of ETRs over
time is driven by a common trend across all firms νt (for example, globally decreasing
statutory tax rates) and an individual component γi,t (based on the identified firm charac-
teristics).
Convergence of ETRs in the context of the approach of Phillips and Sul implies relative
convergence7:
lim
t→∞
ETRi,t
ETRj,t
= 1, for all i and j (3.5)
This is equivalent to convergence in the individual component:
lim
t→∞
γi,t = γ, for all i (3.6)
7Focusing on relative convergence holds the advantage, that it allows for nonstationary stochastic trends
in the common trend component νt (Phillips and Sul, 2009).
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The tested null hypothesis is that there is convergence in the individual component of
the ETRs across firms over time: H0 : γi = γ
Econometric details on the approach are provided in the Appendix. The convergence
test requires a balanced panel data set. I construct a balanced panel focusing on the last 10
years of the sample, 2004 to 2013. The balanced panel data set contains 62,070 observations
from 6,207 firms, among those 151 digital firms. Given that the sample size with regard to
digital firms is rather small in the balanced sample, results to the convergence tests are to
be seen as indicatory evidence.
3.5 Results
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results from the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations on
firm-level determinants of ETRs. I find that firms with a higher R&D intensity, a higher
debt ratio and more cash holdings pay a lower ETR, on average. Furthermore, evidence
from the Philipps and Sul (2007, 2009) clustering and club convergence tests with respect to
effective tax rates will be discussed. I do not find evidence of convergence in ETRs across
the firms in our sample. There is also no evidence of convergence among digital firms,
reflecting that this group comprises firms that are highly heterogeneous in tax relevant firm
characteristics.
3.5.1 Explanatory factors of ETRs
Table 3.4 presents results from pooled OLS estimations. The dependent variable in these
estimations is ETR and all specifications include year and country level fixed effects. In
column (1), the coefficient for employees is positive and highly significant, however, small
in magnitude. Column (2) adds total assets.8 Total assets is better suited to capture firm
size as research showed that the labor share is declining across many industries. The co-
efficient for total assets is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that a
one percent increase in total assets increases the ETR of the firm by 0.9 percentage points,
on average. This is in line with the argument discussed in Section 3.2 that larger firms are
under more intense public scrutiny. Firms that reported a loss last year face lower ETRs,
8I use the logarithm of total assets, to limit the influence of outliers.The dataset contains very large
yet plausible values as they can be attributed to the largest firms in the world, such as BNP Paribas or
Walmart.
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which is coherent with the possibility of loss-carry-forwards in many corporate tax systems.
The difference in ETRs between firms reporting a loss last year and profitable firms is 14.2
percentage points, on average. Column (4) adds a dummy indicating whether the obser-
vation stems from a digital firm or not. The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level
and indicates that digital firms do face lower ETRs: the expected mean difference between
digital and non-digital firms is 0.6 percentage points. However, once industry fixed effects
at the industry group level are included, the significance of the digital firm dummy dis-
appears, reflecting that within industry groups, digital and non-digital firms do not show
different ETRs.9 Column (5) adds macro controls that capture the potential influence of
observable country characteristics. The coefficients for the statutory CIT rate of the coun-
try of the parent company, the unemployment rate and value of the freedom house index for
this country are statistically significant. In column (6), which adds the lagged value of the
ETR of the firm, the only country-level variable that remains significant is the statutory
CIT rate. A one percentage point increase in the statutory CIT rate of the country the
parent company is located in leads to an increase in the reported ETR of the firm of 0.07
percentage points.
Congruent to previous findings in the literature, the coefficient on firm profitability,
return on equity, is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Similar results are ob-
tained when using return on assets as profitability measure. In the robustness section, I also
check for an effect of the volatility of reported profits by including the standard deviation
of the profitability measure in the regression. Results are discussed in Section 3.5.2. The
coefficient for the share of intangible assets in total fixed assets is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level. This indicates, that firms with a higher share of intangible assets
face a higher ETR, on average, which is surprising. However, as the discussion of results
from Table 3.5 will show, the coefficient is not significant anymore when controlling for
unobserved firm-level effects. The coefficients for R&D intensity, the firm’s debt ratio and
share of cash holdings show the expected signs in the pooled OLS regressions.
9It should be kept in mind that also the classification of digital and non-digital firms depends on industry
classifications. Yet, it is done at the 4-digit level while industry groups are broader defined at the 2-digit
level.
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Table 3.4: Results from Pooled OLS Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR
empl 0.0000184∗∗∗ -0.0000229∗∗∗ -0.0000181∗∗∗ -0.0000180∗∗∗ -0.0000190∗∗∗ -0.0000117∗∗∗
(1.79e-08) (1.97e-08) (1.91e-08) (1.91e-08) (1.98e-08) (1.80e-08)
ifas_fias 0.00238 0.00964∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.00866∗∗∗
(0.00223) (0.00219) (0.00211) (0.00214) (0.00234) (0.00214)
cash_toas -0.0578∗∗∗ -0.0416∗∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗
(0.00340) (0.00336) (0.00319) (0.00320) (0.00347) (0.00306)
rd_intensity -0.302∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.00777) (0.00776) (0.00758) (0.00757) (0.00768) (0.00649)
debt_ratio -0.0575∗∗∗ -0.0788∗∗∗ -0.0616∗∗∗ -0.0620∗∗∗ -0.0687∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗∗
(0.00324) (0.00327) (0.00315) (0.00316) (0.00337) (0.00321)
roe 0.000664∗∗∗ 0.000608∗∗∗ 0.000483∗∗∗ 0.000482∗∗∗ 0.000482∗∗∗ 0.000327∗∗∗
(0.0000178) (0.0000170) (0.0000149) (0.0000149) (0.0000155) (0.0000149)
ln_toas 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.00929∗∗∗ 0.00920∗∗∗ 0.00919∗∗∗ 0.00424∗∗∗
(0.000312) (0.000303) (0.000304) (0.000324) (0.000304)
losslastyear -0.142∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗
(0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00245) (0.00291)
digital -0.00643∗∗∗ 0.00171 0.00190
(0.00208) (0.00284) (0.00260)
CIT 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0742∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0215)
gdp_consus -7.66e-16 3.86e-16
(8.19e-16) (8.32e-16)
gdp_pc_consus -0.000000837 0.000000126
(0.000000583) (0.000000630)
unemployment -0.00110∗∗∗ 0.0000490
(0.000424) (0.000414)
freedomhouse 0.00840∗∗∗ 0.00378
(0.00234) (0.00249)
L.ETR 0.498∗∗∗
(0.00532)
_cons 0.117∗∗∗ -0.0477 -0.00177 -0.000537 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
(0.0442) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0352) (0.0346)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 95,847 95,847 95,847 95,847 86,386 65,987
R2 0.264 0.278 0.319 0.319 0.326 0.512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. To make the table more
compact, in these specifications, the effect of the number of employees is measured as the marginal effect
of an increase by 100 employees.
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However, there might be a problem of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, that
is not captured by the included fixed effects at the aggregate country or industry level.
Thus, a fixed effects model is estimated. The fixed effects estimator makes use of within
panel estimation over time and is therefore robust to unmeasured correlation between the
firm specific effect and the exogenous variables included in the model. Results are reported
in Table 3.5. The robustness of the model comes at the price of its inability to estimate
coefficients for time invariant variables. Therefore, I add the concrete size of the loss last
year instead of the previously discussed loss dummy in column (3). Column (4) adds the
previously discussed macro controls. In the fixed effects model, the coefficient of GDP is
statistically significant, albeit very small. It indicates that firms from larger countries show
slightly larger ETRs, while controlling for other influencing factors such as the country’s
statutory CIT, institutional quality as captured by the freedom house index, and relevant
firm characteristics. In Column (5), the coefficients for the number of employees, the share
of intangible assets, cash holdings and reported losses in the previous year are not statisti-
cally significant. The coefficients for R&D intensity, the firm’s debt ratio, return on equity
and firm size, however, are significant at the 1 percent level and show the same signs as
discussed before. The coefficients on firm profitability and the R&D intensity of the firm
are smaller in magnitude than in the pooled OLS specification, the coefficients for firm size
and the debt ratio are larger than before. Results from both the pooled OLS and fixed
effects show that certain firm characteristics such as its R&D intensity, the firm’s debt
ratio, its profitability and size are relevant factors in explaining the ETR that a firm faces
at the consolidated level.
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Table 3.5: Results from the Fixed Effects Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR
empl 0.000000151 -6.12e-08 -6.20e-08 -8.23e-08 2.18e-08
(9.26e-08) (8.39e-08) (8.38e-08) (8.69e-08) (8.50e-08)
ifas_fias 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.00479 0.00475 0.0110∗ 0.00922
(0.00539) (0.00537) (0.00533) (0.00574) (0.00585)
cash_toas -0.0105∗ -0.0144∗∗ -0.0148∗∗ -0.0116∗ -0.00610
(0.00584) (0.00582) (0.00578) (0.00612) (0.00610)
rd_intensity -0.118∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.0804∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0139)
debt_ratio -0.0712∗∗∗ -0.0927∗∗∗ -0.0909∗∗∗ -0.0955∗∗∗ -0.0571∗∗∗
(0.00681) (0.00691) (0.00686) (0.00722) (0.00751)
roe 0.000344∗∗∗ 0.000327∗∗∗ 0.000325∗∗∗ 0.000327∗∗∗ 0.000236∗∗∗
(0.0000179) (0.0000175) (0.0000175) (0.0000183) (0.0000202)
ln_toas 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00155) (0.00177) (0.00196)
loss_size 5.89e-09 5.71e-09 -2.86e-09
(6.91e-09) (6.90e-09) (7.13e-09)
CIT 0.197∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.0297) (0.0317)
gdp_consus 2.86e-15∗∗ 3.94e-15∗∗∗
(1.19e-15) (1.25e-15)
gdp_pc_consus 0.000000940 0.000000152
(0.000000733) (0.000000820)
unemployment -0.000637 -0.000416
(0.000517) (0.000554)
freedomhouse 0.00589∗∗∗ 0.00572∗∗
(0.00229) (0.00258)
L.ETR 0.0661∗∗∗
(0.00771)
_cons 0.363∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.115∗∗ -0.0328 -0.00484
(0.0568) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0340) (0.0368)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
N 95,847 95,847 95,847 87,007 66,473
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results from column (4) in Table3.4 indicate that digital firms pay a slightly lower
ETR, on average. To further investigate differences between digital and non-digital firms,
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Table 3.6 includes interaction terms of relevant firm-level characteristics with the dummy
variable, that indicates digital firms. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 3.6 present results from
pooled OLS regressions, Columns (2) and (4) are obtained from the fixed effects model.
Congruent to the results obtained before, the coefficient for firm size (total assets) is positive
and significant in both, the pooled OLS and fixed effects specification and the coefficients
for debt ratio and R&D intensity are significant and negative. The interaction terms of
the digital dummy with R&D intensity and the debt ratio are not significant, indicating
that digital firms are not any different from other firms. However, three interaction terms
show significant coefficients: Firstly, the coefficient for the share of intangible assets in total
fixed assets is significant at the 1 percent level (5 percent level in the fixed effects model).
Its interaction term with the digital dummy is negative yet smaller than the intangibles
coefficient, indicating that the positive effect of the share of intangibles on the ETR is less
pronounced for digital firms. Secondly, the interaction term of the digital dummy with firm
size is significant and positive. This means that the positive effect of firm size in terms of
total assets is even more pronounced for digital firms, potentially reflecting that they are
under special public pressure. Thirdly, the coefficient for the profitability measure (return
on equity) is positive and significant in both, the pooled OLS and fixed effects specifica-
tion. Its interaction term, is statistically significant and negative. Yet again, smaller in
magnitude and therefore indicating that the effect of profitability on the ETR is positive
but less pronounced as compared to other firms.
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Table 3.6: Adding interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETR ETR ETR ETR
L.ETR 0.501∗∗∗ 0.0825∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.0826∗∗∗
(0.00504) (0.00717) (0.00532) (0.00754)
empl -0.000000114∗∗∗ 3.74e-09 -0.000000117∗∗∗ 1.90e-08
(1.72e-08) (8.08e-08) (1.80e-08) (8.38e-08)
ifas_fias 0.00726∗∗∗ 0.00698 0.00994∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00211) (0.00591) (0.00221) (0.00628)
ifas_digital -0.00995 -0.0311∗ -0.0125∗ -0.0357∗∗
(0.00625) (0.0166) (0.00649) (0.0175)
cash_toas -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ -0.00748
(0.00300) (0.00596) (0.00316) (0.00634)
cash_digital -0.00190 0.0237 -0.000831 0.0192
(0.0108) (0.0216) (0.0114) (0.0231)
rd_intensity -0.130∗∗∗ -0.0796∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.0789∗∗∗
(0.00655) (0.0146) (0.00664) (0.0150)
rd_digital -0.0152 -0.0496 -0.0218 -0.0499
(0.0194) (0.0417) (0.0199) (0.0434)
debt_ratio -0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0563∗∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗
(0.00312) (0.00740) (0.00327) (0.00773)
debt_digital -0.00974 -0.00331 -0.0107 -0.00298
(0.0162) (0.0348) (0.0170) (0.0368)
ln_toas 0.00432∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.00404∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.000296) (0.00176) (0.000309) (0.00207)
toas_digital 0.00269∗∗∗ 0.00614 0.00320∗∗∗ 0.00983∗∗
(0.00103) (0.00441) (0.00107) (0.00473)
roe 0.000338∗∗∗ 0.000245∗∗∗ 0.000336∗∗∗ 0.000248∗∗∗
(0.0000155) (0.0000213) (0.0000162) (0.0000223)
roe_digital -0.0000653∗∗ -0.0000864∗ -0.0000751∗∗ -0.000103∗∗
(0.0000320) (0.0000488) (0.0000323) (0.0000471)
losslastyear -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗
(0.00269) (0.00291)
digital -0.0230∗ -0.0283∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0144)
_cons -0.0170 0.0715 -0.0976∗∗∗ -0.0158
(0.0316) (0.0495) (0.0346) (0.0371)
Macro Controls NO NO YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES NO YES NO
Industry FE YES NO YES NO
N 72,879 73,383 65,987 66,473
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.2 Robustness and discussion
In order to alleviate endogeneity concerns due to a potential reverse causality between firm
level characteristics such as total assets and the ETR, Table C8 uses lagged values of the
share of intangibles, cash holdings, R&D intensity, the debt ratio, total assets and return
on equity. The coefficients show the same statistical significance and are very similar in
magnitude. Thus, I conclude reverse causality to not present a major issue in the analy-
sis. To deal with concerns about a potentially dynamic nature of the panel, I rerun the
main specifications using the Arellano-Bond estimator. Results are reported in Table C9.
Congruent to the results from the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimations, R&D intensity
and the debt ratio show positive and highly significant coefficients, whereas the coefficients
for firm size (total assets) and profitability (return on equity) are positive. With respect
to the interaction terms, all interactions are statistically insignificant except for the inter-
action between return on equity and the digital dummy. As before, this interaction term
is negative yet smaller in size than the coefficient for profitability.
Table C10 adds several control variables, which are potentially of interest but only
available for a limited number of observations and/or countries and thus not added in the
main specifications. Column (1) in Table C10 adds the age of the firm. Age of the firm
is computed as 2014 (presenting the last year in the original sample) minus the year of
incorporation, which is available in the Orbis database. The coefficient for firm age is pos-
itive and significant at the 5 percent level. Many countries provide a special tax treatment
to start-ups and young firms, leading to a lower tax burden for this group. Columns (2)
and (3) control for the influence of policies and tax incentive with regard to R&D. R&D
support is a variable obtained from the OECD Research and Development Statistics and
measures total government support for R&D activities as a share of GDP. It is available for
the year 2006 and comprises direct funding as well as tax incentives in 39 OECD countries.
It ranges from zero percent (Chile) to 54 percent (Russia). Column (2) reports results from
the pooled OLS specification including the R&D support measure and interacting it with
the R&D intensity of the firm. The R&D support variable enters the regression with a
negative and highly significant coefficient. The higher the R&D support of the country the
parent firm is located in, the lower its reported ETR. The coefficient for R&D intensity is
highly significant and of similar magnitude than before. The interaction term is not statis-
tically significant, indicating that the influence of R&D intensity on the reported ETR of
the firm does not depend on the level of R&D support in the country of the parent firm.
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Column (3) reports results on the same specification for the fixed effects model and results
in the same outcome. Column (4) checks for a relationship between reported ETR and
the administrative burden of paying corporate income taxes, measured in the amount of
hours per year spent on preparing and paying taxes. The measure comes from the Do-
ing Business Database of the World Bank and is obtained for the period 2006 to 2013 for
15 European countries and ranges between 76 hours (Ireland, 2006-2012) and 866 hours
(Czech Republic, 2006). Its mean value decreases from 143 hours in 2006 to 129 hours in
2013. However, results from Column (4) indicate no significant relationship between the
administrative burden in the country of the parent company and the ETR of the firm.
Column (5) includes a measure for tax honesty obtained from the World Value Survey. It
is available for 9 European countries and was collected in five waves of the survey (1990,
1995, 1999, 2005, 2010). The tax honesty measure is scaled from 1 to 10. A higher average
value of this measure in a country indicates that cheating on taxes is socially more accepted
in this country, compared to countries with lower average values.10 A negative and signifi-
cant coefficient on that coefficient would indicate that the higher the tax honesty measure
(meaning the lower the average tax honesty in a country), the lower the reported ETR of
firms located in that country. Although the coefficient shows the expected negative sign, it
is not statistically significant.
Table C11 reports pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations for the samples excluding
observations from firms with zero and/or negative tax payments. Results obtained from
these samples are similar to the previously discussed results in many regards, yet there are
some interesting differences: The debt ratio does not show a significant coefficient in the
pooled OLS estimations and a positive coefficient in the fixed effects specifications. There-
fore, the negative effect of the debt ratio on the ETR seems to be driven by loss-reporting
firms. The coefficient for the profitability measures is now negative and highly significant
in all specifications. Among the profitable firms, higher profitability is connected to a lower
reported ETR. Interaction terms with the dummy for digital firms are mostly insignificant,
with exceptions with regard to intangibles and firm size.
10The exact phrasing on the respective question in the World Value Survey is the following: Please tell me
for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between, using this card. (Read out and code one answer for each statement): Cheating on taxes if you
have a chance. More information can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp,
V200 (Wave 5).
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Moreover, I estimate the main specifications by region to investigate heterogeneity in
the ETR determinants across geographical regions. Results are presented in Tables C12 and
C13. Results should be interpreted with caution with regard to Africa, Oceania and South
and Central America due to the relatively small sample size (< 1000 observations). For
Asia, Europe and North America a negative influence of R&D intensity and the debt ratio
can be seen. Coefficients with regard to firm size and profitability are positive. Obtained
effects with respect to R&D intensity and profitability are significantly stronger in Asia.
The negative influence of the debt ratio is most pronounced in Europe, while the positive
effect of firm size is strongest in North America. Table C14 adds interaction terms to the
regressions by region. For North America, the coefficients on the interaction of firm size
and profitability with the digital dummy are significant and of the same sign as previously
discussed. With regard to Europe, only the interaction term for firm size is significant at
the 5 percent level. While there is some evidence for heterogeneity across geographical re-
gions, the main results prove to be robust to dividing the sample and separately estimating
firm level determinants within geographical regions.
Finally, some remarks should be made about the appropriateness of financial statement
data when it comes to analyzing firm level characteristics of digital firms. While I have
discussed general caveats of tax information obtained from financial statements before, the
nature of digital businesses provides additional challenges to the analysis. Assets reported
on a balance sheet have to fulfill strict criteria that are laid out by internationally accepted
accounting principles: they have to be owned and held by the company and they have
to be physical in nature. These criteria are not adequate for digital companies mainly
relying on intangible assets such as brands, customer and social relationships and human
capital. While purchased brands and intangibles can be reported as assets on balance
sheets, intangibles resulting from R&D investments only show up as expenses. While
physical assets depreciate with use, intangible assets often rather increase in value over time.
Looking at stock market valuations and merger and acquisition deals of digital companies,
it is clear that these problems attached to balance sheets and income statements are well
known by investors. For example, in 2014 Facebook was willing to pay 19 Billion USD
for WhatsApp, although WhatsApp did not report any revenues or profits. Walmart’s
ratio of its stock market valuation to its balance sheet volume is 1.9, for Facebook the
ratio is almost 30 times higher (55.6). (Govindarajan et al., 2018). While balance sheet
information might give a blurred picture of the size and economic value of a digital firm,
the discussed distortions are constant over time. The panel structure of my data set allows
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to track developments within firms over time. Therefore, I am confident that results from
my analysis, especially the specifications controlling for firm fixed effects, provide valuable
insights, despite the prevalent short-comings of accounting information.
3.5.3 Testing for convergence
Research with regard to statutory corporate tax rates has found evidence for convergence
of statutory rates for Europe (Regis et al., 2015) and Asia, respectively (Chen et al., 2016).
While both studies do not find strong convergence trends across their full samples, they both
identify several convergence clubs within the respective regions. Following the methodology
by Philipps and Sul (2007,2009), I test for convergence in ETRs. Potentially, the observed
convergence trends in statutory rates could translate into convergence trends of ETRs at
the firm level. Regression results show, that the statutory rate in the country of the parent
company is a significant explanatory factor of firm level ETR. Convergence tests are con-
ducted on a balanced sample of firms, covering the years 2004 to 2013. Summary statistics
on this balanced sample are provided in Table C15.
First, I check for convergence in ETRs across the full sample of firms. The value of
the t-statistic of the one-sided t-test for the null hypothesis of convergence across the full
sample is -21.2597 and the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Thus, I find no evidence
of convergence of ETRs across the full sample of firms. Second, I check for convergence
among digital firms. The reasoning by the European Commission (2018) in the context of
the proposed interim tax on revenues from digital business activities implicitly assumes,
that this group of firms homogeneously pays a lower ETR that can be counterbalanced
by the proposed 3 percent revenues tax. However, also for the group of digital firms, no
convergence trend with regard to the development of ETRs can be identified and the null
hypothesis of convergence is rejected (t− stat = −5.9923 < −1.65).
This result reflects that the group of digital firms is highly heterogeneous in the char-
acteristics that determine the ETR at the firm level. Figure C6 in the Appendix shows the
dispersion in financial statement variables that were identified as tax relevant for the group
of digital firms.11. Figure C6 shows no signs of dispersion as the range between the 10th
and 90th percentile with regard stays is rather stable over time.
11Figure C5 shows the dispersion in these variables for the whole balanced sample
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3.6 Conclusion
The results of this paper show that firm characteristics impact the tax burden a firm faces
as an economic entity. The relationship between the ETR and the R&D intensity, the debt
ratio and the share of cash holdings of a firm is found to be negative, respectively. On the
other hand, larger firms (in terms of total assets) as well as more profitable firms (in terms
of ROA and ROE) face higher ETRs. Checking for differences between digital and non-
digital firms, I find that the positive size effect is more pronounced for digital firms. This is
congruent with the hypothesis that large digital firms are under special public scrutiny. The
relationship between the share of intangibles in total fixed assets and the ETR is negative
for the group of digital firms. This might reflect that the most attractive digital firms are
characterized by particularly high shares of intangibles and that they benefit from special
tax treatment by governments. Moreover, making use of the rich panel structure of the
data set, I test for convergence and clustering trends in ETRs for a balanced sample of
firms. I do not find any evidence for convergence across firms as well as within the group of
digital firms. Both groups of firms show a similar magnitude of dispersion of ETRs across
firms, that stays rather constant over time.
Putting this paper in context of the current political debate, results from estimations
on consolidated financial statement data reflect the distortions, that current corporate tax
systems entail with regard to debt financing and R&D support. However, from the analysis
there is no evidence that digital firms pay particularly low ETRs nor that the development
of their ETRs over time is different from that of other firms. It is certainly true that
current corporate taxation principles are improper in the light of the rising importance
of digital business models. As previously explained, accounting rules entail many flaws in
their ability to correctly depict the economic situation of firms with digital business models.
Moreover, the current corporate tax systems’ focus on physical presence of a corporation
rather than the location of interaction with customers proves increasingly inept. However,
firms act within the currently given set of rules. Considering that there is a lack of evidence
of unequable behavior by digital firms, it is highly questionable to phrase the debate as a
matter of "fairness".
Appendix
figuresection tablesection
3.A Details on the Phillips and Sul Approach (2007,2009)
Phillips and Sul (2009) as well as Du (2017) provide a detailed description of the convergence
test developed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) and its implementation in Stata. The
following provides a summary of those two sources to enable a deeper understanding of the
underlying econometric considerations of the approach.
The approach by Phillips and Sul allows for more heterogeneity in the transition paths
compared to conventional convergence tests. To be more specific, they decompose γi,t is
decomposed to allow for heterogeneity in the transition across individuals (firms) and over
time:
bi,t = bi +
σiηi,t
L(t)tα
(3.7)
with ηi,t being i.i.d. across i and L(t) being a slowly varying function. α indicates
how fast the cross-section variation over the transitions converges towards zero over time.
Therefore, the model allows for temporary divergence and transitional heterogeneity. Monte
Carlo simulations indicated that L(t) is best approximated by L(t) = log(t). Thus, the
hypothesis test is implemented with the following regression model:
ETRi,t =
H1
Ht
− 2log(log(t)) = a+ βlog(t) + εt, fort = T0..., T. (3.8)
with Ht =
1
N
∑N
i=1 > (hi,t − 1)2. Hi,t indicates the cross-sectional variance of the
relative transition parameter hi,t:
Hi,t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
> (hi,t − 1)2 lim
t→∞γi,t=γ,foralli
(3.9)
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The individual transition parameter hi,t identifies the transition path of each firm rel-
ative to the cross-section average, thereby capturing deviations from the common trend.
Thus, the individual transition path can be expressed in the following way:
hi,t =
γi,t
1/N
∑N
i=1 γi,t
(3.10)
In case the test statistic of the one-sided t test rejects the null hypothesis of convergence
for the whole panel, Phillips and Sul (2007) developed an algorithm to check for the exis-
tence of convergence clusters. Convergence test within potential subgroups are conducted
as previously described. Details on the club convergence and panel clustering tests can be
found in Phillips and Sul (2007) and Schnurbus et al. (2016).
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Table C1: Steps to the final sample
Step Firms Observations
Starting sample 155,293 979,610
Keep years 1984 – 2013 155,160 974,402
Drop micro firms 126,638 717,800
Drop certain industries 118,412 670,732
Drop accounting mistakes, implausible values
and outliers
112,143 539,628
Final unbalanced sample 112,143 539,628
Final balanced sample (2004–2013) 6,207 62,070
Notes: Micro firms are firms with total assets < 2 million USD. Firms from the following industries were
dropped: NACE Rev. 2 < 1000, NACE Rev. 2 > 8400. Outliers in terms of ETR include the highest and
lowest 5 % of observations; identified accounting mistakes comprise cases where reported after tax profit
differs by more than 10 % from (profit before tax – taxation). Implausible values include among others
cases where reported total fixed assets are larger than total assets, negative R&D expenses and if reported
taxation is larger than total assets.
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Table C2: Number of firms and observations by country and region
Country Firms Observations Year availability
Top 15 countries
Canada 1,834 7,913 1984 – 2013
Cayman Islands 1,017 5,850 1988 – 2013
China 3,516 21,328 1995 – 2013
France 1,291 6,511 1984 – 2013
Germany 1,977 9,228 1984 – 2013
Great Britain 12,072 52,395 1984 – 2013
India 3,226 18,485 1984 – 2013
Japan 3,033 20,842 1988 – 2013
Malaysia 30,936 133,803 1985 – 2013
Netherlands 7,393 37,084 1984 – 2013
Singapore 1,415 7,492 1985 – 2013
Sweden 1,308 6,029 1984 – 2013
Thailand 14,556 72,683 1984 – 2013
United States 7,561 45,730 1984 – 2013
Vietnam 5,422 19,752 2002 – 2013
Total 96,557 465,125 1984 – 2013
B: World regions
Africa 1,267 6,801 1984 – 2013
Asia 66,235 317,465 1984 – 2013
Europe 31,355 140,077 1984 – 2013
Oceania 1,459 7,621 1984 – 2013
South & Central America 2,432 14,021 1984 – 2013
North America 9,395 53,643 1984 – 2013
Total 112,143 539,628 1984 – 2013
...
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Table C3: Data providers for the top 15 countries in the sample
Country Data provider
Canada Icarus, Dun & Bradstreet
Cayman Islands Dun & Bradstreet
China Bureau of Industry & Commerce, SinoSure
France Coface Services
Germany Creditreform, Creditreform Rating AG
Great Britain Jordans Limited
India CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy)
Japan Dun & Bradstreet TSR Ltd
Malaysia World’Vest Base Inc.
Netherlands LexisNexis Benelux, Graydon, Chambers of
Commerce
Singapore DP Information Group
Sweden UC AB
Thailand World’Vest Base Inc.
United States Dun & Bradstreet, Reuters, WVB, HUAXIA,
KIS
Vietnam Jordans Limited, World’Vest Base Inc.
Notes: Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database provides financial and ownership information on firms worldwide.
Balance sheet and profit and loss account data is collected by independent national data providers. Infor-
mation on data providers is obtained from Orbis User Guide (Bureau van Dijk, 2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2015) and refers to data providers during the period covered in the dataset.
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Table C4: World regions
Region List of countries
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo
(Democratic Republic of), CÃ´te d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equa-
torial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sene-
gal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland
,Tanzania (United Republic of), Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe
Asia Afghanistan , Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Georgia, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic
of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Macau, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal,
Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan,
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen
Europe Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia
(FYROM), Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Repub-
lic of Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
Oceania Australia, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu
South & Central America Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Virgin Is-
lands (British)
North America Canada, United States of America
Notes: Classification following Orbis User Guide (2011). Countries in bold letters indicate the 15 most
frequent countries in the data.
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Table C5: Description and computation of variables in Orbis
Variable name Description Computation
TAXA Taxation: all taxes related to the accounting period
(paid, accrued or deferred)
PLBT Profit/loss before taxation: sum of operating profit
and financial profit
EBIT + FIPL
EMPL Total number of employees included in the com-
pany’s payroll
TOAS Total Assets: sum of fixed assets and current assets FIAS + current assets
FIAS Fixed Assets: Total amount of non current assets
after depreciation
IFAS + tangible fixed as-
sets + other fixed assets
IFAS Intangible Fixed Assets (intangible assets with long-
term effect such as goodwill, R&D expenses)
RD R&D expenses
CASH Cash and Cash Equivalents (Cash-in-hand, Central
Bank Balances, Bank Balances and Cheques)
LOAN Loans due within 1 year + Liabilities to credit insti-
tutions due within 1 year, (convertible) bonds if due
within one year
LTDB Long Term Debt (Financial debt : Due between 2
and 5 years + Financial debt : Due beyond five
years)
ROE Return on equity (PL/SHFD)*100
ROA Return on assets (PL/TOAS)*100
SHFD Shareholder funds (total equity, including minority
interests)
PL Profit (Loss) for the Period (Net profit or loss)
OPRE Operating revenue (Sales + Increase or decrease in
finished goods inventories and work in process +
Own work capitalized + Other operating income)
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes: net profit from
operating activities
OPPL
OPPL Total operating revenues minus all operating ex-
penses
EBIT
PLAT Profit/loss after taxation PLBT - TAXA
FIPL Financial profit/loss: net result from financial activi-
ties of the company; financial revenue minus financial
expenses
Source: Orbis User Guide (2011); variables are named as they can be found in the Orbis database.
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Table C6: Industry Classification with Corresponding NACE and ISIC Codes
Sector Industry Description NACE Rev.2
Group 2-digit (Orbis)
Manufacturing Manufacturing of...
1 ..food, beverages, tobacco 10-12
2 ..textiles, apparel, leather 13-15
3 ..wood and paper; printing 16-18
4 ..coke, refined petroleum products, 19-23
chemicals, chemical products
pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastics
5 ..basic metals, fabricated metals 24-25
6 ..computer, electronic, optical products 26-28
(electrical) equipment, machinery n.e.c.
7 ..transport equipment 29-30
8 ..other manufacturing, repair and installation of
machinery and equipment
31-33
Others 9 Electricity, gas,steam, water supply, sewerage,
waste, remediation
35-39
10 Construction 41-43
11 Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor ve-
hicle
45-47
12 Transportation and storage 49-53
13 Accommodation, food service 55-56
14 Publishing, broadcasting, telecommunications, IT
and other information services
58-63
15 (Finance and insurance) 64-66
16 Real estate 68
Service 17 Legal, accounting, management, scientific re-
search and development, engineering, technical
testing
69-75
Digital Firms with main business segments relying on dig-
ital data, technologies or platforms as targeted by
the digital tax proposal of the European Com-
mission. See OECD (2018), Fuest et al. (2018),
European Commission (2018) for a more detailed
definition.
4791, 5811 – 5819,
6201, 6209, 6311,
6312
Notes: NACE Rev. 2 classifications are equivalent to ISIC Rev.4 groups at the two-digit level.
Agriculture, mining and public sector activities are excluded (this corresponds to dropping observations
from Nace Rev. 2 industries 01 to 09 and 77 to 99). In most specifications, the finance and insurance
industry is excluded as well.
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Table C7: Growth rates by region
mean sd p50 min max count
Africa
growth_toas 0.12 0.29 0.06 -0.49 2.15 4,857
growth_ifas 0.46 2.28 -0.01 -1.00 26.29 2,291
growth_ebta 0.15 0.89 0.06 -5.55 6.64 3,914
growth_plbt 0.17 1.22 0.06 -7.52 9.58 4,886
growth_taxa 0.48 2.01 0.05 -1.00 22.29 4,328
growth_cash 0.82 3.31 0.05 -0.96 37.98 4,599
growth_rd -0.17 0.84 -0.17 -1.00 4.99 163
growth_loan_ltdb 0.42 2.05 -0.00 -1.00 26.37 3,402
Asia
growth_toas 0.14 0.29 0.09 -0.50 2.19 214,245
growth_ifas 0.52 2.71 -0.01 -1.00 37.71 69,567
growth_ebta 0.13 0.89 0.08 -5.74 6.64 83,875
growth_plbt 0.18 1.37 0.06 -7.72 10.16 213,993
growth_taxa 0.56 2.13 0.08 -1.00 23.65 205,889
growth_cash 0.80 3.01 0.09 -0.97 38.07 128,653
growth_rd 0.14 0.73 0.05 -1.00 6.04 19,665
growth_loan_ltdb 0.35 1.89 0.01 -1.00 27.17 108,141
Europe
growth_toas 0.11 0.28 0.07 -0.50 2.19 91,347
growth_ifas 0.40 2.47 -0.03 -1.00 37.72 53,966
growth_ebta 0.11 0.82 0.06 -5.71 6.64 70,196
growth_plbt 0.17 1.34 0.05 -7.72 10.16 91,366
growth_taxa 0.51 2.04 0.05 -1.00 23.64 86,804
growth_cash 0.76 3.04 0.07 -0.97 38.02 87,392
growth_rd 0.13 0.61 0.07 -1.00 6.08 7,630
growth_loan_ltdb 0.35 1.88 0.00 -1.00 27.00 58,735
Oceania
growth_toas 0.22 0.37 0.14 -0.49 2.18 9,746
growth_ifas 0.66 3.13 0.00 -1.00 37.01 6,015
growth_ebta 0.14 1.06 0.11 -5.73 6.63 9,226
growth_plbt 0.17 1.50 0.10 -7.71 10.07 9,907
growth_taxa 0.69 2.26 0.15 -1.00 23.58 9,238
growth_cash 0.83 2.85 0.13 -0.96 37.89 10,036
growth_rd 0.35 0.95 0.19 -1.00 6.00 2,373
growth_loan_ltdb 0.50 2.14 0.06 -1.00 26.57 8,029
South Central America
growth_toas 0.22 0.37 0.14 -0.49 2.18 9,746
growth_ifas 0.66 3.13 0.00 -1.00 37.01 6,015
growth_ebta 0.14 1.06 0.11 -5.73 6.63 9,226
growth_plbt 0.17 1.50 0.10 -7.71 10.07 9,907
growth_taxa 0.69 2.26 0.15 -1.00 23.58 9,238
growth_cash 0.83 2.85 0.13 -0.96 37.89 10,036
growth_rd 0.35 0.95 0.19 -1.00 6.00 2,373
growth_loan_ltdb 0.50 2.14 0.06 -1.00 26.57 8,029
North America
growth_toas 0.16 0.39 0.07 -0.50 2.19 34,521
growth_ifas 0.54 2.69 0.00 -1.00 37.62 22,731
growth_ebta 0.15 1.03 0.08 -5.75 6.61 36,586
growth_plbt 0.19 1.57 0.07 -7.71 10.15 37,474
growth_taxa 0.61 2.25 0.10 -1.00 23.50 25,470
growth_cash 0.91 3.38 0.07 -0.97 38.00 32,772
growth_rd 0.23 0.68 0.11 -1.00 6.11 15,019
growth_loan_ltdb 0.43 2.28 -0.01 -1.00 27.09 24,944
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Table C8: Pooled OLS estimations using lagged firm-level characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR
L.empl -0.000000239∗∗∗ -0.000000151∗∗∗ -0.000000151∗∗∗ -0.000000158∗∗∗ -0.000000115∗∗∗
(2.28e-08) (2.16e-08) (2.14e-08) (2.19e-08) (2.03e-08)
L.ifas_fias 0.00635∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.00361
(0.00250) (0.00228) (0.00230) (0.00249) (0.00223)
L.cash_toas -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00377) (0.00338) (0.00338) (0.00363) (0.00318)
L.rd_intensity -0.308∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.00869) (0.00711) (0.00745) (0.00740) (0.00605)
L.debt_ratio -0.0730∗∗∗ -0.0395∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗ -0.0412∗∗∗ -0.0352∗∗∗
(0.00371) (0.00347) (0.00340) (0.00361) (0.00331)
L.ln_toas 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.00559∗∗∗ 0.00482∗∗∗ 0.00456∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗
(0.000353) (0.000334) (0.000331) (0.000352) (0.000316)
L.roe 0.000511∗∗∗ 0.0000584∗∗∗ 0.0000582∗∗∗ 0.0000492∗∗∗ 0.000125∗∗∗
(0.0000202) (0.0000130) (0.0000130) (0.0000134) (0.0000126)
losslastyear -0.188∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗
(0.00266) (0.00260) (0.00282) (0.00315)
digital -0.00464∗∗ -0.000705 0.00125
(0.00220) (0.00299) (0.00270)
CIT 0.164∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0223)
gdp_consus -1.02e-15 7.04e-16
(9.79e-16) (8.90e-16)
gdp_pc_consus -0.00000125∗ 3.42e-08
(0.000000680) (0.000000646)
unemployment -0.000150 0.000105
(0.000458) (0.000422)
freedomhouse 0.00488 0.00251
(0.00317) (0.00267)
L.ETR 0.501∗∗∗
(0.00557)
_cons -0.0327 0.0649∗ 0.0732∗∗ -0.0444 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0411) (0.0360)
N 70041 70041 69880 62943 63104
R2 0.288 0.369 0.377 0.387 0.496
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C9: Results from the Arellano-Bond estimation
(1) (2) (3)
ETR ETR ETR
L.ETR 0.174∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0160) (0.0122)
empl -8.43e-08 -4.62e-08 -2.65e-08
(0.000000101) (9.77e-08) (0.000000102)
ifas_fias 0.00542 0.0122 0.0125
(0.00720) (0.00760) (0.00780)
cash_toas -0.0105 -0.00653 -0.0106
(0.00670) (0.00753) (0.00735)
rd_intensity -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0172)
debt_ratio -0.0380∗∗∗ -0.0456∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗
(0.00867) (0.00932) (0.00918)
ln_toas 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.00849∗∗∗
(0.00249) (0.00294) (0.00294)
roe 0.000207∗∗∗ 0.000132∗∗∗ 0.000232∗∗∗
(0.0000221) (0.0000215) (0.0000255)
ifas_digital -0.0225
(0.0200)
cash_digital 0.0534∗
(0.0294)
rd_digital -0.121
(0.0745)
debt_digital -0.00266
(0.0475)
toas_digital -0.00650
(0.00686)
roe_digital -0.000147∗∗∗
(0.0000527)
_cons 0.152∗∗∗ -0.0892∗ 0.0417
(0.0578) (0.0506) (0.0481)
Macro Controls NO YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
N 49,744 45,076 45,076
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Arellano-Bond test for serial
correlation structure rejects no autocorrelation of order 1 and cannot reject no autocorrelation of order 2.
This indicates that Arellano-Bond model assumptions are satisfied.
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Table C10: Additional variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR
L.ETR 0.461∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.00596) (0.00803) (0.0126) (0.0182)
empl -3.75e-08 -0.000000139∗∗∗ -6.21e-08 -5.06e-08∗ -2.86e-08
(2.65e-08) (1.89e-08) (7.33e-08) (2.64e-08) (4.89e-08)
ifas_fias 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.00841∗∗∗ 0.00729 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗
(0.00418) (0.00231) (0.00616) (0.00381) (0.00593)
cash_toas 0.00919 -0.0235∗∗∗ -0.00661 -0.00279 -0.00664
(0.00835) (0.00336) (0.00649) (0.00772) (0.0103)
rd_intensity -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0948∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0195) (0.0537) (0.0137) (0.0190)
debt_ratio -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0420∗∗∗ -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0145
(0.00877) (0.00381) (0.00856) (0.00800) (0.0106)
ln_toas 0.00280∗∗∗ 0.00503∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ 0.00355∗∗∗ 0.00143
(0.000714) (0.000337) (0.00207) (0.000635) (0.000906)
roe 0.000238∗∗∗ 0.000330∗∗∗ 0.000242∗∗∗ 0.000271∗∗∗ 0.000317∗∗∗
(0.0000349) (0.0000160) (0.0000215) (0.0000297) (0.0000440)
losslastyear -0.0479∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗
(0.00750) (0.00328) (0.00662) (0.00971)
CIT 0.253∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.0873
(0.0681) (0.0250) (0.0357) (0.0641) (0.0880)
digital 0.0104∗∗ 0.00505∗ 0.00782 0.00695
(0.00512) (0.00278) (0.00485) (0.00714)
age 0.0000539∗∗
(0.0000263)
rd_interaction -0.144 0.405
(0.0965) (0.261)
rd_support -0.842∗
(0.475)
PayingTaxesTimehourspery 0.0000557
(0.0000409)
tax_honesty -0.00992
(0.0401)
_cons -0.205∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ -0.0719 -0.113 0.156
(0.0901) (0.0542) (0.0453) (0.0893) (0.125)
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES NO YES
N 9328 55230 55437 11618 5961
R2 0.380 0.517 0.040 0.397 0.402
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C12: Pooled OLS estimations by region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Africa Asia Europe Oceania SCA NA
L.ETR 0.309∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.0554) (0.00698) (0.0103) (0.0526) (0.108) (0.0156)
empl -0.000000107∗ -0.000000186∗∗∗ -3.92e-08∗ 0.000000236∗ 0.00000197∗ -0.000000210∗∗∗
(6.19e-08) (4.60e-08) (2.29e-08) (0.000000136) (0.00000105) (4.01e-08)
ifas_fias -0.00163 0.00304 0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0243 0.0486 0.00000286
(0.0195) (0.00418) (0.00328) (0.0164) (0.0495) (0.00449)
cash_toas 0.0177 -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.00903 -0.0350 0.240∗∗ -0.0170∗∗
(0.0405) (0.00412) (0.00647) (0.0355) (0.113) (0.00670)
rd_intensity -0.0140 -0.201∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ 0.106 -0.0856∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.0222) (0.0120) (0.0633) (0.273) (0.00830)
debt_ratio -0.0986∗∗∗ -0.0436∗∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗ -0.0341 0.0241 -0.0102
(0.0368) (0.00420) (0.00623) (0.0316) (0.0501) (0.00869)
ln_toas 0.00108 0.00521∗∗∗ 0.00303∗∗∗ 0.00265 -0.000763 0.00443∗∗∗
(0.00281) (0.000463) (0.000526) (0.00283) (0.00680) (0.000769)
roe 0.000195 0.000492∗∗∗ 0.000294∗∗∗ 0.000404∗∗∗ -0.000670 0.000180∗∗∗
(0.000354) (0.0000370) (0.0000243) (0.000124) (0.000534) (0.0000157)
losslastyear -0.00700 0.00613 -0.0441∗∗∗ -0.0676∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0494∗∗∗
(0.0566) (0.00469) (0.00537) (0.0263) (0.0505) (0.00592)
CIT 0.517∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗ 0.546 0.307 0.119
(0.259) (0.0312) (0.0373) (0.493) (0.628) (0.720)
digital 0.0115 -0.00498 0.00551 0.0403 0 0.00724
(0.0191) (0.00432) (0.00433) (0.0306) (.) (0.00524)
gdp_consus 1.91e-13 3.73e-15∗∗∗ -9.90e-15 4.17e-13 -2.14e-13∗ -2.57e-15
(3.69e-13) (1.37e-15) (1.57e-14) (3.17e-13) (1.17e-13) (2.42e-14)
gdp_pc_consus 0.0000423 -0.000000613 0.000000111 -0.0000341 0.0000386 0.0000359
(0.0000374) (0.000000949) (0.000000979) (0.0000220) (0.0000265) (0.0000522)
unemployment -0.00340 -0.00105 -0.000209 0.00698 0.0252∗ -0.00791
(0.00592) (0.00170) (0.000596) (0.0110) (0.0149) (0.0176)
freedomhouse -0.0407∗ 0.00321 -0.00591 -0.0460 -0.0472 0
(0.0247) (0.00279) (0.0119) (0.0480) (0.0568) (.)
_cons 0.0598 -0.153 0.0572 0.828 -0.694 -1.130
(0.284) (0.102) (0.0438) (0.728) (0.459) (2.063)
N 616 37,331 18,831 740 213 8,256
R2 0.331 0.544 0.387 0.432 0.514 0.621
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C13: Results from the fixed effects model by region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Africa Asia Europe Oceania SCA NA
L.ETR -0.0243 0.0826∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ -0.0458 -0.114 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0752) (0.00989) (0.0137) (0.0704) (0.144) (0.0236)
empl -0.000000105∗∗∗ 0.000000172 3.23e-08 0.000000364 -0.00000364 -0.000000287∗
(3.87e-08) (0.000000210) (0.000000142) (0.000000784) (0.00000777) (0.000000174)
ifas_fias 0.0118 0.0144 0.0209∗∗ -0.0729 0.325 -0.0101
(0.0748) (0.00988) (0.0100) (0.0498) (0.203) (0.0106)
cash_toas 0.00900 -0.00673 0.00330 -0.143∗∗ -0.223 -0.000466
(0.0770) (0.00785) (0.0152) (0.0689) (0.215) (0.0132)
rd_intensity 0.660 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.0675∗∗ -0.739∗∗ 12.22 -0.0685∗∗∗
(0.785) (0.0468) (0.0294) (0.319) (10.69) (0.0157)
debt_ratio -0.0501 -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0711∗∗∗ -0.0208 0.115 -0.0315∗
(0.102) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0628) (0.148) (0.0181)
ln_toas -0.0254 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0363∗ -0.136 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.00287) (0.00368) (0.0205) (0.132) (0.00454)
roe -0.000465 0.000370∗∗∗ 0.000212∗∗∗ 0.000257 -0.00210∗∗ 0.000114∗∗∗
(0.000702) (0.0000432) (0.0000381) (0.000200) (0.000974) (0.0000219)
loss_size -0.000000904∗∗∗ 3.61e-08 -1.32e-08 -0.000000323 0.00000182 -7.96e-09
(0.000000154) (2.45e-08) (1.92e-08) (0.000000283) (0.00000503) (5.98e-09)
CIT 0.570∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.623 0.567 -0.961
(0.225) (0.0409) (0.0577) (0.444) (0.932) (1.917)
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
_cons 0.513 -0.0872 0.0688 0.826 1.520 -4.093
(0.439) (0.100) (0.0772) (0.892) (1.945) (2.569)
N 619 37,632 19,013 740 213 8,256
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C14: Pooled OLS estimations by region with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Africa Asia Europe Oceania SCA NA
L.ETR 0.299∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.00698) (0.0103) (0.0527) (0.108) (0.0156)
empl -9.86e-08 -0.000000190∗∗∗ -3.53e-08 0.000000234∗ 0.00000197∗ -0.000000213∗∗∗
(6.12e-08) (4.61e-08) (2.30e-08) (0.000000134) (0.00000105) (4.05e-08)
ifas_fias -0.00594 0.00927∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0193 0.0486 0.00164
(0.0209) (0.00435) (0.00338) (0.0141) (0.0495) (0.00470)
ifas_digital -0.0566 -0.0467∗∗∗ -0.0200 -0.148 0 -0.00671
(0.0558) (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.257) (.) (0.0156)
cash_toas 0.0225 -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.00962 -0.0422 0.240∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.00420) (0.00680) (0.0363) (0.113) (0.00704)
cash_digital 0.0298 0.00173 0.00633 -0.0641 0 0.0373
(0.161) (0.0166) (0.0216) (0.186) (.) (0.0232)
rd_intensity 0.341 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗ 0.106 -0.0828∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.0226) (0.0120) (0.0697) (0.273) (0.00874)
rd_digital -0.342 -0.0510 -0.0715 0.0652 0 -0.0195
(0.817) (0.0757) (0.0506) (0.413) (.) (0.0221)
debt_ratio -0.0927∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0453 0.0241 -0.0128
(0.0400) (0.00425) (0.00636) (0.0323) (0.0501) (0.00914)
debt_digital 0.0203 -0.0271 -0.0215 0.397 0 0.0295
(0.124) (0.0261) (0.0300) (0.336) (.) (0.0308)
ln_toas -0.0000709 0.00517∗∗∗ 0.00277∗∗∗ 0.00241 -0.000763 0.00404∗∗∗
(0.00307) (0.000469) (0.000537) (0.00276) (0.00680) (0.000782)
toas_digital 0.0000834 0.00137 0.00483∗∗ -0.0169 0 0.00484∗∗
(0.00751) (0.00170) (0.00211) (0.0314) (.) (0.00206)
roe 0.000278 0.000485∗∗∗ 0.000293∗∗∗ 0.000547∗∗∗ -0.000670 0.000198∗∗∗
(0.000351) (0.0000385) (0.0000251) (0.000196) (0.000534) (0.0000184)
roe_digital -0.00473∗∗∗ 0.0000888 0.0000127 -0.000204 0 -0.000105∗∗∗
(0.00159) (0.000119) (0.0000763) (0.000247) (.) (0.0000263)
losslastyear -0.0118 0.00625 -0.0443∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0492∗∗∗
(0.0555) (0.00468) (0.00537) (0.0263) (0.0505) (0.00590)
CIT 0.541∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0794∗∗ 0.578 0.307 0.115
(0.262) (0.0312) (0.0373) (0.489) (0.628) (0.720)
digital 0.121 -0.00765 -0.0352 0.304 0 -0.0633∗∗
(0.0957) (0.0229) (0.0263) (0.289) (.) (0.0317)
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
_cons 0.0522 -0.154 0.0597 0.906 -0.694 -1.106
(0.287) (0.102) (0.0438) (0.723) (0.459) (2.063)
N 616 37,331 18,831 740 213 8,256
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C15: Summary statistics for the balanced panel
mean sd p50 min max count
Full balanced panel
ETR 0.25 0.12 0.27 -0.23 0.62 62070.00
ETR1 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.62 60996.00
toas_mio 1722.36 10282.16 97.81 2.00 410527.47 62044.00
empl 6803.93 41165.46 926.00 1.00 2200000.00 35420.00
ifas_fias 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.00 1.18 35709.00
cash_toas 0.15 0.16 0.10 -0.08 1.00 58297.00
rd_intensity 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.12 45336.00
debt_ratio 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.00 1.00 55987.00
roe 16.07 35.11 12.54 -955.88 961.11 61551.00
losslastyear 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 62070.00
digital 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 62070.00
Digital firms
ETR 0.26 0.14 0.28 -0.19 0.62 1510.00
ETR1 0.27 0.13 0.28 0.00 0.62 1469.00
toas_mio 974.86 3105.08 136.65 2.00 34238.30 1510.00
empl 6149.23 19950.37 994.00 1.00 300464.00 1139.00
ifas_fias 0.41 0.31 0.36 0.00 0.97 1305.00
cash_toas 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.93 1480.00
rd_intensity 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.80 1332.00
debt_ratio 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.97 1468.00
roe 14.49 32.18 14.98 -607.40 361.70 1488.00
losslastyear 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 1510.00
Growth rates full balanced panel
growth_toas 0.12 0.21 0.09 -0.37 1.26 54722.00
growth_ifas 0.37 1.85 0.00 -1.00 23.89 31377.00
growth_ebta 0.14 0.49 0.08 -1.88 3.36 39460.00
growth_plbt 0.19 0.78 0.09 -3.06 5.62 54752.00
growth_taxa 0.29 1.01 0.08 -0.94 10.08 52784.00
growth_cash 0.58 2.08 0.10 -0.95 25.03 50936.00
growth_rd -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 371.00
growth_loan_ltdb 0.31 1.67 0.01 -1.00 22.64 39569.00
Growth rates digital firms
growth_toas 0.13 0.23 0.09 -0.37 1.22 1332.00
growth_ifas 0.54 2.17 0.04 -1.00 23.50 1158.00
growth_ebta 0.13 0.44 0.09 -1.78 2.81 1271.00
growth_plbt 0.14 0.65 0.10 -2.99 4.54 1334.00
growth_taxa 0.30 1.01 0.08 -0.93 9.18 1292.00
growth_cash 0.36 1.32 0.10 -0.94 20.37 1317.00
growth_rd -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 23.00
growth_loan_ltdb 0.37 1.90 -0.02 -1.00 18.23 971.00
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3.C Additional Figures
Figure C1: Dispersion of ETRs for the full sample and digital firms
Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of effective of tax paying firms (including only firms with tax payments >
0). The graph on the left-hand side is identical to Figure 3.1. The graph on the right-hand side shows the dispersion
of ETRs for the group of digital firms. The shaded area represents the dispersion within the 10th and 90th
percentile, the solid line indicates the median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentile,
respectively. The dotted red line indicates the mean value. While the trend in means and median values is very
similar, the decline of the ETR for the 25th and 10th percentile is more pronounced for the group of digital firms.
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Figure C2: Dispersion of ETRs by region
Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of effective of tax paying firms (the measure ETR2 excludes zero or
negative tax payments). The sample is split by regions. Countries included in the respective regions are listed in
Table C4. The shaded area represents the dispersion within the 10th and 90th percentile, the solid line indicates
the median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively. The red line indicates
the median value for digital firms.
Figure C3: Dispersion of ETRs including non tax paying firms
Notes: The graph on the left-hand side shows the dispersion of ETRs, using ETR1 as measure for effective tax
rates. It includes observations from firms that report zero tax payments. The graph on the right-hand side shows
the dispersion of ETRs for the group of digital firms. The shaded area represents the dispersion within the 10th
and 90th percentile, the solid line indicates the median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th
percentile, respectively.
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Figure C4: Dispersion of ETRs including negative and zero tax payments
Notes: The graph on the left-hand side shows the dispersion of ETRs, using ETR as measure for effective tax
rates. It includes observations from firms that report zero or negative tax payments. The graph on the right-hand
side shows the dispersion of ETRs for the group of digital firms. The shaded area represents the dispersion within
the 10th and 90th percentile, the solid line indicates the median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and
75th percentile, respectively. The dotted red line indicates the mean value.
Figure C5: Dispersion of firm characteristics over time
Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of tax relevant firm characteristics for the balanced sample. The
shaded area represents the dispersion within the 10th and 90th percentile, the solid line indicates the
median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively.
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Figure C6: Dispersion of firm characteristics over time
Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of tax relevant firm characteristics for the balanced sample of
digital firms. The shaded area represents the dispersion within the 10th and 90th percentile, the solid line
indicates the median ETR by year. The dashed lines show the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Effects of the removal of a banking
sector government guarantee on the
corporate sector: firm-level evidence
from Germany
4.1 Introduction
Up until 2001, public banks in Germany were protected by a longstanding federal govern-
ment guarantee, which had existed since the emerging days of the German banking sector.
The decision to remove it was made at the European level following a formal complaint,
as non-public banks saw it to be in violation of European anti-subsidy rules. We take up
on this event to analyze the effects of this regulatory change in the (public) banking sector
on German firms. The analysis of potential effect of regulatory changes in the banking
sector on the corporate sector is relevant for a number of reasons: Government guarantees
continue to be a popular policy tool during crisis times. Many countries reacted to the
This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Christa Hainz. We are thankful to participants at the An-
nual Conference of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) in Lake Tahoe, the Annual Meeting
of the German Economic Association in Vienna, the ESCS meeting in Budapest as well to participants
at internal seminars at the LMU Munich, the University of Augsburg and the ifo Institute for valuable
comments and suggestions.
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financial crisis of 2008 by either nationalizing financial institutions or providing blanked
guarantees. These interventions in the banking sector usually happen with two main aims:
firstly, to increase confidence and trust of market participants in the banking sector and
secondly, to attenuate credit crunches and ensure firms’ access to credit during times of
economic distress. Public guarantees in banking are therefore to not only meant to have
direct effects on the banking sector but it is anticipated that they are transmitted to the
real economy via firms depending on external finance. The analysis of this transmission to
the real economy is therefore especially relevant for heavily bank dependent systems such
as Germany and other countries in the European Union. While the direct effects on bank
behavior have been analyzed in the literature extensively, the effects on firms have received
less attention so far.
Moreover, most public guarantees introduced during times of banking sector distress are
designed as temporary measures. It is therefore of vital importance to not only analyze
effects of their introduction but to be aware of effects of their subsequent removal. The
case of the German guarantor’s liability offers a favorable setting for the analysis. The
guarantor liability was a longstanding legal institution and granted to every public bank in
Germany, regardless of its systemic importance or economic performance. This presents an
advantage compared to the analysis of state guarantees introduced in crisis times, which are
almost always directed at troubled institutions and whose analysis therefore suffers from
endogeneity problems. Furthermore, there were no major policy changes with regard to
non-public banks such as cooperative banks and private banks during that time. The event
allows for the natural identification of a group of bank and firms, which is affected by the
removal of the guarantee and a group that remains entirely unaffected.
Our research is related to two strands of the literature. Firstly, our paper builds on
research discussing the effects of state interventions and regulatory changes on bank behav-
ior. Secondly, our paper adds to contributions that discuss effects of regulatory changes and
state interventions in the banking sector on the real economy. Regarding the first point,
there is preponderant consent in the empirical literature, that significant effects on bank
behavior exist. Using data from a sample of German banks, Berger et al. (2016) find, that
regulatory interventions and capital injections lead to decreased risk taking by German
banks. At the same time, however, public interventions also lead to decreases in liquidity
creation and therefore entail a social cost. Gropp et al. (2014), Fischer et al. (2014) and
Körner and Schnabel (2013) use the removal of the guarantor liability to analyze effects on
bank behavior. Gropp et al. (2014) use savings banks data and come to the conclusion,
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that the removal led to decreased risk-taking, as savings banks cut off their riskiest bor-
rowers and abolished risk-sensitive debt instruments from their portfolios after 2001. On
the contrary, focusing on Landesbanken, Fischer et al. (2014) find that the removal of the
guarantor liability in 2001 led to increased risk taking due to a predominant charter-value
effect. Körner and Schnabel (2013) exploit the distinct structure of the German banking
sector and take into account network effects between savings banks and their superordinate
Landesbanken. They find that especially those savings banks, whose Landesbank suffered
from a strong deterioration of their credit ratings following the formal removal of the guar-
antee in 2005, increased their risk-taking.
Regarding contributions focussing on the transmission of shocks and changes in the bank-
ing sector to the real economy, most papers focus on the analysis of real effects in times of
financial distress. Levintal (2013) investigates shocks to banks’ balance sheets in 18 OECD
countries for the period 1979 to 2003 and find that real effects on the economy exist,
but that their economic significance is restricted to sufficiently large shocks. Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2008) provide evidence that financially dependent sectors perform worse during
banking crises relative to sectors being independent of external finance. Buch and Neuge-
bauer (2011) show that idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have significant
short-run impacts on GDP growth. Using data from the recent financial crisis, Buca and
Vermeulen (2017) add to the previous findings by showing that credit tightening of banks
led to decreased investment by firms in Europe, especially those in bank dependent indus-
tries. Campello et al. (2010) use survey data to study whether credit constraints during the
recent global financial crisis affected corporate spending plans: constrained firms undergo
deeper cuts in employment and tech spending as well as postpone or cancel investment
projects. Some contributions look at the real effects of government interventions in the
banking sector. Giannetti and Simonov (2013) investigate the effects of bank bailouts on
credit supply and firms’ performances in Japan and find that capital injections only have
positive effects on the supply of credit if they are sufficiently large. Laeven and Valencia
(2013) study the effect of bank recapitalization policies on firm growth during the recent
financial crisis and show that the bank recapitalization policies have a disproportionately
large effect on firms, which depend on external finance.
Lastly, our paper is related to the contribution by Gropp et al. (2015). Congruent to our
analysis, they also look at real effects of the removal of the guarantee at the firm level. Yet,
they focus on a different research question by discussing effects on restructuring decisions.
Our paper brings the previously discussed strands of the literature together as we ana-
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lyze the effects of a guarantee removal in the banking sector on firms in the economy. With
our focus on the effects on firms we differ from the papers by Körner and Schnabel (2013),
Fischer et al. (2014) and Gropp et al. (2014) that use the same event for identification.
Furthermore, we add to their approach by accurately disentangling the timing of events: we
differentiate the effects between 2001 and 2005 by considering that actual changes in fund-
ing conditions for public banks are likely to have occurred only after the transition period
ended. Our panel data set combines information from the ifo Investment Survey with data
from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Amadeus and BvD Markus data bank. The biannual
ifo Investment Survey entails questions about undertaken and planned investments, the
perceived financing situation of firms and the influence of political and economic factors
on investment decisions over a long time horizon. Merging this survey data with data ob-
tained from the Amadeus and Markus database allows us to add balance-sheet information
as well as data on bank connections of the firms in our sample. We identify the effect of the
removal of the public guarantee on firms by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis.
Focusing on the 10-year period between 1998 and 2007, we find that, compared to firms
being affiliated with non-public banks, public bank firms perceived a deterioration in their
financing situation following the effective removal of the guarantee 2005. In 2001, when the
the removal was decided but not enacted due to an agreed four year transition period, we
do not find any effects. Therefore, obtained results are in line with the findings by Fischer
et al. (2014) and Körner and Schnabel (2013) as we find no evidence at the firm level that
banks tightened their lending as a response to the Brussels accord in 2001. Furthermore, we
check for effects at the firm level with regard to total investment and employment. We find
that the effective removal at the end of 2005 did not lead to statistically significant negative
effects in terms of total investment and employment of firms. This is most likely due to
the fact that especially Landesbanken made extensive use of the favorable funding condi-
tions that persisted during the grandfathering period and did not yet restrict their lending
during the period that is covered in our sample. Although the particular institutional ar-
rangements of the removal of the guarantor’s liability are likely to have counteracted real
effects that would have occurred in the absence of the grandfathering period, the robust
results in terms of firms’ perceptions of their financing situation show that firms suspected
a deterioration in their financing situation following the removal of the public guarantee
for their banks.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview on the composition of
the German banking sector and details on the institutional setting. Section 4.3 introduces
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our hypotheses regarding the effect of the removal of the guarantee on firms. Section 4.4
describes the data set and estimation strategy applied, while section 4.5 explains the empir-
ical approach. Section 4.6 presents the results and discusses the institutional peculiarities
of the case that might impact the analysis. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Setting
The banking sector and firm-bank relationships in Germany are characterized by three
distinctive features: Firstly, public banks play a major role and build, together with private
banks and cooperative banks, the three main pillars of the German banking sector. Our
analysis will focus on the two major types of public banks: Landesbanken and savings banks
(Sparkassen). Secondly, firms in Germany largely depend on external finance provided by
banks and usually maintain stable long-term relationships with their main banks. Thirdly,
both public and private banks play a major role in providing access to finance for the
corporate sector. Furthermore, this section will introduce details on the guarantor liability
and the terms and timing of its removal.
4.2.1 The composition of the German banking sector
The German banking sector is characterized by a large number of institutions and the
prevalence of three main categories of banks: private banks, cooperative banks and public
banks. The emergence of savings banks dates back to the 18th century. They were founded
with the explicit goal of alleviating poverty by ensuring access to financial services for ev-
erybody and promoting the development of small-scale enterprises and regional businesses.
This social mandate of savings banks was the main reason to grant them with a public
guarantee in the first place. The first Landesbanken emerged in the 19th century and from
the 20th century onward, Landesbanken started acting as "central banks" for the savings
banks of a given region (Detzer et al., 2013). This is the structure that still character-
izes the interconnectedness of savings banks and Landesbanken today: Landesbanken are
owned by the respective federal states and the savings banks located in the state. Savings
banks are universal banks but the geographical range of their activities is set by the regional
principle, which is laid down by law: savings banks are not allowed to operate outside the
geographical area of their chartering municipalities (OECD, 2010b). Landesbanken serve
as clearing houses for savings banks as they offer savings banks access to large scale credit
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and hold their excess liquidity reserves.1
Public banks still play a central role in the German banking sector today. However,
the overall number of public credit institutions has been declining over the last decades.
This reflects a general trend towards more concentration in the banking sector as also
private and cooperative banks showed a pronounced decline in the total number of credit
institutions. Overall, this was mainly due to mergers and acquisitions of very small credit
institutions. Figure D2 in the Appendix depicts the development of the total number
of banks in Germany over the period 1998 to 2007. While the total number of credit
institutions was close to 3,500 in 1998, it declined to roughly 2,000 credit institutions
towards the end of 2007. The number of savings banks declined from 595 to 438, the
number of Landesbanken from 13 to 10. With 451 institutions in total, public banks had a
share of about 25 percent in the total number of banks in Germany at the time. In terms
of total size measured as the balance sheet sum of the sector, the German banking sector
grew from roughly 4,500 billion Euro to close to 8,000 billion Euro. Public banks make up
for roughly one third of the overall size of the German banking sector as Figure D1 shows.
In international comparison, the German banking sector is one of the least concentrated
markets in Europe and characterized by a high level of competition and a relatively low
level of profitability (Detzer et al. 2013)
4.2.2 Firm-bank relationships in Germany
Most German firms depend on access to external finance provided by banks. According to
evidence from the EU-EFIGE Bruegel-Unicredit data set, 89 percent of participating Ger-
man firms state that firms depend on external finance in their industry sector as indicated
in Figure 4.1.
1See Körner and Schnabel (2013) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between Landesbanken
and savings banks.
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Figure 4.1: Dependency on external finance among German firms
Notes: Categorical survey question on the dependency of firms on external finance in the respective
industry sector of the firm with 1: not dependent at all, 5: very dependent. Distribution of answers
plotted for participating firms from Germany. The bar graph shows that only 10.7 percent of firms state
that firms in their industry sector do not depend on external finance. Source:
EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-Unicredit Dataset, 2012. Data available upon request.
External finance can be obtained from various sources. Hainz and Wiegand (2013) show
that bank credit is the main source of external finance for firms in Germany. For their
sample of firms, they find that 73 percent of firms use bank credit. Alternative sources
such as capital market financing or inter-company loans are less frequently used. The ifo
Investment survey focuses on firms from the manufacturing sector. Figure 4.2 shows that
public bank credit does play a substantial role for the manufacturing sector, with the total
lending volume varying between 53 and 67 billion Euros.
4.2.3 The guarantor liability and the maintenance obligation
The public mandate of public banks from the days of the emergence of the German bank-
ing sector explained the existence of explicit state guarantees in the form of two legal
institutions, the guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) and a maintenance obligation
(Anstaltslast). The maintenance obligation defines the obligations of the owner of the bank
(the federal states or municipalities) to enable the bank to fulfill its functions. This im-
plicitly defined a bail-out guarantee for public banks in times of financial turmoils (Körner
and Schnabel, 2013). If the owners of the bank decided to dissolve a bank, the guarantor
liability became effective. The guarantor liability stated that in the event of a resolution of
a savings bank (Landesbank), the municipalities (federal states) are directly liable to the
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Figure 4.2: Lending to manufacturing firms by bank type
Notes: The dashed line shows total lending volume to the manufacturing sector by all banks in billion
Euro. The solid line shows public bank lending to the manufacturing sector. Data Source: Time series
data base of the Deutsche Bundesbank: https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_
series_databases/time_series_databases.html?https=1 (last access 20/07/2018).
creditors of the banks. Taken together, both mechanisms guaranteed creditors of public
banks a default risk of basically zero. As Körner and Schnabel (2013) point out, the only
hypothetical event, that would imply losses for the creditors of public banks was the default
of an owner of a public bank. It would therefore require a municipality or federal state to
default on its debt.
While the structure of the interplay between savings banks and Landesbanken is still
largely preserved from the emerging days of the banks, the public banks’ focus on the public
mandate got blurred. Landesbanken got increasingly engaged in international wholesale
activities and their investment portfolios did not show significant differences from those of
large private banks. At the same time, the public guarantee guaranteed led to public banks
having a zero default risk. This secured them high ratings from the main rating agencies
and therefore very favorable refinancing conditions. Among the 27 financial institutions
with a "triple-A" ranking in the European Union in 2000 were 22 German public banks
(Die Welt, 2000). Therefore, it was plausible, that the legal institutions of the guarantor
liability and maintenance obligation led to an unfair competitive advantage of public banks
in the banking sector. Considering this likely breach of European competition law, non-
public banks demanded to abolish the special treatment pf public banks to level the playing
field in the banking sector.
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4.2.4 Timing of events
A formal complaint of the European Banking Federation was filed at the European Com-
mission in 1999. In the complaint, the formal argument brought forward was, that the
guarantor liability constitutes a form of illegal state aid and is therefore in breach of the
EC Treaty. News reports and articles from the late 1990s show, that there was already a
public debate going on at this early stage (see for example: Der Spiegel, 1997; Die Welt,
2000). Yet, at this point it was far from certain that the removal of the guarantee would
be pushed through as several German politicians took sides with the public banks (Der
Spiegel, 1997).
After intense negotiations in Brussels, an accord was reached on July 17, 2001. The
so-called Brussels Agreement determined the abolishment of the guarantor liability (and a
de facto abolishment of the maintenance obligation) after a transition period of four years.
The grandfathering clause in the Brussels Agreement stated that public banks’ debt already
existing in 2001 would continue to be covered by the guarantor liability. Newly created li-
abilities, which are issued before the end of the transition period on 18 July 2005, are to
be covered if they mature before 1 January 2016. Any other kind of liabilities not covered
by these two exceptions is not protected by the government guarantee anymore (Moser et
al., 2002).
4.3 Hypotheses
A firm’s perceived financing situation depends on the interest rate it pays on its loans and
how easy access to credit is. This, in turn, is determined by the banks’ lending decisions.
Therefore, we argue in a first step how the removal of the guarantor’s liability is likely to
have influenced the interest rates public banks pay for refinancing and their risk taking.
This in turn influences loan rates and access to credit. We assume that the managers of
public banks have an objective function that consists of the bank’s current and future prof-
its, i.e. its franchise value. The announcement that guarantees will be removed reduces
the franchise value and increases risk taking incentives (Keeley, 1990). As the franchise
value decreases with the announcement of the removal, the risk taking incentive increases
immediately with the announcement in July 2001. The risk-taking can be contained by the
banks’ creditors and owners. Creditors will exert market discipline only after 2005 when
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their investment is no longer protected by the public guarantee. The governments as owners
and guarantors should monitor the bank’s risk taking at least until 2005 because they are
liable for all liabilities issued until the end of the transition period. However, governments
need to be aware that the risk taking incentives of bank managers increase already in 2001
without being contained by market discipline. This means that the governments need to
adjust their monitoring so as to counteract the bank management’s increased risk taking
incentives.
Based on these arguments we can derive the testable hypothesis. Between 2001 and
2005 the lending rates do not change for firms. However, the risk taking incentives of the
bank management increase, but can be contained by governments if they adjust their mon-
itoring. For the firms this implies that the lending policy of public banks either does not
change or they are more willing to take risk, rendering access to credit easier. The following
hypothesis summarizes the effects.
Hypothesis 1: Public bank firms do not perceive their financing situation as worse
after 2001.
After 2005 the public banks face higher refinancing costs and as a result should increase
their lending rates. Risk taking incentive are higher than in the period before 2001. How-
ever, in 2005 the creditors of public banks should start exerting market discipline. For the
public bank firms this means that they have to pay higher interest rates on loans render-
ing the perception of the financial situation more difficult. The effect on access to credit
depends on whether market discipline can counteract the higher risk taking incentives of
the bank manager. This means that access either does not change or be-comes easier. In
the latter case, the financing situation of the firm is affected by two opposing effects which
leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Public bank firms do not perceive their financing situation as better
after 2005.
Interestingly the empirical literature on the changes of the public banks’ behavior does
support only some of our predictions and its results are sometimes contradictory. For
the Landesbanken, Fischer et al. (2014) show that they demand lower interest rates and
increase risk taking after 2001. For the savings banks, Körner and Schnabel (2013) provide
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evidence that their refinancing rates increase after 2001 and that there is a further increase
after 2005. With respect to the interest margin a decrease after 2001 is found that can be
compensated after 2005. Körner and Schnabel (2013) derive the result by using cooperative
banks as control group but note that due to a structural break in the time series data on
cooperative bank reliability of results might be limited. Gropp et al. (2014) compare savings
banks’ lending through time-series variation and find an increase in interest rate spreads
and a decrease in loan size. The latter decrease is also found when comparing lending by
savings banks in a difference-in-differences analysis with lending by other German banks,
including cooperative banks. Whereas Körner and Schnabel (2013) argue that the increase
in refinancing rate is transmitted to savings banks by their Landesbank, Gropp et al. (2014)
find that savings banks had to pay higher interest rates on their bonds after 2001.
4.4 Data and descriptives
The final sample includes 28,619 observations from 4,404 firms for the period 1998 to 2007.
This gives an average of 6.5 observations per firm. Our dataset is therefore an unbalanced
panel data set. The removal of the guarantor liability was decided upon in 2001 and
enacted by the end of 2005. For the two groups of firms, roughly 30 percent of the total
observations stems from the period before the policy change (1998-2000) and 70 percent
from the period 2001-2007. Table 4.1 shows the number of firms and observations in the
two groups. Non-public bank firms comprise all firms that were not affiliated with any
public bank (Landesbank and/or savings bank) in the year 2000. Public bank firms are
firms, that reported at least one public bank among their bank connections. In total, our
sample contains 4,404 firms, of which 58.8 percent are public-bank firms and 41.2 percent
belong to the non-public bank group, that is not affected by the removal of the guarantee.
The firms in our sample have participated in the ifo Investment Survey for 26 years, on
average. The legal form of firms in the sample is representative for the German private
sector with most firms being organized in a legal form with limited liability (GmbH). Our
data set allows us to track the bank connections of individual firms across three points
in time: 2000, 2006 and 2010, which lies outside our main period of interest but gives an
indication whether further bank switches happened after 2006. No data on bank connections
could be obtained for the years prior to 2000. We therefore assume, that bank connections
of firms were constant in the period 1998 to 2000. Research on bank-firm relationships has
shown that the majority of firms in Germany maintains rather long-term relationship with
its banks and annual switches are unlikely to occur. For example, participating German
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firms in the EU-EFIGE Bruegel Dataset were asked for how many years the current main
bank has been their main bank before: the mean answer was 22.7 years, with a median value
of 17 years (EU-EFIGE, 2012). We are therefore confident that although we cannot observe
bank-connections of firms at the starting year of our sample in 1998, bank connections in
2000 provide an accurate picture of the situation before the removal of the guarantee.
Table 4.1: Public bank firms and private bank firms in the sample
Group No. of firms Share No. of obs. Observations/firm
Non-public bank firms 1,815 41.2 % 11,958 6.59
Public bank firms 2,589 58.8 % 16,661 6.44
Total 4,404 100 % 28,619 6.5
Notes: Groups defined based on bank connection data for the year 2000. Share indicates the share of
firms in total firms by group. The last column reports the average number of observations by firm by
group.
As previously indicated, we also have information on the bank connections on the firms
in our sample for the year 2006, the year after the end of the transition period. Comparing
the information allows us to identify firms that switched groups over time. Table 4.2 shows
developments in the data between 2000 and 2006. As we can see in part B of the table, the
average number of banks that firms report changed over time. For the public bank firms,
it decreased from 1.97 to 1.45, for the public bank firms, it increased from 3.01 to 3.19. In
our empirical analysis, we will include a control variable to pick up this differences in the
number of banks across groups.
Part C of Table 4.2 shows the switchers that we can identify, because we have infor-
mation on the bank connections of those firms in both years. As we can see, from 2000
to 2006 there was a net flow towards public banks. More firms switched from private to
public banks (or took up an additional public bank connection) than the other way around.
This hints at the fact that public banks actually used the four-year grandfathering period
to attract corporate customers. We will account for this by reporting results in two speci-
fications, including all firms and using a sample that excludes all switchers. The results for
the regressions on the sample that excludes group switching firms will be reported in the
Section discussing robustness tests.
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Table 4.2: Changes in bank connections over time
A: Number of firms Non-public bank firms Public bank firms
...in 2000 1,815 2,589
...in 2006 1,691 2,713
B: Number of banks
...in 2000 1.97 3.01
...in 2006 1.45 3.19
C: Switchers 2000 to 2006 2006 to 2010
...private to public 371 171
...public to private 254 203
D: Non-Switchers 3,718 3,291
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics on the firms in the two groups from the ifo in-
vestment survey. Additional summary statistics on balance-sheet variables obtained from
the BvD Amadeus database can be found in the Appendix in Table 4.A. Table 4.3 shows
that non-public bank firms are larger in terms of total employees and revenue, on average.
The mean number of employees in the public bank group of firms is 567, while it is 748 in
the non-public bank group. Public bank firms are older with an average age of 65.61 years.
The difference in age between the two groups is around 16 years. Non-public bank firms
invest more in absolute terms but when accounting for the differences in firm size, both
groups show a mean of similar magnitude.
The survey question on the perceived financing situation (Financing_perception) is
our main dependent variable in the empirical analysis. Answers to this question are scaled
from 1 to 5. An answer of 1 represents the financing situation being perceived as strongly
animating while an answer of 5 represents a strong negative influence. Figure D4 in the
Appendix shows the exact wording and graphical presentation of the question in the ques-
tionnaire. Across all years in the sample, public bank firms are more optimistic regarding
their financing situation with a mean value of 3.05 compared to 3.13 of non-public bank
firms as Table 4.3 indicates. The variables policy, return and sales perception are survey
questions using the same scale from 1 to 5 as the question on the financing perception with
higher values indicating worse perceptions. Both groups show very similar means regarding
their perceptions of the sales situation this year. Non-public bank firms are, on average, a
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bit more optimistic with regard to returns and perceptions of the general economic policy
situation. An interesting number from the summary statistics on balance-sheet variables
is the share of bank debt in total debt. Public bank firms have a bank debt share of 39
percent on average, non-public bank firms show a slightly lower value of 35 percent, on av-
erage. This shows that firms in both groups depend on external finance provided by banks
and that their dependency is of similar magnitude, on average. Table D6 in the Appendix
summarizes changes in investment, employment and bank debt for the two groups as well
as the whole sample. Table D6 differentiates three periods: before the change (1998-2000),
during the transition period (2001-2005) and after the change (2006-2007). We see that
there are basically no changes with regard to employment in the two groups and only a
slight reduction from the share of bank debt in total debt for the group of public bank firms
in the after-change period. From the descriptive statistics, there is no evidence with regard
to a negative trend in terms of total investment.
4.5 Empirical strategy
We employ a difference-in-differences analysis to identify the effect of the removal of the
guarantor liability on the perceived financing situation. We also check for effects regarding
total investment and employment. The group of public bank firms comprises firms that are
affiliated with at least one public bank (savings bank and/or Landesbank) in 2000. Our
non-public bank group contains firms that are solely affiliated with non-public banks in
the year 2000. We differentiate the time period before the removal (before 2001 and 2005
respectively) and after the removal. The removal of the guarantor liability offers a natural
setting for a difference-in-differences analysis as the group of public bank firms is exposed
to the policy change in the after-removal period while the group of non-public bank firms is
not. Regarding the period before the removal, the two groups are not exposed to differing
shocks or policy changes that could influence their perception of the financing situation.
In order for a difference-in-differences estimation to identify the average effect of the re-
moval of the guarantor liability on firms being customers of public banks, several statistical
assumptions have to be met. The common trend assumption is of central importance: In
the absence of treatment, firms in the treatment and control group are assumed to follow a
parallel trend. We check for a parallel pretend between the two groups of firms comparing
the mean answers of our main survey question of interest on the influence of the financing
situation on investment activities this year. It should be kept in mind, that firms answer
this question on a scale from 1 to 5 with the answer categories having the following meaning:
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics by group and for the full sample
Mean Std. Deviation Obs.
Full sample
total revenue 200.17 1833.82 15,987
total investment 8.14 80.33 16,937
employees 641 4664 17,256
firm age (in 2007) 58.65 60.40 15,752
financing perception 3.08 0.88 13,137
policy perception 3.39 0.93 11,127
return perception 2.87 1.24 10,189
sales perception 2.78 1.28 10,305
Public bank firms
total revenue 170.07 1979.68 9,686
total investment 6.94 87.75 9,922
employees 567.40 5305.01 10,228
firm age (in 2007) 65.61 63.67 9,011
financing perception 3.05 0.89 7,962
policy perception 3.41 0.94 7,053
return perception 2.88 1.26 6,764
sales perception 2.78 1.29 6,855
Non – public bank firms
total revenue 246.44 1582.65 6,301
total investment 9.85 68.44 7,015
employees 748.11 3527.32 7,028
firm age (in 2007) 49.35 54.37 6,741
financing perception 3.13 0.87 5,175
policy perception 3.35 0.89 4,074
return perception 2.84 1.22 3,425
sales perception 2.77 1.25 3,450
Notes: Due to restrictive data policies for EBDC survey data obtained from the ifo Institute, it is not
possible to report minimum and maximum values or percentiles on the respective variables.
1: strong inducement, 2: slight inducement, 3: no influence, 4: slight negative influence,
5: strong negative influence. Figure D3 in the Appendix indicates a stable parallel trend
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for most years in the sample.2 The parallel trend ends after 2005. As previously indicated,
2005 is the main year of interest, as the Brussels accord did not lead to immediate changes
due to the agreed grandfathering period. The importance of the end of the transition period
has also been recognized in the paper by Körner and Schnabel (2014), who use the same
event for identification of effects on bank risk-taking. We do report regression results for
both points in time, 2001 and 2005. In the discussion section, we furthermore check for
effects around the time of the filing of the complaint in 1999.
Employing a difference-in-differences analysis, our main specification for the perceived fi-
nancing situation is of the following form:
Financing_perceptioni,t = α+β_publicbanki+γ_timet+δ_interactioni,t+ψXi,t+φt+εi,t (4.1)
The perception of the financing situation of firm i in year t is explained by a set of factors.
Firstly, publicbank is the dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm reports a bank
connection to a public bank in 2000 and zero otherwise. time is the dummy that splits our sample
into a pre- and post-change period, using either the year 2001 or 2005. interaction is the interac-
tion term between publicbank and time and takes the value of one if the observations stems from
a public bank firm in the post-change period.3 The coefficient δ is therefore our main coefficient of
interest: it indicates whether there is an additional effect from belonging to the public bank group
in the post-change period on the perceived financing situation of firm i. We also include a varying
set of control variables of interest, among others to see whether the number of banks the firm is
affiliated with or the level of bank competition in the firm’s postal code makes a difference. We
also include fixed effects at the industry and federal state level to account for potential differences
in the effects across industries and/or federal states. We will discuss the included controls in the
results section.
We run the regressions using different specifications of the model. In a first step, we estimate
the model using the OLS estimator. We then apply a panel data estimation strategy by using a fixed
effects estimator. Pischke (2005) suggests the inclusion of fixed effects in difference-in-differences
settings when the treatment was not randomly assigned. In our case, firms are free to choose their
bank connections. It might be the case, that based on some (unobserved) firm characteristics, some
2The parallel trend is broken for one year in the sample, the year 2000. When checking other variables
of the survey, we see stable parallel trends with exception for the same year as well. One potential reason
could be that the composition of firms in the non-public bank group for that year was different for some
reason.
3When reporting the results, we differentiate between time_2001 and time_2005 as well as interac-
tion_2001 and interaction_2005 to avoid confusion on the applied pre- and post-change period.
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firms might be more likely to be treated, meaning choosing a public bank. Körner and Schnabel
(2013) also use a fixed effects estimator in their analysis of effects of the removal of the guarantee
on bank risk-taking. Especially given that the parallel trend assumption is not fulfilled in one year
of our covered period, we add robustness to obtained results by replicating them with the more re-
strictive fixed effects model. We therefore report estimation results obtained from both, the pooled
OLS and fixed-effects estimations.
4.6 Results
In this section we report the regression results for our main dependent variables of interest: the
perceived financing situation of firms. Furthermore, we check for effects on total investment and
employment. We report both, results from pooled OLS and firm fixed effects estimations. We will
first report results on the effect on the perceived financing situation from the announcement of the
removal of the public guarantee in 2001 and the actual removal in 2005. This will be followed by a
presentation of results with regard to total investment of employment. In the robustness section,
we rerun the main specifications while excluding firms that switched groups during the transition
period. Furthermore, we take a closer look at the exact timing of events by checking for a potential
effect of the public discussions towards the end of the 1990s as well as for an effect when including
both relevant points in time 2001 and 2005, in the regressions.
4.6.1 Effects on the perceived financing situation
Table 4.4 shows the estimation results for the pooled OLS and firm fixed effects regressions on the
perceived financing situation of firms for 2001. Columns (1),(3), (5) and (6) report results from
pooled OLS specifications, columns (2) and (4) report results from the fixed effects estimations.
Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Dummies at the industry and federal state level
are included in all pooled OLS estimations. They are not included in the fixed effects estimations,
as characteristics such as the industry classification and location of the firm are time invariant and
would therefore be dropped in the estimations. Our main coefficient of interest is the interaction
term, as it captures the effect for the removal of the public guarantee on firms being customers
of savings banks and/or Landesbanken. The coefficient on the interaction term is statistically in-
significant in all six specifications. This is in line with our first hypothesis, that the announcement
of the removal of the public guarantee is likely to not have any effect on public bank firms due to
the agreed transition period.
Next, we test whether our second hypothesis holds. We check for an effect of the actual
removal of the public guarantee that set in with the end of the transition period in 2005. Table
4.5 summarizes results of the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations now using a time dummy
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that is one if the observations is from the years 2006 or 2007 and zero otherwise. The interaction
term between the time dummy and the dummy indicating whether the firm is indicated with a
public bank now shows a significant coefficient in columns (3) to (6). Given the scaling of the
question from 1 (strongly inducing) to 5 (strong negative influence) a positive value means, that
there is a negative effect of the removal of the public guarantee on the perceived financing situation
for public bank firms. Also the fixed-effects estimation in column (4) results in a positive and
significant coefficient for the interaction term, yet here the coefficient is a bit smaller in magnitude.
Columns (5) and (6) show that the negative effect of the removal is less pronounced, the more
banks the firm is affiliated with. Firstly, it is likely that firms with more banks are larger in size
and therefore less likely to be credit restricted. Secondly, for firms with multiple bank connections,
it might be easier to substitute away from a bank that restricts its loan supply.4 show that the
negative effect is less pronounced in areas with a higher level of bank competition, measured in
the number of banks in the zip code of the firm. Coefficients of sales and revenue expectations
are significant and positive. Like our dependent variable, sales and revenue expectations are scaled
from 1 to 5 with higher values indicating worse expectations. Firms that are pessimistic about
their business performance are also less optimistic about their financing situation, which reflects
that firms are aware that banks might classify them as risky borrowers.
4.6.2 Effects on total investment and employment
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show results for an effect on total investment and employment. The coefficients
of the interaction terms are insignificant in all specifications. The lack of an effect with regard to
total investment and employment could be due to several reasons: Firstly, the period covered in
our data set is relatively short. The transition period ended in 2005, which leaves only two years of
data after the effective removal of the government guarantee. However, among others Acharya et al.
(2018) have shown, that restrictions in the access to external financing lead to negative effects on
investment and employment in the short run (within two years after the experienced credit crunch).
From the descriptive statistics in Table D6, there was already indicatory evidence that no changes
occurred with regard to employment across the firms in our sample. Also, no negative trend in
terms of total investment occurred. Therefore, the main explanatory factor for the lack of real ef-
fects of the removal at the firm level might be the particular setting of the removal of the guarantee.
We will discuss this as well as incentive effects of the generous transition period more in section 4.6.3.
4At this point, it should be recalled that it is sufficient to be affiliated with one public bank in order to
be classified into the public banks group. Public bank firms might therefore also be affiliated with private
banks or cooperative banks. This is more likely, the larger the number of stated bank connections of the
firm is.
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Table 4.4: Estimation results on the perceived financing situation in 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS OLS
time_2001 0.172∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0398) (0.0394) (0.0388) (0.0445) (0.0446)
publicbank -0.0678∗ 0 -0.0926∗∗∗ 0 -0.0887∗∗ -0.0885∗∗
(0.0351) (.) (0.0339) (.) (0.0392) (0.0397)
interaction_2001 0.0203 0.0270 0.0580 0.0598 0.0593 0.0593
(0.0379) (0.0371) (0.0376) (0.0374) (0.0427) (0.0427)
employees 0.0000255 0.0000192 0.0000179 0.0000188
(0.0000255) (0.0000135) (0.0000500) (0.0000510)
revenue_percept. 0.209∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0120) (0.0146) (0.0144)
sales_percept. 0.0862∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.0984∗∗∗ 0.0991∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0129)
total_revenue -1.38e-08 -2.05e-08∗∗ -0.000000122 -0.000000117
(4.41e-08) (9.19e-09) (0.000000168) (0.000000170)
total_investment -0.000000917 -0.000000305∗ 0.00000260 0.00000237
(0.00000207) (0.000000182) (0.00000243) (0.00000247)
number_of_banks -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗
(0.00975) (0.0102)
banks_zipcode -0.00245 -0.00326∗
(0.00164) (0.00166)
_cons 3.021∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.080∗∗∗ 2.108∗∗∗ 2.178∗∗∗ 2.195∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.0216) (0.111) (0.0373) (0.118) (0.123)
LB Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
N 12,167 13,137 8,944 9,825 7,277 7,277
R2 0.054 0.039 0.208 0.176 0.223 0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6.3 Robustness and discussion
Firstly, Table4.8 reports results for the sample of firms that did not switch group during the
transition period. Secondly, Table 4.6.3 checks for a joint effect of the announcement of the removal
in 2001 and the actual removal in 2005, following the specification of Körner and Schnabel (2013).
Furthermore, we check for a potential effect at the time the official complaint was filed in 1999 in
Table 4.6.3. Lastly, we discuss induced behavioral changes among public banks during the transition
period and assess the external validity of results obtained.
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Table 4.5: Estimation results on the perceived financing situation in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS OLS
time_2005 0.142∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0419) (0.0414) (0.0467) (0.0468)
publicbank -0.0681∗∗ 0 -0.0758∗∗∗ 0 -0.0748∗∗ -0.0748∗∗
(0.0292) (.) (0.0275) (.) (0.0316) (0.0320)
interaction_2005 0.0655 0.0371 0.0930∗∗ 0.0668∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.111∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0395) (0.0403) (0.0396) (0.0446) (0.0446)
employees 0.0000256 0.0000204 0.0000192 0.0000200
(0.0000254) (0.0000136) (0.0000497) (0.0000507)
revenue_percept. 0.209∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0120) (0.0146) (0.0145)
sales_percept. 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0986∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0130) (0.0129)
total_revenue -1.33e-08 -2.09e-08∗∗ -0.000000123 -0.000000118
(4.41e-08) (9.30e-09) (0.000000168) (0.000000170)
total_investment -0.000000906 -0.000000319∗ 0.00000253 0.00000230
(0.00000207) (0.000000182) (0.00000243) (0.00000247)
number_of_banks -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗
(0.00975) (0.0102)
banks_zipcode -0.00249 -0.00330∗∗
(0.00164) (0.00166)
_cons 3.020∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.065∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.0216) (0.111) (0.0374) (0.118) (0.122)
LB Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
N 12,167 13,137 8,944 9,825 7,277 7,277
R2 0.054 0.039 0.208 0.176 0.223 0.225
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Excluding switchers
As described in Table 4.2 in the Data section, there are some firms in the sample that switched
groups during the transition period. To make sure that our results are not driven by those firms, we
run the main regressions using a sample that excludes the switching firms. Table 4.8 reports results
from pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations for the perceived financing situation on the sample
of firms, that did not switch groups during the transition period. Once we include the previously
discussed firm level controls, pooled OLS regressions show a positive and statistically significant
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Table 4.6: Effects on investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
time_2005 -0.0374 0.0289 0.0447 0.103∗
(0.0589) (0.0447) (0.0905) (0.0621)
publicbank -0.211∗∗ 0 -0.154∗ 0
(0.0850) (.) (0.0899) (.)
interaction_2005 0.0881 0.0160 -0.0589 -0.0393
(0.0598) (0.0441) (0.0813) (0.0588)
_cons 7.333∗∗∗ 6.429∗∗∗ 7.130∗∗∗ 6.706∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.0239) (0.282) (0.149)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO
N 15,097 16,237 7,259 8,933
R2 0.160 0.035 0.484 0.096
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.7: Effects on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
time_2005 -0.0658∗∗ -0.0188 -0.225∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0148) (0.0504) (0.0199)
publicbank -0.126∗∗ 0 -0.0230 0
(0.0603) (.) (0.0657) (.)
interaction_2005 0.0508 -0.0189 -0.0144 0.0130
(0.0323) (0.0139) (0.0474) (0.0178)
_cons 5.135∗∗∗ 4.881∗∗∗ 4.362∗∗∗ 5.635∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.00760) (0.204) (0.255)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO
N 16,074 17,255 7,496 9,199
R2 0.211 0.010 0.516 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
coefficient of the interaction term. It is of similar magnitude than before. However, in the fixed
effects specification, the interaction term does not show a significant coefficient anymore.
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A closer look at the timing of events
Reviewing news paper articles from the late 1990s (see for example Der Spiegel, 1997; Die Welt,
2000) indicates that the potential removal of the public bank guarantee was a publicly discussed
topic at that time. However, given that German politicians supported the stand of the public
banking lobby at the time, it is questionable whether the removal was perceived to be a likely
event to occur and induced any measurable changes at the firm level. Nevertheless, we check for
an effect around the time the official complaint was handed in in 1999. To check for an effect in
1999, we split the sample into a period before 1999 and after 1999, indicated by the time dummy
(time_1999). The interaction term is the interaction between the public bank dummy, defined as
before, and the time_1999 dummy. Once firm level controls are included, the coefficient of the
interaction term is insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence for a statistically significant effect
on firms from public discussions during the late 1990s.
Following Körner and Schnabel (2013), we include both decisive dates of the policy change,
2001 and 2005 in the regressions, to see if our obtained results for the actual removal in 2005 still
hold. Table 4.6.3 summarizes the results. As before, the coefficient of the interaction term for 2001
(interaction_2001) is insignificant in all specifications. The coefficient of the interaction term for
2005 (interaction_2005) is significant at the 10 percent level once firm controls are included. It is of
very similar magnitude than before and therefore confirms our results of a perceived deterioration
in the financing situation of public bank firms in 2005.
Induced behavioral changes
The transition period is likely to have induced behavioral changes among public banks, especially
the Landesbanken. Anticipating potential rating downgrades after 18 July 2005 and a subsequent
increase in funding costs, Landesbanken used the transition period to issue substantial amounts of
bonds. Fischer et al. (2014) show that the volume of unsecured bond issuances increased markedly
from around 3 billion in 1998 to 95 billion in the first half of 2005. For example, the Bavarian Lan-
desbank Bayern LB increased its issuance behavior by a factor of 14 compared with the value in the
year 1999. These behavioral changes during the transition period are likely to influence our results.
The transition period prevented a shock in funding costs for public banks after its announcement
in 2001. During the transition period, public banks are likely to even have expanded their credit
supply due to the large amount of liquidity they took up during the four years between 2001 and
2005. It is likely that behavioral changes only have occurred among Landesbanken and not among
savings banks, whose business model mainly depends on consumer deposits and does typically not
involve trading activities in financial markets. Nevertheless, it is plausible that also savings banks
profited from the increase in liquidity of the Landesbanken via spillover effects within the public
banking network.
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Table 4.8: Estimation results for the perceived financing situation in 2005 (switchers ex-
cluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS OLS
time_2005 0.163∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0460) (0.0451) (0.0459) (0.0450) (0.0509) (0.0510)
publicbank -0.0602∗ 0 -0.0812∗∗ 0 -0.0779∗∗ -0.0800∗∗
(0.0328) (.) (0.0321) (.) (0.0385) (0.0388)
interaction_2005 0.0561 0.0263 0.101∗∗ 0.0690 0.115∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0438) (0.0448) (0.0438) (0.0491) (0.0491)
employees 0.0000339 0.0000197 0.0000141 0.0000114
(0.0000288) (0.0000144) (0.0000573) (0.0000588)
revenue_percept. 0.210∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0130) (0.0159) (0.0157)
sales_percept. 0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.0999∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0114) (0.0141) (0.0140)
total_revenue -7.00e-09 -2.89e-08∗∗ -0.000000109 -8.91e-08
(4.95e-08) (1.16e-08) (0.000000188) (0.000000191)
total_investment -0.00000160 -0.000000375∗ 0.00000380 0.00000374
(0.00000244) (0.000000224) (0.00000272) (0.00000276)
number_of_banks -0.0279∗∗ -0.0250∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0118)
banks_zipcode -0.00256 -0.00334∗
(0.00174) (0.00177)
_cons 3.055∗∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗ 2.173∗∗∗ 2.193∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.0238) (0.128) (0.0406) (0.132) (0.137)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
N 10,342 11,131 7,608 8,321 6,298 6,298
R2 0.053 0.037 0.209 0.182 0.225 0.227
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
These developments do not contradict our obtained results with regard to the survey question
on the perceived financing situation. The lack of an effect on the perceived financing situation in
2001 shows, that firms were aware of the existence of the transition period, that secured refinancing
conditions for their banks for the next four years. Our results with regard to 2005 show, that firms
did expect to see a deterioration in their financing situation after the end of the transition period.
This hints at the fact that firms were aware of the rating downgrade that happened towards the end
of the transition period and the likely consequences for lending behavior of public banks. In July
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Table 4.9: Checking for an effect in the year 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS OLS
time_1999 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0996∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0422) (0.0456) (0.0420) (0.0527) (0.0527)
publicbank -0.135∗∗∗ 0 -0.113∗∗ 0 -0.114∗ -0.114∗
(0.0522) (.) (0.0519) (.) (0.0587) (0.0592)
interaction_1999 0.0878∗ 0.0909∗ 0.0625 0.0716 0.0689 0.0694
(0.0513) (0.0474) (0.0513) (0.0471) (0.0590) (0.0590)
_cons 3.062∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.092∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.0216) (0.114) (0.0373) (0.122) (0.127)
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
N 12,167 13,137 8,944 9,825 7,277 7,277
R2 0.054 0.039 0.208 0.176 0.223 0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.10: Checking for a joint effect of 2001 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS OLS
time_2001 0.328∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0391) (0.0416) (0.0394) (0.0477) (0.0477)
publicbank -0.0680∗ 0 -0.0927∗∗∗ 0 -0.0890∗∗ -0.0888∗∗
(0.0352) (.) (0.0339) (.) (0.0392) (0.0397)
time_2005 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.0138 0.00310 -0.0306 -0.0298
(0.0420) (0.0399) (0.0426) (0.0399) (0.0476) (0.0476)
interaction_2005 0.0656 0.0287 0.0773∗ 0.0471 0.0974∗ 0.0987∗∗
(0.0441) (0.0423) (0.0445) (0.0425) (0.0497) (0.0497)
interaction_2001 -0.000151 0.0191 0.0327 0.0463 0.0272 0.0268
(0.0414) (0.0397) (0.0414) (0.0400) (0.0472) (0.0473)
_cons 3.020∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.078∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗∗ 2.193∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.0216) (0.111) (0.0373) (0.119) (0.123)
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO YES YES
N 12,167 13,137 8,944 9,825 7,277 7,277
R2 0.054 0.039 0.208 0.176 0.223 0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2004, Fitch Ratings downgraded all Landesbanken by 4 to 7 notches. (Senkarcin, 2016) Given that
most bank-firm loan contracts are medium-to long-term contracts and that the transition period
entailed a clause that also secured all debt of public banks that matured before 1 January 2016,
our sample period is simply too short to capture any negative real effects. However, given that
the financial crisis set in shortly afterwards and that it heavily affected most Landesbanken, an
identification of effects would be difficult, even if our dataset had covered more years after the
removal of the guarantee.
Regarding the external validity of the results obtained from the analysis of the removal of the
guarantor liability and maintenance obligations, a distinction has to be made. We feel confident
that results with regard to the perception of the financing situation of firms are valid for the removal
of public guarantees in the banking sector in other settings, too. However, results with regard to
effects on total investment and employment are likely to be blurred by the transition period, that
is unique to the analyzed case. The policy design of the transition period prevented a shock in
funding costs for banks in 2001, that would have potentially translated into negative real effects at
the firm level. Therefore, we do not find any effects in terms of employment and investment that
might have been found in other settings.
With regard to policy implications from the analysis, the lack of negative real effects at the
firm level does not imply that the policy design of the removal of the public guarantee should
be assessed positively. The incentive effects of the transition period led to severe consequences
that enfolded during the financial crisis from 2008 onward. Senkarcin (2016) discusses the failed
policy design of the removal of the guarantee with regard to bank risk taking in detail. He finds,
that the long transition period of four years caused Landesbanken to take on hazardous strategies.
Next to investing in mortgage derivatives, excess funds were passed on to risky borrowers. Both
Landesbanken and savings banks failed to take the chance to adapt their business model during
the transition period (Senkarcin, 2016). In turn, the subsequent severe problems of public banks
during the financial crisis are likely to have entailed negative real effects on the corporate sector.
However, a quantification of these effects is beyond the scope of our paper.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper assesses firm level effects of the removal of a long-standing government guarantee in
the German banking sector. As only public banks were affected by the removal while non-public
banks remained unaffected by the policy change, the setting allows for a difference-in-differences
analysis. We find that firms being affiliated with public banks perceived a deterioration in their
financing situation after the end of the transition period in 2005, compared to firms being solely
affiliated with non-public banks. We do not find any evidence for effects in terms of employment
and total investment. Regarding the lack of real effects, the particular setting of the removal of the
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guarantor liability and maintenance obligation has to be taken into account. Several lessons can
be drawn from the analysis: the transition period is likely to have prevented a shock in refinancing
costs for public banks (Landesbanken) in 2001. Considering that previous research has shown that
shocks in the banking sector get passed on to the corporate sector (Acharya et al., 2018), it is
possible that there would have been negative effects from the removal of the guarantee on public
bank firms in the absence of the transition period. Overall, evidence from our survey data analysis
shows, that firms are sensible to changes in the banking sector, given that they largely depend on
external finance. Next to the incentive effects of the policy design on bank risk taking, this should
be kept in mind when announcing the removal of public guarantees.
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Appendix
4.A Additional tables
Table D1: Additional information on the data set
Variable Name Description Scale/Unit
ifo Investment Survey
total investment gross fixed capital formation (equipment and buildings) in the
business year x
in Mio. Euro
employees number of employees last year (overall company)
total revenue total revenue (overall company) last year in Mio. Euro
financing situation factors influencing investment activities: influence of financing
situation this year
1 - 5
sales expectations factors influencing investment activities: influence of turnover
situation/expectation this year
1 - 5
return expectations factors influencing investment activities: influence of expected
return this year
1 - 5
policy expectations factors influencing investment activities: influence of economic
policy parameters this year
1 - 5
BvD Amadeus
age computed as 2007 minus year of incorporation of company in years
total assets total assets of the company in 1000 Euro
financial assets financial assets of the company in 1000 Euro
total debt debt in total in 1000 Euro
total equity total equity/shareholders’ funds in 1000 Euro
sales total sales of the company in 1000 Euro
profit loss for period profit/loss for period in 1000 Euro
bank debt ratio computed as debt to financial institutions divided by total
debt
debt ratio computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets
BvD Markus
bank connection name of banks the company is associated to in year x (available
for 2000, 2006 and 2010)
number of bank connections number of different banks the company is associated to in year
x (available for 2000, 2006 and 2010)
number of bank types number of different types of banks the company is associated
to in year x (available for 2000, 2006 and 2010)
Notes: For variables from the ifo Investment survey, monetary values prior to 2002 were reported in DM;
corresponding Euro values were computed using an exchange rate of .... Regarding the number of
employees, the wording of the question does not differentiate between full time/part time employees.
Information on the bank connections of firms is available for three distinct years.
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Table D2: Number of firms by group and year
Year Private bank firms Public bank firms Total
1998 824 1,159 1,983
1999 828 1,166 1,994
2000 840 1,173 2,013
2001 966 1,310 2,276
2002 1,070 1,443 2,513
2003 1,239 1,678 2,917
2004 1,338 1,806 3,144
2005 1,584 2,251 3,835
2006 1,703 2,438 4,141
2007 1,566 2,237 3,803
Table D3: Bank types: Classification of banks in the sample
Bank type code Description
1 Big commercial bank (Deutsche Bank, Com-
merzbank, Postbank, UniCredit, Dresdner
Bank)
2 Regional banks and other commercial banks
3 Savings bank
4 Landesbank
5 Cooperative bank (Volksbank, Raiffeisenbank
and others)
6 Central cooperative bank (DZ Bank, DG Bank,
WGZ Bank)
7 Foreign bank in Germany
8 Bank in a foreign country
9 Others (special purpose banks etc.)
Notes: Banks were classified following the bank categories of Deutsche Bundesbank in their official
Banking statistics. For more information see: https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/
Banks_and_other_financial_institutions/Banks/banks.html (last access 25/06/18)
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Table D4: Information on ifo Industry Classification and Distribution of Firms
ifo Industry Code Description N.P. firms P. firms Total share
210 Manufacture of mining products 3.86 5.76 4.98
222 Drawing plants, cold rolling mills 1.14 1.45 1.32
223 Foundry industry 2.19 2.48 2.36
230 Metal production 1.26 1.04 1.13
250 Chemical industry 6.39 2.88 4.32
260 Wood machining 1.44 3.13 2.43
270 Production of pulp, paper and pa-
perboards
1.22 1.01 1.10
280 Manufacture of rubber 1.02 0.97 0.99
310 Steel and lightweight construction 2.72 2.34 2.50
320 Mechanical Engineering 15.77 12.51 13.85
331 Road vehicle production 4.18 1.87 2.82
340 Electrical engineering 7.78 4.92 6.10
350 Precision engineering, optics 3.02 3.65 3.40
370 Steel deformation 3.13 4.95 4.20
380 Manufacture of EBM equipment 6.19 7.27 6.82
411 Fine ceramics 0.56 1.01 0.83
412 Manufacture of glass 2.32 0.81 1.43
420 Wood processing 3.18 5.66 4.64
430 Manufacture of musical instru-
ments, toys, jewelry, etc
1.50 1.41 1.45
441 Manufacture of paper and paper-
boards
3.12 3.48 3.33
442 Printing, copying 4.47 9.83 7.62
450 Production of plastics goods 4.71 5.58 5.22
462 Leather fabrication, without manu-
facture of shoes
0.76 0.56 0.64
463 Manufacture of shoes 0.70 0.53 0.60
471 Drapery 4.48 3.62 3.97
472 Clothing trade 1.46 1.71 1.61
510 Food industry 7.84 8.06 7.97
- Others 3.59 1.51 2.37
Total 100 100 100
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Table D5: Summary statistics on balance-sheet information
Mean Std. Deviation Obs.
Full sample
total_assets 210803.19 1841717.13 14,494
fixed_assets 117288.53 1179560.93 14,415
total_debt 119476.79 811214.17 9,009
short_term_debt 60414.38 547610.06 14,374
long_term_debt 21250.97 223469.81 14,485
bank_debt 28751.01 187833.91 5,239
sales 364752.32 2541471.83 9,455
financial_profit_loss 4609.19 108748.41 17,556
interest_expenses 4051.68 33963.49 10,387
operating_profit 23019.90 227863.41 12,311
debtratio 0.69 0.40 14,494
bankdebtfraction 0.38 0.26 5,239
Public bank firms
total_assets 165039.28 2000135.30 8,170
fixed_assets 93167.03 1314757.92 8,117
total_debt 95280.57 842738.59 5,013
short_term_debt 48197.01 596936.11 8,109
long_term_debt 13639.99 133075.71 8,166
bank_debt 24893.72 218424.56 3,029
sales 332319.82 2764531.46 5,030
financial_profit_loss 3711.59 122497.76 9,980
interest_expenses 3141.18 33294.72 5,711
operating_profit 14037.88 195935.24 6,794
debtratio 0.71 0.43 8,170
bankdebtfraction 0.39 0.25 3,029
Non – public bank firms
total_assets 269925.76 1612436.25 6,324
fixed_assets 148376.85 977359.02 6,298
total_debt 149831.05 768871.80 3,996
short_term_debt 76227.73 475821.22 6,265
long_term_debt 31086.59 302368.37 6,319
bank_debt 34037.76 134958.62 2,210
sales 401619.09 2261099.84 4,425
financial_profit_loss 5791.62 87388.75 7,576
interest_expenses 5163.71 34734.06 4,676
operating_profit 34080.96 261482.48 5,517
debtratio 0.66 0.39 6,324
bankdebtfraction 0.35 0.27 2,210
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Table D6: Changes in debt, investment and employment over time
Public banks Non-public banks
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
1998 – 2000
bank_debt 0.40 0.27 0.32 0.29
growth_bank_debt -0.04 0.40 -0.12 0.50
growth_investments 0.21 1.00 0.19 0.99
growth_employees 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.13
financing_perception 2.90 0.88 3.00 0.83
2001 – 2005
bank_debt 0.40 0.24 0.35 0.27
growth_bank_debt -0.04 0.38 -0.09 0.42
growth_inv 0.17 1.03 0.18 1.02
growth_empl -0.01 0.12 -0.00 0.12
financing_perception 3.17 0.91 3.25 0.90
2006 – 2007
bank_debt 0.38 0.25 0.36 0.25
growth_bank_debt -0.04 0.44 -0.04 0.45
growth_investments 0.32 1.01 0.26 0.92
growth_employees -0.00 0.12 0.00 0.13
financing_perception 2.98 0.79 2.99 0.78
Table D7: Effects on employment (switchers excluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS FE FE
time_2005 -0.0658∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.0279∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0578) (0.0152) (0.0254)
publicbank -0.126∗∗ -0.0940 0 0
(0.0603) (0.0797) (.) (.)
interaction_2005 0.0508 -0.0192 -0.0202 0.0191
(0.0323) (0.0541) (0.0146) (0.0215)
_cons 5.135∗∗∗ 4.273∗∗∗ 5.801∗∗∗ 5.469∗∗∗
Controls NO YES NO YES
(0.235) (0.209) (0.263) (0.0650)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES NO NO
Federal State FE YES YES NO NO
N 16,074 6,555 16,074 6,555
R2 0.211 0.523 0.056 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.B Additional figures 165
Table D8: Effects on total investment (switchers excluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
time_2005 -0.0890 0.00964 -0.00439 0.0776
(0.0674) (0.0510) (0.103) (0.0649)
publicbank -0.250∗∗ 0 -0.237∗∗ 0
(0.0971) (.) (0.110) (.)
interaction_2005 0.127∗ 0.0281 -0.00476 -0.0221
(0.0669) (0.0493) (0.0919) (0.0619)
_cons 7.347∗∗∗ 6.390∗∗∗ 7.129∗∗∗ 7.037∗∗∗
Controls NO NO YES YES
(0.343) (0.0258) (0.286) (0.0503)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO
Federal State FE YES NO YES NO
N 12,778 13,702 6,288 8,320
R2 0.170 0.034 0.489 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure D1: Developments in the size of the banking sector
Notes: The figure shows the development of the balance sheet sum by bank type in billion Euro. Public
banks comprise Landesbanken and savings banks; commercial banks comprise private banks and branches
of foreign banks in Germany. Source: Time series data base of the Deutsche Bundesbank;
https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/time_series_
databases.html?https=1 (last access 06/07/2018).
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Figure D2: Developments in the number of credit institutions
Notes: Public banks comprise Landesbanken and savings banks; private banks comprise big banks and
regional and other credit banks. The reduction in the total number of banks over the period can largely
be explained by mergers among cooperative banks with the number of credit cooperations falling from
2406 to 1197. The total number of savings banks declined from 595 to 438, the number of Landesbanken
from 13 to 10. Data source:Time series data base of the Deutsche Bundesbank;
https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/time_series_
databases.html?https=1 (last access 06/07/2018).
Figure D3: The influence of the financing situation of firms on investment decisions
Notes: The solid line shows the mean answer of firms in the public bank group by year, the dashed line
shows the mean answers of firms, which are not affiliated with public banks.
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Figure D4: Influencing factors of investment activities: exact phrasing of the questions
Notes: All questions were asked referring to last year, this year and next year: 19WW refers to this year,
19VV refers to next year. ifo differentiates between a western and eastern version of the survey. The
questions were asked annually in the autumn version of the survey for the region west, gaps exist with
regard to data from the region east
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